Social unrest at the grassroots level has shone both domestic and international light on the issue of dam projects within India. The Narmada Sagar dam (NSD) project and Sardar Sarovar dam (SSD) project in India have been the focus of widespread debate in recent years because of their potentially harmful implications. Dam projects undoubtedly take into account complex issues involving social, environmental, and economic factors. The decision to build a dam is a complexity in itself that should be analyzed to determine if the potential dam will have a positive impact in the overall view of development.

What are the social, environmental, and economic impacts of the NSD and SSD? Taking these impacts into account, are the projects beneficial to the development of the citizens in the dam’s target area? A critical analysis of these questions may lead to potential modifications of these projects, or may even lead to a more critical stance when planning future dam projects. These questions will be answered through an analysis of the projects as they stand now, investigating their intended purposes and benefits. Social implications of the relocation of citizens in the areas to be inundated will be examined. The intended benefits of the projects for irrigation and hydroelectric power for citizens will be analyzed. Environmental consequences of the projects in terms of sedimentation, water logging, the destruction of forests, as well as water-borne diseases will be investigated. Finally, the economic implications of the projects will be examined, through the consideration of direct and indirect costs, and in addition to these factors, the involvement of the World Bank in these projects will be investigated.

A history of the projects

The concept of building dams on the Narmada River originated from a British entrepreneur in 1863 who had the idea to harness the Narmada’s water to irrigate crops in the drought prone state of Gujarat (McCully 1994). The first technical studies for the damming of the river were conducted in the late 1940’s (Wood 1993, 972). After more intensive studies, the Central Water and Power Commission came to the conclusion that the terminal dam on the river (the Sardar Sarovar dam) should be constructed at Navagam in Gujarat. It also recommended that the dam should be built in two stages, the first stage at a full reservoir height of 160 feet, and then the second stage upgrading to 300 feet (Wood 1993, 972).

In 1959 the proposed full reservoir height of the SSD was raised to 455 feet (Wood 1993, 972). This change occurred because it was found that water could be transported by canal to the Kutch region of Gujarat and eventually to the state of Rajasthan some 460 km away from the dam (McCully 1994). The Narmada River flows through the states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra, and a dispute between these states arose over the distribution of the Narmada River’s resources and the costs of the dam projects in the 1960’s. With the purpose of resolving this dispute, the Central Government of India formed the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) in 1969, and this tribunal sat for ten years. Thereafter in 1979, the NWDT awarded Madhya Pradesh 65% of the river’s resources, 32% to Gujarat, 2% to Rajasthan, and 1% to Maharashtra (Dixon, Talbot and Le Moigne 1989, 54). Both the SSD and NSD projects initially did not meet the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF) regulations, and were both denied clearance for building in 1983 (Wood 1993, 976). In 1987, due to political pressures of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress party and the increasing damages from severe droughts in Gujarat, the SSD and NSD projects were given conditional clearance by the Central Government (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 63). Conditional clearance was given because, "the environmental assessment required under India’s environmental regulations was not ready." The MEF allowed the projects to begin while the assessment was being completed, with the understanding that it would be completed by 1989, but as time elapsed, the assessment was not completed in 1989, and the construction continued (The World Bank 1995, 92).

Location and description of the dams

The SSD is situated near Badgam in the Bharuch district of Gujarat. The NSD is located upstream of the SSD, near Punasa in the East Nimar district of Madhya Pradesh (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 63). Both dams are the largest dams of the over 3000 dams proposed as part of the overall Narmada River Valley dam project. The NSD is designed to work in conjunction with the SSD by storing water in its reservoir for regulated release to the SSD (Wood 1993, 974). Water from the dam will be distributed to the states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra as previously stated. In terms of physical structure, both dams are large-scale concrete dams being built across the Narmada river valley, with the SSD’s full reservoir height set at 455 feet, and the NSD’s height set at 860 feet (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 72).

What are the intended purposes/benefits of the dam projects?

