Swissair SR 111: “smoke in the cockpit”

This serves to introduce Bert Werjefelt who, several years ago, joined our efforts to expose the problems we had seen with the FAA and the NTSB. These problems included altered reports and inaccurate records. Burt is the CEO of VisionSafe Inc. In the early 90s he had invented a device which assisted the pilots and provided a clear path of vision to the critical flight instruments and the outside world when faced with dense continuous smoke in the cockpit. With his product, he applied and met the FAA’s stringent requirements for certification. Instead of open arms, his certificated product was soon bad-mouthed in the industry by the very same FAA. The FAA had realized that such a product undermined the long-held FAA position that dense continuous in-flight events were virtually non existent and had claimed no lives on US domestic carriers. This was untrue and contrary to many official reports produced by Bert that focused chiefly on overseas non-domestic carriers using US certificated equiptment. The non-domestic carrier events clearly demonstrated this problem of the pilots inability to see and was hardly a phenomenon of just these carriers.

Simply, Bert's product was necessitated, in part, by the result of fires from the wire and sound blanket insulation materials that now are seen as far more flammable than previously acknowledged. His early battle with the FAA produced many hundreds of FAA documents which are relevant to the ValuJet 592, TWA 800 and Swissair 111 tragedies which were yet to come. They fill in many blanks of what the FAA knew and when did they know it, but more importantly, they give a clearer picture of the FAA culture and agendas contrary to the FAA's public face and claims of 'Safety Is Number One'.

Attached are two transcripts of Burt's phone calls to, then, FAA Deputy Administrator, Anthony Broderick, and are produced here in an e-mail format. Copies of the original formats and any of the referenced documents here are available.

These transcripts are instructive, informative and shocking to the first time reader. The 12 in-flight examples of 'dense continuous smoke' in the cockpit events given by Burt were aboard overseas carriers. The FAA would have you believe that overseas events on US built and certified equipment is irrelevant to FAA rulemaking; in fact, its illegal for the FAA to ignore them.

In this pre-ValuJet FAA rhetoric heard here, the FAA claims that lack of rulemaking was because "no domestic carrier" had lost a life due to such dense smoke. That is now measured against the loss of flight 592 and, of course, flight 111. The NTSB’s ValuJet 592 Final Report’s exclusive focus on the oxygen canisters as the iniating event is troublesome. That report was loaded with undocumented opinions, conjecture, alteration and deleting of contrary witness reports, omissions of contrary facts, adoption of incomplete data as fact, etc. It appears that ValuJet may have been a horrific rebuttal to the FAA’s long standing denials to the dangers of in-flight ‘dense continuous smoke’ problems and compounded all the more by the now understood FAA’s long-standing awareness to wire and acoustical sound proofing insulation flammability troubles.

We now know that the FAA's limited 60 degree wire flammability test saw some samples exceed the FAA's own standards for smoke production. Unfortunately, aircraft wire bundles also run straight up and down (90 degrees) and, of course, a fire travels that way much more quickly. (See Cahill’s report DOT/FAA/CT-89/29).

In these transcripts, the FAA claimed then, and claims now, that they had ‘no reports' as their rationale for lack of FAA actions to the dangers of in-flight fires. That claimed lack of reports became the reasons for the lack of rulemaking to provide the means to survive such 'dense continuous smoke' events where the pilots cannot see vital instruments, cannot see out their windows and are essentially blind. Claims of 'no records' are now measured against the increasing numbers of just such events ‘found’ since flight 111. Contrary to that, 264 such events were testified to by FAA's McSweeny in that November, 1993, Senate Aviation hearing as the FAA then sought to downplay Burt's testimony to the need for the FAA to follow its own rulemaking to provide actions that pilots could not be so blinded.

Burt addressed but a few of the possible ignition sources then, the FAA offered none. We now know that the FAA's 'Bunsen burner test' is "unreliable" compared to the industry sought ‘swab test’ and that many types of insulation blankets found throughout the world’s fleet are far more flammable than previously thought. (See Cahill’s report #DOT/FAA/AR-97/58). In this report, alone, five on-the-ground aircraft fires are catalogued. Had they been in-flight fires, injuries and deaths would have occurred. Although important enough to find their way into this report, but in a continuing pattern of hiding such serious events, none of these events can be found in the usual FAA/NTSB Internet database.

We now know of that latter Tech Center report, plus Cahill's two other reports (DOT/FAA/CT-88/4 and DOT/FAA/CT-TN94/55). These reports described the hazards; of wire insulations, resetting of circuit breakers, inability of circuit breakers to protect except against against Direct Shorts, and the clear definition that this is an"Electrical" problem (versus a "Mechanical") weren't included in her Tech Center Database Library Catalog until our complaint early this year. Again, even though important enough to find their way into this report, none of the three illustrative in-flight fires in the 95 report can be found in the usual FAA/NTSB internet database.

We now know of the twisted trail of FAA’s FOIA responses that finally produced those three reports. Various FAA Regionals (including the originating Regional) either denied or claimed ignorance of one or more of the other associated reports.

Now, hundreds of such events have been found and the accuracy of these databases has become an issue. Administrator Garvey has also noted the incompleteness of these databases and their diminished value to identify the scope of these in-flight events. In the transcripts here, and in recent times now, the FAA still continues to point to their own databases as evidence to trivialize the scope of these ‘smoke in the cockpit’ problems. Worst yet, you find no wording or attention to the wire and sound (acoustical) insulation flammability testing troubles. (See DOT/FAA/AR-97/58, "Evaluation of Fire Test Methods for Aircraft Thermal Acoustical Insulation" by D. Blake).

By no means last, it appears the omissions of data to these flammability problems is certainly a pattern. At this point, the FAA’s claims to issuing a ‘Handbook Bulletin’ drawing attention to wire bundle fires involving lint and debris also cannot be found amongst 440 other such ‘Bulletins’. This Bulletin drew attention to unexplained wire bundle fires but made no connection to the three Cahill reports describing the electrical iniating event.

There’s more, but for now lets step back to 1992/3 and listen to what the FAA had to say. The 1993 transcript is presented first because it offers extensive background narrative. Second, the 1992 transcript demonstrates the FAA’s inconsistency and patterns of denials. Lastly, for those of you who have never seen it, my list of almost three dozen such in-flight emergencies taken from the very limited databases. The sources are noted. These comprise but 11% of the lowest number of 264 testified to by FAA in that 1993 Senate Hearing. More recent disclosures range far higher.

TRANSCRIPT OF PHONE CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY FAA ADMINISTRATOR ANTHONY BRODERICK CONCERNING HIS OBSTRUCTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRITICAL AVIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS. JANUARY 26, 1993, pg 5,11, 12, &13

The following is a transcript of one of many recorded conversations between Bert Werjefelt, President of Vision Safe Corp, Hawaii and FAA officials. In order to put the conversation in perspective, included herewith is some brief background information (pages 1- 4) and also some explanatory commentary in the course of the conversation (by Werjefelt).

