Arms Control

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US Opens Door to New Nuclear Arms

The LA Times reports that the US Senate is including funds for new types of nuclear weapons in the defense authorization bill. This would be a big change in US nuclear policy, which has been more concerned with preserving the capability of current nuclear weapons without testing, than about developing new nuclear weapons. By turning away from arms control, the US could well undermine the existing nonproliferation regime and encourage other countries to develop or improve nuclear weapons.

North Korean Nuclear Program

Anxious not to be overshadowed by the war in Iraq, the North Koreans have been making a stir. Now they claim to have a nuclear weapons, which they are apparently willing to trade for some kind of financial assistance, if the price is right. President Bush seems willing to accept North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, as long as they don't export them. Unlike President Clinton, President Bush seems unwilling to contemplate war with North Korea. Secretary of State Powell has so far taken the historical US position that North Korea should not have nukes.

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

So far (May 5) no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been found in Iraq, although an Army team says that an Iraqi scientist claims that such weapons were only destroyed on the eve of the war. The Washington Post reported on April 22 that the Bush Administration is losing confidence in its intelligence reports about WMD. On April 30, the Iraqi in charge of bioweapons reported that they had all been destroyed before the war.

For timeline on Iraqi WMD, click here.

North Korean-Pakistani Cooperation on Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

North Korea told the U.S. during talks in Beijing in April that it has nuclear weapons.

North Korea and Pakistan appear to have been working together closely on nuclear and missile technology. Apparently we have sanctioned them both for missile technology that Pakistan bought from North Korea, but we are not sanctioning Pakistan for supplying uranium enrichment technology to North Korea. Because the evidence is so strong, the New York Times thought that the U.S. was sanctioning both for both kinds of transactions. But the State Department denied that.

The fact that the State Department failed to sanction either country because of transfers of nuclear enrichment technology is some kind of a cop out. Pakistan's nuclear program is built on uranium enrichment, rather than separating out plutonium. If North Korea indeed has a previously undeclared enrichment plant, it is almost certain that they got Pakistani help to build it. If American intelligence were any good, it could confirm this. If there were really no basis for sanctions, it would indicate that North Korea does not really have an enrichment program, and thus that the flap which led to the departure of the IAEA safeguards experts was unjustified.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The primary mechanism for restraining nuclear proliferation is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. According to the State Department history:

The Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. On July 9, President Johnson transmitted it to the Senate, but prospects for early U.S. ratification dimmed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. The Senate adjourned without voting on the Treaty. In February, 1969, President Nixon requested Senate approval of the Treaty, and in March the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification on March 5, 1970. In broadest outline, the basic provisions of the Treaty are designed to:
-- prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (Articles I and II);
-- provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons (Article III);
-- promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the other purposes of the Treaty, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to include the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosion technology being made available to non-nuclear parties under appropriate international observation (Articles IV and V);
-- express the determination of the parties that the Treaty should lead to further progress in comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures (Article VI).

Article VIII provides for a conference to be held five years after entry into force of the Treaty to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Four such review conferences have been held since the Treaty entered into force.

IAEA

The NPT designated the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply safeguards to non-nuclear weapons states, to monitor their nuclear programs and prevent them from developing nuclear nuclear weapons.

Missile Nonproliferation

Missile proliferation is a relatively new concept, compared to nuclear proliferation, which has been an international concern for many more years.

MTCR

One of the main mechanisms for controlling missile proliferation is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which I helped create while working for the State Department in the 1980s.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation

Chemical

The main mechanism for controlling the proliferation of chemical weapons is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Chemical weapons are unique among weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because they have been around since World War I, in which they were used extensively. Corporal Hitler was recovering from being gassed when World War I ended.

Biological

The main mechanism for controlling the proliferation of biological weapons is the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).