There are a few purposes for building dams in the Narmada river valley, and they include, "in the order of priority (but not in terms of volume of water use), the provision of drinking water, industrial water supply, irrigation and power generation" (Dixon, Talbot, and Le Moigne 1989, 54). It is evident from the fact that in addition to the two dams, over 75,000 km of secondary canals will deliver water to irrigate farms, that irrigation is a major part of the dam projects (McCully, 1994). The command area of the projects (the area where water is to be delivered for irrigation in particular) is stated as being 2.0 million hectares in Gujarat (70% of which is drought prone), 3.1 million hectares in Madhya Pradesh, and less than 0.1 million hectares in both Rajasthan and Maharashtra" (Dixon, Talbot, and Le Moigne 1989, 55). Hydroelectric power is another major product of the dams. Dam officials have set the amount of hydroelectric power provided by the SSD at 1450 MW and 1000 MW from the NSD (Wood 1993, 974). Official also estimate that, "drinking water would become available for 3800 villages and 147 towns in Gujarat" (Wood 1993, 974). The number of people who will benefit from the water and electricity delivered from the dams is estimated as being close to 40,000,000 with the majority being in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh where a large portion of the population "is without adequate water or electrical supply" (Frederiksen 1996, 86).

Social implications of the projects

Who and how many people need to be resettled from the area to be inundated?

It is estimated that over 250,000 people will be displaced by the SSD and NSD, and this have caused major dispute in recent years ("Damned" 1992, 36). Table 1.1 shows the breakdown of the number of villages and people affected by the two dams. The figures show that over 100,000 people will have to be relocated due to the SSD and about 170,000 people due to the NSD (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 66). The majority of the people affected currently reside in Madhya Pradesh, as both of the dams’ reservoirs are located primarily in that state.

It is important to consider who is being relocated. The NSD’s submergence area includes a population of over 67,000 tribal people (Jayaraman 1988, 583). On the other hand, over two-thirds of those displaced by the SSD are tribal people (Wood 1993, 975). The fact that there is a large number of tribal people being displaced is significant because it has been observed that, "these tribals have been traditionally cultivating forest lands for decades [and] do not have legal title to the land: hence they will not get any compensation" (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 64). Apart from the fact that the tribals may not get compensation, relocation will be detrimental to the livelihood of these peoples because they rely on the landscape for their beliefs, rituals, and festivals (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 64).

What are the governmental policies regarding resettlement in this case?

Under the NWDT award given in 1979, oustees from any area submerged by the SSD have the option of being relocated to Gujarat or to stay in their own province. Unfortunately there is a lack of suitable land for oustees. Officials from Madhya Pradesh have offered financial compensation instead of land with the goal of sending oustees to Gujarat. Oustees in turn have refused to relocate in Gujarat stating that the land offered to them was "sandy and unirrigable", and thus unsuitable for them (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 65). As for those displaced by NSD, predominantly those from Madhya Pradesh, their only option is to relocate in villages within Madhya Pradesh. Again the problem of unsuitable land remains as, "the grazing lands that remain in the villages have hardly any soil cover and are of very poor quality, totally unfit for crop production" (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 65).

In spite of the lack of suitable agricultural land for oustees, the government of Gujarat claims to have "the best resettlement and rehabilitation policy in the world for the people displaced by the projects" (Sattaur August 1991, 10). Under this policy, oustees are eligible for 2 hectares of land for each person, regardless of how much they had in the past, and temporary accommodations. This seems reasonable if it was actually put into practice with a respectable standard of living, but it seems that it has not. NGO’s are claiming that oustees are not receiving their full share of land, and that the temporary housing consists of "tin sheds with one sheet of tin separating the family from their livestock" (Sattaur August 1991, 10). The government of Gujarat’s resettlement policy does have its merits, though its implementation needs to be addressed in a more suitable manner. On the other hand, the government of Madhya Pradesh does not offer any relocation or compensation packages to "landless labourers who lose their livelihoods when their employers are resettled" (Sattaur October 1991, 16). If the government of Madhya Pradesh does not offer compensation to landless labourers then it is evident that all oustees are not being looked after.

How have the citizens affected by the dam reacted to involuntary relocation?

The World Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement says that, "displaced people should ‘regain at least their previous standard of living’" ("Damned" 1992, 36). Involuntary resettlement without suitable compensation also runs into the problem of backlash from the people affected. For instance, villagers in Jalsindhi, which is located in the area to be submerged by the SSD, are refusing to accept the rehabilitation package offered by the government of Gujarat. The villagers cite the problems of hostility of the local people in the areas of relocation, the lack of forests for wood, the absence of rivers for fishing, and the lack of pastures for grazing cattle (Sen 1995, 51). There are other instances where villagers are refusing to relocate and are fully willing to accept drowning as a form of protest. Public attention has increased as protestors and organizations such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement) have been putting pressure on governments and capital lenders, such as the World Bank.

How have the resettlement activities to date affected the construction of the dams?