SUMMARY: The FAA attitude shown below prevails today in spite of explicit and well known legal requirements to eliminate "unsafe conditions" and full knowledge of numerous accidents and serious incidents of unsafe conditions relating to loss of pilot vision because of "hazardous quantities" of "continuous" smoke in the cockpit, where many hundreds of lives have been lost. Boeing has told the Wall Street Journal, that they alone have lost seven jets where smoke in the cockpit was a suspected cause. In clear defiance of the law, Anthony Broderick, the Deputy FAA Administrator, makes it shockingly clear in the following conversation that he does not intend to enforce the existing safety regulations to eliminate this unsafe condition until after! there has been another smoke accident – with a US airline. Our information about Mr. Broderick is made public because we consider Mr. Broderick’s actions on the unsafe conditions relating to smoke in the cockpit a shocking abuse of the public trust and in clear violation of his duties under the Federal Aviation Act. We are not the only ones with complaints about Mr. Broderick. It is now well known that Mr. Broderick is also under criminal investigation by the Deputy Inspector General for obstruction, or interfering with an investigation, concerning enforcement of the safety regulations relating to "bogus parts". We believe the "smoke in the cockpit" issue closely parallels and may strongly reinforce the Inspector General’s current investigation of Mr. Broderick.

EVIDENCE OF UNSAFE CONDITIONS: Following is a list of some smoke related accidents which clearly delineate the safety problem that the FAA is required to eliminate. The law requires that, based on all but one of these accidents (02 JUL ‘86, this foreign aircraft was not certified by the FAA), the FAA take action to eliminate the unsafe condition, where pilots cannot see the flight path or the vital instruments to safely control and land the plane, because the inherent design and operation of the smoke evacuation systems do not function sufficiently to remove the smoke from their critical field of vision.

21 FEB’70 - An American-made 4-engine jet transport crashed, 47 dead. Last transmissions from aircraft: "…emergency we have…smoke on board. I can’t see anything…is crashing… good bye everybody…good bye everybody…reducing power we cannot see anything can you give me a low altitude ?" (Swissair flt 330)

11 JUL’73 - An American-made 4-engine jet transport crash landed. 122 dead. ALPA reported, "...smoke in the cockpit made the situation so intolerable that the captain decided to make a forced landing. He had to open the sliding cockpit window to maintain ground reference."

03 NOV’73 - An American-made jet transport crashed, crew died (no passengers, only cargo). Reports reveal: "The smoke venting system didn’t work well enough to clear the cockpit in time. The plane landed 262 feet short of the runway."

06 OCT'76 - An American-made 4 engine jet transport crashed, 73 dead. Final accident report: "Finally it became impossible to see the flight instruments because of smoke." Recommendations from accident report: "The criteria for the certification of large Commercial aircraft should include requirement for a positive means of smoke removal, particularly from the cockpit area."

02 JUN’83 - An American-made 2-engine jet transport made an emergency landing because of an inflight fire, 23 dead. The chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board testified during US Congressional hearings: "The smoke in the cockpit bad by this time become so thick that the captain had difficulty seeing his airspeed indicator during approach."

23 SEP ‘83 - An American-made 2 engine jet transport crashed, 111 dead. CAA report: "CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) indicates crew unable to see due (to) smoke."

31 DEC ’85 - An American-made twin-engine private aircraft crashed, 7 dead. Reports indicate: "There was smoke - and it filled the cockpit. The plane hit some high wires, then crashed into the ground and exploded." Tower recording from pilot, just prior to crash. "We have smoke in the cockpit ! We have smoke in the cockpit !"

02 JUL’86 - A foreign-made twin-engine jet transport made a forced landing, 54 dead. CAA report: "...smoke on flt (flight) deck & cabin forced (to) land in forest."

28 NOV ‘87 - An American-made 4-engine jet transport crashed, 159 dead. Initial reports: "Pilot radios of smoke in cockpit, then silence. Final accident report, Article 4.15, possible cause of accident, "disorientation consequent on reduced cockpit visibility in smoke…"

02 FEB ‘89 - An American-made 2-engine jet transport made an emergency landing. Airline Incident Investigation Report: "Smoke intensity on flight deck seriously impaired the Pilots ability to see the flight instruments."

17 DEC ‘89 - A foreign-made 2-engine jet transport made an emergency landing ( this type was certificated by FAA 6 months earlier, presumably in accordance with AC 25-9.) ICAO Accident Summary: " in seconds thick severe smoke severely impaired vision on the flight deck…by this time neither pilot could see each other…a visual landing was carried out with very limited visibility…Damage to aircraft substantial."

11 JUL ‘91 - An American-made 4-engine jet transport crashed, 261 dead. Reports indicate: "severe smoke conditions on board the aircraft shortly before the burning plane plowed into the ground at 250 m.p.h. and exploded…investigators have been unable to determine yet what caused the pilots to finally lose control…"

20 DEC ‘94 - An American made 4-engine jet transport crashed "...the crew called to report smoke in the cockpit. There were no further messages from the crew." The aircraft was later found in a marshy area 100 miles from the destination airport

BACKGROUND: In the early eighties I (Werjefelt) developed a new type of closed circuit emergency breathing equipment (long duration, very compact and light-weight smoke hood) which was primarily intended for airline passenger use to protect against smoke and toxic fumes during inflight smoke and fire emergencies. - There had been numerous tragic accidents where many hundreds of people had been asphyxiated.. This technology, which was later licensed to one of the Fortune top ten companies is now in use, but only for crew use, on approximately 80% of the US airliners and 50% world wide.

I testified in several Senate and House Hearings on airliner health and safety matters during the 80's. In the course of these events I had occasion to discuss these serious safety matters with the then Director of Safety of the FAA, Jack Harrison.

Harrison made it clear that he wanted us to "get off the FAA’s back about getting smoke protection on board the planes for passengers, because it won’t happen,.." When questioned why, loosely quoted, he responded that "what good is it to protect the passengers from smoke and toxic fumes when the pilots can’t even see to land the plane because of all the smoke?". He went on to say that there is a regulation that requires pilots to be able to see when they have smoke emergencies ( FAR 25.831 (d), which The Airline Pilots Association petitioned the government to establish ), but, in spite of the regulation, neither the FAA nor any of the major airframe manufacturers had been able to solve this safety problem, to meet the requirements of the safety regulation for serious smoke emergencies. - They could only deal with very small amounts of smoke which as he made very clear to me, is not what kills people or blinds the pilots. It’s the serious emergencies where the smoke can’t be stopped that is the real problem, he said. He also pointed out that there had been many smoke in the cockpit accidents. Boeing later told us they had been working to solve the problem for the last forty years and subsequently they also told the Wall Street Journal that they (Boeing) alone had lost seven jets where smoke in the cockpit was a suspected cause. - The Boeing statement coincides with the accident record.

He (Harrison) told me that if I could solve this safety problem so pilots could see then we could seriously discuss the matter of passenger smoke protection. I accepted his reasoning although I didn’t fully agree with him, since the pilots have respiratory protection and the same toxic fumes they are protected from, are equally toxic to the passengers. I also quietly accepted the challenge to find a way to ensure pilots would be able to see to safely control and land the plane during serious smoke emergencies.

