| Subject: IFE
System It was a gamble but.... it didn't pay off |
|
| Subject: IFE
System It was a gamble but.... it didn't pay off |
|
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 1999 15:37:41 -0500
From: Ader <ader@compuserve.com>
To: frank gomer <gomerf@flyt.com>
CC: tim clark <timothyclark@compuserve.com>, jim bennett <sai@cybercenter.cl>,
edward block <EdwBlock@aol.com>, lyn romano <rosebush2@hotmail.com>,
wireman <wireman@hfx.andara.com>, dan mcglaun <dan@mcglaun.com>, jay miller
<JNiessen@aol.com>,
lois legge <llegge@herald.ns.ca>, geffrey thomas <jade@wantree.com.au>,
david evans <devans@phillips.com>, bob rowland <rwroland@aol.com>,
res gehriger <res.gehriger@sfdrs.srg-ssr.ch>, max lenz <hau-if@datacomm.ch>,
john sampson <sampson@iinet.net.au>, james bergquist <clittle@cari.net>,
| You informed Mr. Res Gehriger on Nov 4, 1998 about the
IFE system. May I quote you here in full: [...quote...] "MY POINT OF VIEW is shown below: IFT was informed by Swissair on 29 October of its decision to deactivate the company's in-flight entertainment system on all Swissair MD-11s and 747s. Swissair told IFT that this precautionary measure was taken in response to recent technical investigations conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and by the Technical Services Division of Swissair. These investigations, which are a normal occurence following an aircraft accident, identified some concerns with the installation of the company's system. However, the company specifically has been told by representatives of the Transport Safety Board of Canada, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, and Swissair that these concerns have not been related, in any way, to the cause of the crash of Swissair Flight 111. In addition, these agencies have advised IFT that there has been no indication that its system malfunctioned or failed during the flight prior to the crash. The system installed on Swissair airplanes met all applicable Federal Aviation Regulations and was certified by the FAA. IFT and its system integrator/installation contractor, Hollingsead International, Inc., intend to work closely with Swissair to address any installation concerns and to take the necessary steps that will allow Swissair to reactivate the system as quickly as possible. Finally, the company will continue to provide on-site engineering support to the investigative team of the Canadian Transportation Safety Board in Halifax. signed: FRANK GOMER, PRESIDENT [...unquote...] As so often messages like this are caught up by time. But let me first quote you the status as per today concerning the [a very important - and may I say now "sensitive" issue?] S.T.C.: [...quote...] "We have been following up the MD-11 under Type Certificate Data Sheet #A22WE and the Supplemental Type Certificate (S.T.C.) #ST 00236LA-D. As you know the S.T.C. covers the installation of Interactive Flight Technologies' entertainment system and Hollingsead International. The S.T.C. is held by Santa Barbara Aerospace, Inc., and was developed by its em-ployee, Glen Mills, who is a designated F.A.A. D.A.S. Coordinator. August 31, 1998 microfiche summary of Supplemental Type Certificates does not list S.T.C. #ST 00236LA-D or any of the three revisions. The parts manufacture approval (P.M.A.) user guide F.A.A. #050-007-00807-4 does not list anyone holding a P.M.A. for the entertainment system. We have filed Freedom of In-formation Act requests and requests with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada regard-ing the S.T.C. Personally, I expect that the responses to our requests and discovery will con-firm that the S.T.C. was not issued prior to the crash." [...unquote...] |
And let me add to this what was in the media:
[...quote...]
Tuesday Jan 12 3:33 PM EST
Wiring installation faulty on Swissair Flight 111
STEPHEN THORNE
HALIFAX (CP) - Sensitive wiring aboard MD-11 jets like the one that crashed
off Nova Scotia on Sept. 2 has been subjected to an unusual amount of
handling and some was improperly installed, The Canadian Press has learned.
A circuit panel where investigators discovered cracked, chafed and cut wire
insulation aboard Swissair Flight 111 and over a dozen other MD-11s was
ordered modified by regulators in 1993, according to documents.
The regulatory directive would have required extensive handling of wires
where the damage was found.