To make a long story short: After several years of research and development and testing I came up with a technical solution, which positively evacuates any smoke from the pilots critical field of vision so the pilots can see the flight path and vital instruments to safely control and land the plane. This has been fully FAA certified since 1990. The equipment is very small and weighs only 5 lbs. and does not require any modification to the aircraft. It’s as simple to use as a fire extinguisher. Scores of pilots from many airlines as well as private companies have used the equipment in simulated cockpit smoke with less than one minute of training. Smoke has been so thick you could not even see the hand in front of your face. Yet, every time when using this equipment, pilots have been able to land (the simulator). They have also verified that without this equipment, they crashed every time.

Subsequently, FAA in Washington was informed about the new FAA certified technology and we asked them to enforce the relevant safety regulation. To our complete astonishment, the FAA refused, claiming it was no longer a safety problem and that the existing systems were adequate. They also told us, and others who inquired, that our equipment was only experimental, when in fact it was fully FAA certified. (It had taken us several years to accomplish this.) The FAA even tried to rescind the FAA certification, but were not successful.

There is much more to the story about all the acrimony and the- - flagrant malfeasance by FAA officials. We have file cabinets full attesting to unbelievable stonewalling, even to the point where the FAA has literally re-written accident reports in order to try to cover up the unsafe conditions so they would not have to act to enforce the existing safety regulation In retrospect one must seriously question whether Harrison, FAA’s Director of Safety, was hoping to send me on a wild goose chase to solve a problem that appeared to them to be unsolvable (they had been working on it for decades). By so doing he would have me 'off the FAA’s back' about passenger smoke protection. Or, possibly, he was genuinely trying to get rid of the unsafe conditions, so pilots could see and passengers would have respiratory protection and not have to be asphyxiated. In any event, the FAA is now faced with both issues. - Or, stonewalling the entire matter, which is what they have been doing.

Providing for pilot vision is simple and inexpensive in terms of airline economics (about one cent -per ticketed passenger). But, you can’t just do that and have the pilots land a plane full of "asphyxiated" passengers! So, they must also address passenger respiratory protection which is also relatively inexpensive - (a few cents per ticketed passenger) and a relatively simple task in terms of educating the public in how to use the equipment. But, above all, the way I perceive it, is they (FAA. and the Airlines) are fearful of telling or reminding the consumer (when they go through their safety demonstration) that there may be smoke emergencies, when so many airline passengers are already white-knuckle fliers.

Nevertheless, the following conversation dearly shows that Mr. Broderick, the Deputy FAA Administrator is flagrantly violating the law and stonewalling the enforcement of the existing safety regulations, to the detriment of public safety. He makes it perfectly dear that he has no intention of enforcing the existing safety regulation to ensure pilots can see to safely control and land the aircraft during serious smoke emergencies, until after there has been yet another tragic disaster claiming American lives – on a US airline! We believe any pilot or passenger, who is knowledgeable about the facts would be left in shocked disbelief after reviewing the conversation with Mr. Broderick. We could not believe what we were hearing - However there is no doubt whatsoever about Mr. Broderick’s totally irresponsible behavior because, this is not the only conversation we have had with Mr. Broderick et al which confirms this unbelievable hidden agenda and abuse of the public

TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION (26/1/93):

Werjefelt: Hello

Broderick: Hi Tony Broderick here returning your call

Werjefelt: Yes, Bert Werjefelt here.. emm.. I still have.. I don’t know if you have seen the latest letter I sent back to the Administrator in regard to the letter we received of .. I think your letter January 14..

Broderick: Er.. I think I’ve seen it-

Werjefelt: O.K. The question still remains unanswered on your part:.. Are Pilots supposed to be able to see during conditions of dense continuous smoke.

Broderick: If smoke is so dense and continuous that they can’t see – they won’t be able to see.

Werjefelt: Well are they supposed to be able to see ?

Broderick: We have never applied the regulations so as to require that to be demonstrated

Werjefelt: In your proposed Advisory Circular you are recognizing the problem

Broderick: We have never applied the regulations to require that the pilots be able to see in conditions of dense smoke

Werjefelt: And you’re saying that’s not the intent of the regulation ? Is that it?

Broderick: I’m saying we’ve never applied them to achieve that intent. That’s correct.

Werjefelt: Well, we all recognize that you haven't done that. - We have said that from the outset …

Broderick: Ok

Werjefelt: ….that doesn’t excuse you from not doing so now, the way we interpret the Federal Aviation Act and the (existing) regulation and the reason for the regulation.

[Comment: The existing regulation, FAR 25.831(d), reads in part "If accumulation of

hazardous quantities of smoke in the cockpit area is reasonably probable, smoke

evacuation must be readily accomplished..." The FAA Administrator has stated, in

writing, that the purpose of this regulation is "...that there be a means or procedure

to evacuate smoke that may be present in the cockpit, thereby providing an adequate

view of the instruments and the outside world." FAA Advisory Circular 25-9 provides

information on how to comply with the regulation and dearly delineates the need to

address "hazardous quantities" of "continuous" smoke. Which, incidentally is what the

pilots believe is now being done and which is what ALPA petitioned the government for.]

Broderick: You’re correct. If we in fact decided that it was a safety problem of sufficient magnitude that it needed correction, we could in fact enact a, or propose through the normal Administrative Procedure Act process, a regulation. And, if the evaluation of that regulation was that it was a cost that was worth the benefit to be obtained, we could enact that regulation.

Werjefelt: Well you could also enforce the (existing) regulation, and issue a Airworthiness Directive, right ?

(Comment: There is a world of difference between enforcing an existing regulation and establishing a new regulation. - The average time to establish a new regulation is in the order of 6 (!) years. In our case the regulation already exists and all that is needed is an Airworthiness Directive to enforce it properly!]

Broderick: No, no sir, no we..

Werjefelt: Why can’t you do that?

Broderick: To do an Airworthyness Directive you have to have an unsafe condition, as determined by the Administrator, which exists in an aircraft and which you have reason to believe would exist as an unsafe condition on other aircraft of that type design.

(Comment.- Indisputable and totally independent accident reports and information of

"unsafe conditions" is clearly evidenced in the list of some smoke related accidents

we have provided to Mr. Broderick et al.( recited earlier). It is repeatedly shown

that because of inadequate design or procedures of not being able to evacuate

smoke adequately, from the pilots critical field of vision, "unsafe conditions" where

pilots are unable to see to safely control and land the planes have repeatedly

occurred. The law, FAR 39.1, strictly and simply requires that regardless to whether

"unsafe conditions" are discovered on U.S. or foreign owned aircraft, certified by the

FAA, if the unsafe condition is inherent to the design or operation of the aircraft it

must be eliminated on all types of the same type design certified and operated in the

U.S. and, the foreign aviation authorities must be notified of the unsafe condition!

In fact, the record shows, especially when there have been sensational and highly

publicized catastrophes with foreign owned U.S. planes, the FAA has acted in

accordance with FAR 39.1 and issued Airworthiness Directives. Such has been the case

with unsafe conditions involving icing, thrust reversers etc. Furthermore, it is not

a requirement that there must be fatal accidents involving airline passengers (or for

that matter) in order to issue Airworthiness Directives to eliminate unsafe

conditions. It is not even necessary that there be an accident or that it be an

airline - it also applies to private and cargo planes - all FAA certified aircraft. -

The same unsafe conditions, where pilots are unable to see, that are apparent from the

list of some smoke accidents we have provided to Mr. Broderick, exist as unsafe

conditions on every single airliner in this country and on 99% of the corporate

aircraft. (A few corporate operators have taken steps to eliminate the unsafe conditions.)

Werjefelt: Well that's what your Advisory Circular says exist and you haven’t addressed it.

Broderick: Well I ..I mean I certainly don’t read the Advisory Circular that way and we would not issue an Advisory Circular if we had an unsafe condition that needed correction.

Werjefelt: Well you sort of have portrayed that you have cured the problem by the procedures called for in the Advisory Circular. You state the problem in the beginning, but then you don’t proceed to cure it.

(Comment: -FAA experts and FAA documents clearly recognize continuous smoke as a

serious safety problem. In fact, FAA Advisory Circular 25-9, which is FAA’s statement

of how to comply with the regulation, states "accidents of fire or smoke that cannot

be extinguished continue to occur. Smoke and fire procedures should, therefore, be

formulated considering that the fire or smoke exposure may be continuous. Smoke from

fires in cargo or equipment located in inaccessible locations, should be considered to

be in particular. Continuous smoke from equipment bays, equipment cooling systems,

the cockpit, and cargo compartments should be considered reasonably probable because

these compartments have so many potential sources of smoke or have a history of fire

or smoke occurrences (Emphasis Added]." The safety deficiency is that the FAA

certification procedures do not include the well recognized hazard of continuous dense

smoke. This is in clear contradiction to the FAA statement that "...Smoke and fire

procedures should, therefore, be formulated considering that the fire or smoke

exposure may be continuous.")

Broderick: Well, I mean I’m not..I’m not sure what you’re…what you're getting at. I mean we wrote the Advisory Circular. We make recommendations in it. We have in fact conducted tests.. had tests conducted in accordance with it. I recognize that you don’t believe that our requirements go far enough and that’s..I mean that’s a reasonable disagreement.

Werjefelt: No, its not a disagreement. I think you guys have agreed that they didn’t go far enough because you now propose a change to the Advisory Circular which incorporates continuous smoke (for the test procedure) in the cockpit and that pilots need to see. You just don’t want to put it in effect, into real effect, for another 20 – 30 years.

(Comment: After this conversation it appears Mr. Broderick had this new test

procedure to deal with continuous smoke removed because it does not appear in the

final revised version !!! Any change to an Advisory Circular does not make it

retroactively mandatory. Nor is an Advisory Circular in itself mandatory. And any

change to the actual certification requirements do not affect any of the planes

presently used, nor does it affect those types that are now certified and which may

continue to be manufactured for another 20 or 30 years ! In contrast, an

Airworthiness Directive (AD) is an immediate action whereby the FAA can promptly

eliminate an unsafe condition.]

Broderick: Er, Mr. Werjefelt, there are a lot of things that we do, that we think are better than what we used to do. If we required all improvements to be incorporated to be retroactively incorporated...ah, no one would ever able to build an airplane.

Werjefelt: Naw, thats not true, I mean this is an unsafe condition, has brought down a number of planes which you guys are falsely disputing and….

Broderick: Well what airplanes ?

Werjefelt: Well look ... we've given you a list and you just choose to ignore it.

Broderick: I’ve seen it. The only airplane I know of that I would agree is an airplane accident that occurred because of smoke in the cockpit, and resulted m any kind of fatalities, is the freighter accident in Boston in 1974.

(Comment: Even if he limits the discussion to accidents in America only, his

statement is absolutely false. For example, the accident that occurred on December

31, 1985 occurred in the U.S. This is the accident that killed singer Ricky Nelson!

In any event, the list provided to Mr. Broderick et al was only intended to

indisputably prove the existence of the unsafe conditions. By no means is it a

complete list of all the smoke related accident here in the US or world wide. With

the exception of Mr. Broderick et al, we, and all others we have conferred with,

consider this list alone to be overwhelming proof of the unsafe conditions. Most

importantly however, the law does not allow Mr.Broderick to exclude or ignore the

indisputable evidenc of the unsafe conditions from foreign accidents with FAA

certified planes, as he proceeds to do)

Werjefelt: Well, huh? What about the one in 1970? 'What about the South African one that went down? One of the suspected causes was smoke in the cockpit.

Broderick: Our regulations don’t have anything to do with airplanes that are operated outside this country.

Werjefelt: How untrue - you certified it.

Broderick: Airworthiness Directives as you may know are not applicable outside of this country.

(Comment: This is true. All we are asking is that they be applied in this country,

as the law requires, so that the unsafe conditions are eliminated in the US. What

foreign countries or operators do is their business. However, most western countries

follow the US on safety matters such as these.)

Werjefelt: Hold it a minute, you say an unsafe condition exists on one plane, an American made certified plane, so you’re supposed to stick your head in the sand and ignore the fact that the same (unsafe) condition exists on planes in this country?

Broderick: Mr. Werjefelt, we just don’t agree with you.

(Comment-. Mr. Broderick's irresponsible stonewalling is unbelievable. He is

required by law to act to eliminate the unsafe conditions. This unsafe condition

exists on virtually every plane in the US - and elsewhere, for that matter.)

Werjefelt: Well, that's obvious. But, you know your situation on addressing this issue - not going after the airworthiness directive, like the law requires is akin to having telephone fraud being perpetrated and then when the FCC or the phone companies figure out a way to catch the perpetrators you’re saying "Oh, we haven’t done that before so we’re not going to do it now"… Its the same difference. Its a ludicrous argument on your part. And its not in the interest of safety. So.. we’re still back to square one, huh?

Broderick: Well, I mean, I don’t know what else to say. We don’t agree with your statement that the possibility of continuous smoke in an airplane ahh..results in an unsafe condition. (!)

(Comment: Mr. Broderick’s ludicrous stonewalling defies the imagination. Just look at

the list of smoke related accidents ! When smoke is continuous and can’t be stopped

(which we have shown happens time and time again) and, by Mr. Brodericks own admission

earlier, pilots have no way of coping with dense continuous smoke, the small cockpit

area will quickly be so full of smoke pilots can’t see. The accident record we have

provided shows this can occur in a matter of seconds. Clearly, to any reasonable

person, this is an unsafe condition. The accident record proves it. FAA’s own

documents say it must be addressed. Information we have provided to Mr. Broderick

shows Accident Investigation Boards have concluded that the unsafe condition must be

eliminated. The Airline Pilots Association have written to the FAA and stated: ALPA

is very concerned that aircraft cockpits must be able to evacuate smoke effectively,

so that the crew can safely land the aircraft." ALPA goes on to say "It is important

to be able to evacuate continuous smoke if the source cannot be immediately

identified." Moreover ALPA also states regarding their review of a number of smoke in

the cockpit incidents that: "...there appeared to be several failure modes (which

would cause smoke generation] where it was not possible to disconnect the damaged

system. Therefore, there is a need for the continuous smoke evacuation capability."]