And some electrical wiring was improperly installed last year as part of a
new inflight entertainment system in Swissair’s MD-11s, say experts who
studied photographs of the affected areas aboard several other aircraft.
"Things like that are not allowed at Boeing and I’m sure not at
McDonnell-Douglas either," said Patrick Price, a retired Boeing technician.
"They wouldn’t dare."
Canadian investigators have found evidence of cracks, chafing and
electrical arcing on wires aboard the plane in which 229 people died.
On Monday, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, acting on advice
from its Canadian counterpart, urged immediate inspections of MD-11
aircraft for damaged wiring insulation.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration said action is "on the fast track"
after preliminary checks by crash investigators found insulation damage
around two cockpit breaker panels and above the forward cabin doors aboard
more than a dozen MD-11s they inspected last month.
"The inspection should include examinations for loose wire connections,
inconsistent wire routings, broken bonding wires, small wire bend radii,
and chafed and cracked wire insulation," wrote Jim Hall, U.S. board chairman.
The response by the FAA, aviation’s top regulator, will probably come in
the form of a safety order to airlines known as an airworthiness directive,
Alison Duquette, an agency spokeswoman in Washington, D.C., said Tuesday.
"We’ll respond formally to the board within 90 days, probably sooner.
That’s the protocol."
The general-purpose wiring aboard MD-11s is insulated by controversial
Kapton, or aromatic polyimide tape, while the entertainment systems were
powered by wire wrapped in softer Tefzel.
"The cardinal rule was broken," said Price, who helped design Boeing’s
arc-tracking laboratory outside Seattle. "You don’t mix types of wires."
The U.S. military and the plane’s manufacturer, McDonnell-Douglas, have
found Kapton can wear away softer insulations like sandpaper over the
course of thousands of hours of high-vibration flying.
Price also viewed a videotape of blue wire bundles in an MD-11’s overhead
panel and noted some was doubled over and held in place by white plastic
ties - "glaring errors," he called them.
He noted Kapton can be extremely sensitive to handling, especially as it
ages. The U.S. military has effectively banned the material for that reason.
"Kapton insulation is brittle and can shatter like glass if stressed like
bending over 180 degrees and under vibration from the airplane," Price said
from Tacoma, Wash.
"The cardinal rule at Boeing is that you cannot bend a wire over 90
degrees, period."
Price said it’s also evident installers - the job was subcontracted by
Interactive Flight Technologies of Phoenix - used pliers to bend the wires,
another faux pas. He said it doesn’t matter whether it was Kapton or Tefzel.
"You don’t dare do that with insulation material - you might damage it,"
said Price. "Any time you use pliers to make a bend on wire, that’s a
no-no. I saw a couple of examples of that in routing."
Air Safety Week, a trade journal, published photographs this week of what
it quoted unidentified experts as calling improper installation of inflight
entertainment wiring aboard an MD-11.
"Moreover, the practices in these photos seem to conflict with wiring
guidelines contained in the Air Transport Association’s Specification 117,"
wrote editor David Evans.
The specification says wiring should be "mechanically and electrically
sound and neat in appearance (and) adequately supported throughout its length.
"Wires and wire groups should be protected against chafing or abrasion in
those locations where contact with sharp surfaces or other wires would
damage the insulation."
An electrical engineer who requested anonymity said he has viewed
photographs of MD-11 electrical systems and he’s convinced installation and
handling of wires found by crash investigators are at the root of Flight
111’s demise.
"There are wiring devices and mechanical techniques that have been used to
install this wire that directly contradict well-established, well-developed
practices," said the engineer.
"These practices lead to breaks in the insulation which then have the
possibility of allowing an electrical event to occur."
There is also evidence the areas in question were subjected to work other
than installation of the high-tech entertainment system.
An FAA airworthiness directive dated April 1, 1993, ordered the flight
compartment overhead circuit panel modified "to prevent display units from
going blank, which could lead to momentary loss of flight-critical display
information."
© The Canadian Press, 1999
[...unquote...]
I don't think we need to have any doubts about Pat Price's experience and
we can take it for granted that it is all as rotten as it possibly can be. Your
e-mail to Res Gehriger of November 4, 1998 is far off track, don't you
think?
Regards
Ader