Werjefelt: Well.. Come on. You stated it by yourself in the Advisory Circular…on the second page of your Advisory Circular you go on at length to describe how unsafe the conditions are when there is smoke in the plane... and continuous smoke. I can’t believe what you’re saying.

Broderick: Umm, The measures that are used every day in the United States are quite clearly able to cope with the hundreds of in flight fires that occur every year. Ahm.. and it is not a problem. Nineteen years ago we had one accident in a freighter.

(Comment: The same or even stronger safety measures are used in many other

countries. They also have many inflight fires annually, which luckily, as in the US,

are mostly minor or manageable. But, that’s not what we are talking about - the issue

concerns serious smoke emergencies. As I pointed out earlier, it is absolutely false

for Mr. Broderick to say that there has only been one smoke accident in the US in the

last 19 years. For example, Ricky Nelson was killed in a smoke accident in the US in

85. And, there have been others, which we are sure Mr. Broderick is also well aware

of. The same unsafe condition as with the freighter mentioned by Mr. Broderick, of

pilots not being able to see, still exists on almost every single plane in the US, and

overseas - on freighters as well as passenger planes. Mr. Broderick has continually

argued that there have not been enough smoke accidents in the US to warrant that he

eliminate the unsafe condition. How many accidents and American fatalities does he

need in order to do his job? The law says that his job is "to prevent the occurrence

or recurrence of accidents". His job is not to wait for more tragic accidents in the

US which he is so blatantly doing. However, as pointed out in a recent letter to Secretary

of Transportation, Mr. Pena, this may have changed last year with the crash of USAir 427

in Pittsburgh which, as is so typical in smoke accidents, was trailing smoke and flying out of

control prior to the tragic accident crash.

Investigators still don’t know what caused the crash. But, one thing is for certain,

if there was dense continuous smoke in the cockpit, which the record shows can occur

in seconds, the pilots would not be able to see to control and safely land the plane

because Mr. Broderick refuses to enforce the existing safety regulations ! We may

never know the cause of that accident. However, it is inexcusable that blind pilots

is even a possibility as a cause or a factor in this terrible tragedy. Especially so,

when Mr. Broderick has had almost five years to eliminate this unsafe condition.)

Werjefelt: Ah.. I’ve given you the list. You are choosing to ignore it because you’re forced to act if you acknowledge it. I just find your position so contrary to your duties under the Federal Aviation Act that its…

Broderick: ..you've made that quite clear in your letter.

Werjefelt: ….unbelievable (pause) So, my question remains then: Are pilots supposed to see when there are conditions of dense continuous smoke

Broderick: Not if it’s so dense that they can’t see..

Werjefelt: Then they’re not supposed to see?

Broderick: We don’t expect people to see through smoke that is so dense that they can’t see.

Werjefelt: Well the pilots expect it. You guys have conned them into believing that the systems can cope with dense continuous smoke. Now you finally agreed that they can’t. And, you’re not going to do anything about it.

Broderick: What have we ever said could cope with dense continuous smoke?

Werjefelt: Why don’t you look through your correspondence.

Broderick: Well that’s Your correspondence not ours.

Werjefelt: Yours too.

Broderick: OK

(Comment: As noted earlier, right in the beginning of the FAA advisory circular it

clearly and conspicuously delineates the reason for the regulation, one of them being

to eliminate the unsafe conditions of "hazardous quantities" of "continuous smoke" in

the cockpit. Anyone would clearly be led to believe that is being addressed. But,

hidden in one sentence in the very back of the document one discovers such is not the

case. "Hazardous quantities" of "continuous smoke" is not addressed! Early in the

dispute FAA was telling us (see correspondence) that continuous smoke is addressed.

They have since changed. The point I was making is that virtually all pilots have

been led to believe that the present systems can cope with continuous heavy dense

smoke. It has even gone so far that FAA has approved flight manuals, where pilots are

clearly, but falsely led to believe that they will be able to see to control and land

the plane when smoke is "persistent" and "severe"!!! What is of additional

importance to know is that, in the aftermath of other recent smoke accidents, the NTSB

again asked the FAA to address the smoke issue. In short, the FAA’s response was that

there was nothing more the FAA could do to cope with continuous smoke than to revise

the flight manuals and instruct the pilots that, instead of landing at the nearest

suitable airport, they be instructed to land at the first available landing site - in

other words crash land the plane ! It appears the NTSB finally gave up. Needless to

say, the flight manuals were never revised to tell the pilots to crash land nor were

they revised to inform the pilots that when smoke is persistent and severe (dense and

continuous) they will in all likelihood not be able to see to even be able to

accomplish a controlled crash landing! Clearly the message from the FAA to the pilots

is that they can cope with continuous smoke. - ask any pilot.)

Werjefelt And the pilots petitioned you to put the rule into place for heavy dense smoke and your documents acknowledge the continuous aspect of it. I mean any brain dead prawn would acknowledge it.

(Comment: The 'cockpit smoke regulations has been in place since the mid-1960's. The

AirLine Pilots Association (ALPA) petitioned the FAA for such a regulation after

several smoke-related accidents to eliminate the unsafe conditions of "heavy dense"

smoke. Because the technology did not exist to cope with heavy dense continuous

smoke, essentially nothing has changed in terms of assuring pilot vision during such

emergencies. In fact, the record shows there are planes, now flying, certified before

the regulation went into effect, which have far better capability to cope with smoke

(even though it is totally inadequate) than ones that have been certified in recent years)

Broderick: I gather you put me in another class then.

Werjefelt: Well, I think we both consider each other in the wrong class for some ungodly reason. And I’d like to believe it’s that you’re not doing your duty and you think you are.

Broderick: That’s right

Werjefelt: Well I think the vast majority of pilots and the American population would disagree if they knew the issues at hand here. I mean you are saying outright that pilots are not supposed to be able to see in dense continuous smoke.

Broderick: I am saying that we don’t expect pilots to see in smoke that is so dense and so continuous that they cannot see.

(Comment: So why does he approve flight manuals that tell pilots they will be able to

see to land when there is "persistent" and "severe" smoke. Why doesn’t he warn the

pilots that there are known and documented circumstances when they won’t be able to

see and they will therefore in all likelyhood have a fatal crash? Why doesn’t he tell

them the plane has not been certified to assure they can see when smoke is "persistent" and "severe"??)

Werjefelt: Well there ways for them to see now.

Broderick: Changing the design of the aircraft?

Werjefelt: This is not changing the design of the aircraft. You’re making it a big complicated thing. It doesn’t even have to change one squat on the plane.

(Comment: The equipment to enable pilots to see regardless how much smoke there is has

a self-contained power supply and is completely portable and can be used for its

intended purpose without any changes to the aircraft. It is the size of a small book

and is as simple to use as a fire extinguisher. As I said earlier, pilots have

successfully used it in simulated smoke emergencies with less than a minute of training.)

Broderick: It costs money to do – to effect that change

(Comment: Mr. Broderick has repeatedly been informed that the cost, estimated by one

major airline, is on the order of 1 (one) cent per ticketed passenger.)

Werjefelt: No kidding! What do your changes cost from the roofs blowing off planes and all the other neglect that has been going on for years, cargo door flying off etc. etc. What do they cost?

(Comment: Again, these are typical examples of the FAA, under Mr. Broderick’s

direction, not acting to prevent such accidents until after there have been

sensational tragedies. The record is full of these types of examples.)

Broderick: Well they are spending billions to correct that problem. But, that’s because it is a true problem that has consensus agreement in the expert community. I frankly know of no one besides you and your company who think this is a problem

(Comment: The consensus he is talking about wasn’t hard to arrive at after you have

half a dozen people sucked out through the fuselage and slaughtered in the jet engine,

because of a faulty cargo door or after a flight attendant is sucked up through the

roof of a plane after part of the roof is lost in flight because of years of neglect

and corrosion. Contrary to Mr. Broderick’s false statement that he knows of no-one

else who thinks there is a safety problem, in our case there is tremendous consensus

of the smoke in the cockpit "problem". And he knows it. (1) There is a regulation

because of the problem. The pilots petitioned for the regulation. The record shows

they did this because they know it is a problem. (2) ALPA has recently written a

letter to the FAA reminding them that the regulation is to be enforced for conditions

with dense continuous smoke. Obviously they wouldn’t write such a letter if they

didn’t believe it is an ongoing problem. (3) FAA’s own documents state it is a

problem. (4) The problem, and the need to correct these unsafe conditions, has even

been noted by independent accident investigation boards in the accident reports we

have provided to Mr. Broderick. But he doesn’t want to acknowledge them. (5) Above

all, anyone with commonsense knows that blinded pilots is an obviously fatal problem !)

Werjefelt: You say it's a problem in your Advisory Circular but you’re ignoring it.

Broderick: A problem that should be solved by Federal Action ?

(Comment: Yes, that’s what the law requires, without any discretion whatsoever.)

Werjefelt: Have you read the Advisory Circular ? ….let me just read that section for you. Hang on a second........(pause)…..Mr. Broderick..?

Broderick: Yes.

Werjefelt: OK. Hang on here

Broderick: I have to get to a meeting in about 5 minutes.

Werjefelt: OK Section .. under subjects and definition right? It was in my letter. You have a section: "Smoke Sources and Duration (continuous smoke source)" – That’s how you guys label it in your Advisory Circular. ‘Reasonably probable sources of smoke include fires caused by cigarettes etc. etc. - may produce hazardous quantities of smoke... You go on to say "..Incidents of fire or smoke that cannot be extinguished continue to occur, smoke and fire procedures should therefore be formulated considering that the fire or smoke may be continuous." It is your specific instruction. And you’re arguing about it. And it says .."a long history of fire and smoke among other places in the cockpit...."

Broderick: Mr. Werjefelt. If in fact we thought that problem was serious enough to require retroactive action, we would have taken it. We don’t believe that is the case.

(Comment: This is the essence of the dispute. It is mind boggling that Mr. Broderick

has the audacity to say these unsafe conditions, with blinded pilots and no way to

cope with the smoke, where many hundreds of people have already been killed, isn’t

"serious enough" to warrant the elimination of the unsafe conditions !!! It is a

simple case of stonewalling. Regardless of what he thinks, he is required by law to

act, to "..prevent the occurrence or recurrence of accidents..". He does not have

any other legal choice. The unsafe conditions are overwhelmingly obvious. However,

unless there is widespread public awareness about a safety problem, which usually

only comes about in the course of well publicized tragedies, nothing seems to be

done. Sadly, as his long record shows, time and again, he does not act until after

there are sensational accidents on his front doorstep.)

Werjefelt: No, not until the next accident occurs. And then you scurry around and say, oh we've been working on it. We've been working on it. We’ll fix it. Just like the icing problems on the planes. - You knew about it for 10 years and never did anything about it. Why is it instructed in here to address it? Why do you lead pilots and everybody to believe its being addressed? And then you don’t address it?

(Comment: There was no technology to address it in the past. But that, as you see, he does not want to admit)

Broderick: Mr. Werjefelt jet engine maintenance is addressed in other advisory material, it doesn’t mean every body has to put a jet engine on their airplane.

(Comment: What has that got to do with it? Why doesn’t he answer the question?)

Werjefelt: Ohhh... Come on... Give me a break ! We are talking about an unsafe condition which is acknowledged by the FAA. And then, the FAA, hidden in the back of the document, doesn’t address it. And, it’s the cause of numerous accidents, which you are disputing.

Broderick: Not in the United States.

(Comment: As I have explained before, what Mr. Broderick says is false. And besides

it is not relevant under the law. He is required by law to act to eliminate the

unsafe conditions on US certified planes regardless in which country the unsafe

condition is discovered. To wait for more preventable accidents to occur in the US is

unconscionable and in violation of the law.)

Werjefelt: Not in the United States ! On American made planes ! Certified in America ! Operated in accordance with American standards…or better in many cases.

(Comment: The reason some planes are crashing and 'burning up" is because he is not

enforcing the safety regulation for design/operation of the American planes they are

using. Because of that, pilots cannot see to safely control and land the plane.

Therefore they crash and burn and lives are needlessly lost)

Werjefelt: 0HHH…..You know you are doing such a disservice to this country.

Broderick: Sorry you think that.

Werjefelt: Well, its not just what I think. The facts are clear….well….

Broderick: Well, I need to go. Uhm, I wish we could reach agreement. But, it is apparent that we can’t.

Werjefelt: Well, obviously we can’t. If you guys are lying through your teeth it’s a little hard to find agreement. I mean every issue we've brought up are lying about.

Broderick: Its kind of hard to make any progress if one side is calling the other side a liar.

Werjefelt: Well you’re calling me a liar - This is an outright case of restraint of trade at this point - our customers call up the FAA to ask about the problem. You’re denying it exists. They are asking if there is a need for our device …No there’s no need for the device…for pilots to see. You’ve now said you don’t want the pilots to see when there is dense continuous smoke!

Broderick: Well as I have said, I have got to go. I have a fairly large meeting about to start.

Werjfelt: Uh huh, Well. you run along to your meeting. And... we will pursue this.

Broderick: OK, Thank you very much.

Werjefelt: You are very welcome Mr. Broderick.

Broderick: OK

END OF- CONVERSATION

-----------------------------------------

TRANSCRIPT OF PHONE CONVERSATION

March 5, 1992

10:00 am (HST)

Anthony Broderick of FAA..................Returning Vision Safe's Call

Werjefelt- This is Bert Werjefelt... and I'm trying to get some information here. Hang on just a second, let me get some information...Okay, Mr. Broderick, your letter to Hugh Waterman on January 23rd in response to his letter to President Bush that he wrote in early December. Are you familiar with that letter?

Broderick- Ah, I don’t have it in front of me....

Werjefelt- I've had some discussions with McSweeny and it doesn't seem that we are really getting a resolution to the problem. It seems mostly that ... (interrupted) it seem that - well first of all let me ask you this. He was saying the response was near immediately going out to the.. on the appropriations bill issue. Has that gone out at this point or ?

Broderick- I think so. It is in the final coordination process. It takes a while to get reports out to Congress. There are lots of people who have to review it.

Werjefelt- Uh-huh. Well, I assume you also review it before it goes out.

Broderick- Usually, yeah.

Werjefelt- And is the posture basically the same as is reflected in your letter to Mr. Waterman or.............. ?

(Pause) ..............................

Broderick- Hello?

Werjefelt-Yes, Hello.

Broderick-Yes it is.

Werjefelt- I see. Well I realize You don't write the letters, you have your staff assist you with it, but the response You provided to Mr. Waterman is virtually in its entirety erroneous. It is not true or Correct.

Broderick- What is not true about it?

Werjefelt- Well. Can you get a copy of the letter and I'll

(interrupted) ….

Broderick- Not very easily. Why don't you just tell me what you think is not true. I mean we may have a disagreement about what is erroneous. But what’s not true?

Werjefelt- What’s not true? Well, I guess the way you word the language. You’re saying in one sentence here. I'll go through it "Our review of data from airplane accidents since 1980 that had inflight fire and smoke associated with emergency indicates that flight crews were able to safely control the plane." I mean we have evidence to the contrary. In fact, planes have been lost where smoke in the cockpit was the probable or possible cause for it.

Broderick- Airline airplanes?

Werjefelt- Sure, yeah.

Broderick- Which ones?

Werjefelt- Well, let me go on. (interrupted) ...

Broderick- I mean, I just like to know. .... Which airline airplanes, carrying passengers in the United States or a US carrier anywhere else, has been lost due to smoke in the cockpit, as a probable cause?

Werjefelt- Well I would say it is a foreign carrier, (interrupted) but if it is a US made ... (interrupted) ...

Broderick- Well I don’t have anything to do with foreign carriers.

Werjefelt- Oh really? Well its funny then, how come you ah, after a Swedish airplane goes down, or a Scandinavian airplane, because of icing problems - well known icing problems by the way - within a couple of weeks after, you issue a notice to address the icing issue.

Broderick- Dr. Werjefelt, I did not issue an icing notice that applies to foreign carriers.

Werjefelt- Well it applies to US carriers right?

Broderick- Let me tell you something, There has never been a US built, US airline operated airplane, which has lost lives, passenger lives, due to smoke in the cockpit – fire. Okay. Show me which ones have. Just .. See one of the things I think that we have a problem with is you think that there is a problem that isn't addressed. We believe that our standards address these problems.

Werjefelt- Well I know you believe that but.. (interrupted)

Broderick- ... The way to prove us wrong is to provide just the date and the location of the accident that involves smoke in the cockpit, that would have been obviated by your device ... and I don’t think you will find a very long list. Obviously that has to be a list of airplanes that come under our regulatory authority. It’s pointless to point to foreign airplanes.

Werjefelt- It is not pointless. Why do you turn around and issue notices on de-icing two weeks after a foreign air carrier goes down.

Broderick- Dr. Werjefelt, do foreign airlines come under our regulatory authority?

Werjefelt- No, but I think you are missing my point. A foreign carrier, a US made airplane, which is built and operated according to US standards goes down because of icing problem. What do you guys turn around and do? You issue a notice within two weeks to all US carriers to fix the icing problem.

Broderick- Dr. Werjefelt, can we stick with smoke and not icing and just answer my question as to what carriers you are talking about? What airlines...

Werjefelt- Well we are trying to see if we are going to talk apples and oranges. If Boeing says they have lost 7 jets because of smoke in the cockpit - what I read from you is that this doesn't concern you, so long as it was not US owned or US operated.

Broderick- It doesn't concern me from the viewpoint of demonstrating that there is a regulation that is required in the United States. No.

Werjefelt- Oh, well then how come you act on this icing problem then?

Broderick- I thought we were talking about smoke?

Werjefelt- Well it doesn't matter whether a plane goes down because of ice or smoke. It goes down and people are killed or hurt, or planes are destroyed, or whatever.

Broderick- I guess, I mean, we're not going to get anywhere on this, what I am trying to tell you is that the US standard for design, operation and maintenance of aircraft work well with regard to smoke in the cockpit.

Werjefelt- But only in the US?

Broderick- I am only limiting my concern to the US for this discussion. I can only write a regulation which affects US airlines. I must demonstrate that the cost to US airlines are outweighed by the benefits to the United States when I write a regulation. And if I have no benefit, I certainly can't have a lot of cost.

Werjefelt- Well we can demonstrate the benefits but I guess we ...

(Interrupted)

Broderick- ... You can't demonstrate the benefits if there have been no accidents.

Werjefelt- Well if the accidents are happening everywhere else but you choose to ignore them and you are just waiting for one to happen in the US before you act. How can anybody argue (interrupted) ...

Broderick- ….We don’t chose to ignore them,

Werjefelt- Sure you are.

Broderick- ….problems that are causing them other places.

Werjefelt- Alright, if you have a test that doesn't take into account continuous smoke but yet your experts acknowledge continuous smoke as being a serious problem in aviation safety. And that test subsequently proves to be essentially worthless for smoke evacuation purposes, in the real world. If its not happening, if that is not occurring in the US,are you going ignore it or are you going act on that?

Broderick- We believe that the tests are appropriate and they serve their intended function.

Werjefelt- Well ... So, you would be willing to come out, if I invite you out for a demonstration, a smoke demonstration in one of your planes there at National, you can come out and attest to the fact (interrupted)

Broderick- I don’t. I would be going to a smoke demonstration at National. By the way how do you solve the decompression problem with your device?

Werjefelt- What decompression problem?

Broderick- Well if you're at 20 or 30 thousand feet and one of these inflate and then the airplane gets a decompression, what does your device do?

Werjefelt- Well it is solved and certified by the FAA. It has a relief valve on it.

Broderick- Mr. Werjefelt, that is not certified by the FAA to do anything except not provide a hazard to the crew.

Werjefelt- Well its demonstrate .... (interrupted)

Broderick- ... performing it's intended function. It is just certified under a no hazard basis.

Werjefelt- It is certified to meet its intended function. We spent considerable time and money to accomplish that.

Broderick- Well how do you solve the problem with decompression ... ?

Werjefelt- I just explained to you that we have a relief valve on, which is certified by the FAA.

Broderick- Oh? Okay.

(Pause) ................................

Broderick- So then it works when you have the relief valve and you then fly down to ah say... 5,000 feet, it still Performs its intended function?

Werjefelt- Yea, but at that point you’re increasing the pressure so the unit would be deflating.

Broderick- Right.

Werjefelt- and we have taken care of that as well.

Broderick- How do you do that?

Werjefelt- Well its continuously supplied with air.

Broderick- Oh, is it battery operated?

Werjefelt- Yeah.

Broderick- Oh, okay. Allright. Well, do you have any other questions?

Werjefelt- No, I wish that we could find some common course that is less abrasive than what we have now.

Broderick- Dr. Werjefelt, I think that we have been pretty reasonable in trying to deal with the fairly inflammatory letters that you have sent in. Ah now then...

Werjefelt- Your letters are just as inflammatory. You’re sticking your head in the sand and ignoring that there are any problems.

Broderick- ( Broderick apparently goes off of the speaker phone and picks up the handset) I think that you got a fundamental disagreement with us about the existence of a problem. You've defined a problem that we don’t think exists and then you solved it. Then you berate us for not accepting your solution.

Werjefelt- Your own experts acknowledge the problem.

Broderick- I am sorry but we do not accept the fact that we have a problem that requires a solution.

Werjefelt- Well let me read you what your own experts say then. Okay?

Hang on. Where is the ... (interrupted)

Broderick- No, no, I don't want, Dr. Werjefelt, to debate the existence of the problem with you.

Werjefelt- You don’t want to debate it?

Broderick- ... solution is. Now you can go and find any one of thousands of people that now work or used to work at the FAA or are otherwise somehow imbued with the title of aviation safety expert. What I am telling you is that we don’t think that we have a problem which deserves a regulatory solution. You can argue with us but you can’t. I mean there is nothing that I know of that you can do to prevent us from disagreeing with you. It is as simple as that. We have studied the issue, we have studied the material you've sent. We don't think - we know that you have not yet convinced us that we have a problem that needs a regulatory solution.

Werjefelt- Hey, your own experts and your own advisory material, the problem is clearly acknowledged. You guys just (interrupted) ...

Broderick- Find any advisory material that says we have an unsolved problem. Okay?

Werjefelt- Oh yea, your advisory circular 25-9 is ample testimony to that very fact You attest repeatedly .... to continuous smoke, hazardous quantities of smoke being a problem. Yet you don't have a test that addresses the issue of continuous smoke.

Broderick- Let me just tell you once again that we do not believe that we have a problem that needs a regulatory solution - PERIOD.

Werjefelt- Okay, if pilots then are reporting that in planes certificated as recently as 1989, they can't see through the smoke, they- pilots- it's so thick with smoke they can’t even see each other. Is that what you guys intend to accomplish with your tests and certification requirements?

Broderick- We do not have a problem that requires a regulatory solution.

Werjefelt- So you think it is perfectly fine that pilots can't see then.

Broderick- We don’t have a problem that requires a regulatory solution.

Werjefelt- Jez, I can't believe what I am hearing.

(Pause) ..................................

Werjefelt- You don't call it a problem that (interrupted)

Broderick- We do not have a problem that requires a rule-change, I’m sorry. I’m sorry you don't agree with that. We respect your right not to agree.

Werjefelt- That is fine, I don't respect your right to not act to prevent the recurrence of accidents.

Broderick- You said recurrence, where was the first one.

Werjefelt- Boston, 73 for instance.

Broderick- Cargo airplane? Hazardous material? Right?

Werjefelt- Right

Broderick- You know, okay? I know about that accident. DC-8 right?

Werjefelt- Right.

Broderick- Non-passenger operation right?

Werjefelt- Yea.

Broderick- Right.

Werjefelt- Mr. Broderick. Listen, you apparently will not accept any foreign--U.S. made, but foreign-operated aircraft, as being of any value in your determining whether there is a problem or not.

Broderick- I didn’t say that.

Werjefelt- Well that’s what I ... (interrupted)

Broderick- Given all the data, we do not believe we have a problem that needs a rule change. ... Are you there?

Werjefelt- Okay, let me read you this then ... ah (interrupted)...

Broderick- Dr. Werjefelt, you don’t have to read me anything, I told you that ... (interrupted)

Werjefelt- But you don't want to hear, if I can point to a problem. You just don’t want to hear. You've closed your mind to it.

Broderick- I told you that I've done the research. I understand yourpoint of view, and I don’t agree with it. It is as simple as that. You’re not going to be able to convince me by pulling a sentence here and a sentence there out of documents that you’ve got in front of you.

Werjefelt- Oh baloney.

Broderick- know what the prior history is.

Werjefelt- Believe me I know what it is.

Broderick- I said I know what it is.

Werjefelt- I don’t think you do. Planes are going down. If the accident report says that it probably went down because the pilot couldn’t see. You just don't want to hear it.

Broderick- Well, and you just don't want to accept my answer.

Werjefelt- Well, wait a minute. If they are reporting ... if the accident report says it went down because the pilot couldn’t see, you don’t want to hear (interrupted) ...

Broderick- I told you that we have operating and maintenance procedures that differ from foreign carriers. You cannot compare foreign operations to domestic operations.

Werjefelt- That’s baloney. You , certify the planes here, if they happen to be operated in a foreign country. Smoke evacuation isn't changing.

Broderick- Ah, Ahhh... As I have told you before I don’t think that we have a regulation that needs to be written in this area.

Werjefelt- I don’t care how you do it, the main thing is pilots should be able to see if there is continuous smoke. You have no provisions for that right now, and planes are going down because of it.

Broderick- No, not in this country they are not.

Werjefelt- Not in this country - Oh holy smokes. You just don’t want to hear if planes are dropping all around you, as long as they are not dropping on your front door step you’re not going to address it. You just don't want to address this issue. You're addressing other issues where planes go down overseas. Your addressing them immediately with things.

Broderick- Because it makes sense to do so. In this case it does not.

Werjefelt- Right, right. So the next plane that goes down because the pilots couldn’t see and if it goes down in some foreign country, are you going to do anything about it?

Broderick- We will investigate and learn what we can and see what is appropriate.

Werjefelt- Yea, a number of them have happened already. You don’t investigate and you don’t want to hear. You've just told me that

Broderick- No I didn’t tell you that.

Werjefelt- Yes you did. You don’t want to hear about the foreign ones. Tell me about the US ones you said.

Broderick- Mr. Werjefelt, I have in front of me, the accident summary from Britain that starts in 1947 and lists every accident that has ever occurred in their records in the world. Okay? I understand that there are other countries that have different accident histories than we do.

Werjefelt- But they are caused because of - as it concerns smoke

(interrupted)...

Broderick- ... Well go sell your device to them.

Werjefelt- Ah, I can’t believe this is our own government. I just can't believe it. I can't believe - Jeez this drives me up the wall.

Broderick- I am sorry we don’t agree.

Werjefelt- You don't even want to see the facts. That’s the problem.

Broderick- Mr. Werjefelt, I think, I know the facts. And the facts are that we don’t have a problem that needs a regulation to solve it.

Werjefelt- Okay, so if an accident occurs then or has recently occurred where the report is that: "in seconds, thick smoke severely impaired vision on the flight deck. By this time, neither pilot could see each other". Is that the kind of safety standard the FAA subscribes to.

Broderick- I would suggest that those people check their maintenance and operations standards.

Werjefelt- Oh baloney ! That is absolute baloney. It is a plane ....you certificated... (interrupted)...

Broderick- ... Well it has worked pretty well in the United States for the last 20 years or so.

Werjefelt- Really?

Broderick- yes.

(Pause)

Werjefelt- Well I ... You know what, the next plane that goes down, believe me, I am gonna make sure that you are accountable, personally. If it is the last thing I do Buddy.

Broderick- Okay, thank you very much

Werjefelt- You’re welcome

END