The Supreme Court of India ordered a halt on construction of the SSD on December 7, 1995 ("Indian Supreme" 1996). This order came about due to a lawsuit filed by the Narmada Bachao Andolan against the Central and state governments of India with respect to resettlement issues, environmental impact and economic non-viability ("Indian Supreme" 1996). The State of Madhya Pradesh has proposed that the dam’s proposed height be reduced to 436 feet from 455 feet before the case went to court, and now it wants the dam to be at a maximum height of 384 feet (Dharmadhikary 1996). The Madhya Pradesh [MP] government proposed the change in height because, "the largest number of oustees (80 percent) are from MP. It [the MP government] argued that the Gujarat government has not kept up its end of the deal because it was supposed to resettle people" ("Indian Supreme" 1996). Currently the SSD has been built to a height of 208 feet and the courts are refusing to allow construction to resume until authorities ensure the rehabilitation of the people displaced is secured (McCully 1997). The reduction of the height of both the SSD and NSD is a critical issue because a reduction translates into less area being flooded. It has been estimated that if the proposed height of the SSD is reduced to 420 feet, 90% of the potential oustees would be eliminated, and 80% of the cultivable land to be submerged would be saved. In the case of the NSD, if the proposed height were reduced from 860 feet to 814 feet, the population displaced would be reduced to 20,000 people (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 72).

Are the proposed/stated benefits of the dam projects realistic?

When the NDWT awarded percentage shares of the water resources of the Narmada River and set the heights of the NSD and SSD in 1979, it based its percentages and height on the quantity of water flow in the river. The tribunal used an estimate of 27.25 million acre feet (MAF) for the flow in 1979, using figures from 1891-1947. Using this figure, the tribunal calculated a full reservoir height of 436 feet for the SSD for irrigation purposes, and was later raised to 455 feet to allow for the generation of additional hydroelectric power for Madhya Pradesh. The initial figure of 27.25 MAF has now been deemed to be an overstatement, as records up to 1992 show an average flow of 23 MAF. With this figure, the height of the dam has been re-estimated so that it should be 400 feet high. Madhya Pradesh is willing to forego its share of hydroelectric power by reducing the height of the dam, because of the fact that most of the inundation is avoided at this height (Lodaya 1994). India has had experience with overestimating figures in regards to dam projects. The Gandhi Sagar dam had overestimated figures and this left the top 5.4 metres of the dam dry, which translated into 30% of its capacity. A total of over 50,000 people were needlessly evacuated for the reservoir of this dam (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 72).

In the case of the NSD, the height of the dam was also set too high. This has a direct impact on the hydroelectric output of the SSD because the output was estimated assuming that the NSD would provide regulated releases of water for it at its proposed height. The government of Gujarat now says that the power generation of the dam will be closer to 425 MW instead of the stated 1450 MW during the first stage of the project before the irrigation system is in place. After the system is in place, the output will be reduced to a mere 50 MW (McCully 1994).

The provision of drinking water is another benefit of the projects that has been stated by officials. Both dams do have the potential to provide drinking water, but "no plans have been completed for how the drinking water is to be delivered to consumer, nor has any money been allocated for this component of the project" (McCully 1994). Without plans or allocated funds for the drinking water component of the projects, it seems unlikely that drinking water will be provided by the projects any time in the near future.

Opponents to the projects are also pointing to the benefactors of the projects in their arguments against the dams. There is a belief that "the wealthy farmers, rather than the poor, ‘will benefit most from the project’" (Sattaur October 1991, 16). The government of Gujarat has said that it will not allow cash crops to be grown in the command area of the projects, but again opponents point out that, "five of the largest sugar processing factories in Asia are now being built in the Sardar Sarovar project command area" (Sattaur October 1991, 16). There may be another reason why these factories are being built in this area, but there is a high likelihood that they are in anticipation of cash crops such as sugar cane.

Proponents of the projects point out that, "the region [command area of the dams] is ‘one of the most severe drought-prone areas of the nation’," and that, "during a drought, bringing in water by truck or train and providing other basics costs about $200 million [U.S.] a year" (Hattangadi and Ichniowski 1992, 10). It is true that the state of Gujarat experienced serious droughts in the 1980’s and this was a contributing factor to the conditional clearance of the projects in 1987. The estimate that 40 million people will receive water and electricity from the dams, presented earlier in this paper, is one that should be considered when weighing the costs against the benefits of the project.

Sedimentation and Siltation

Sedimentation is not a problem that dams cause, but is one that shortens a dam’s useful life. It occurs when, "the larger sediments in the water entering a reservoir are deposited at its upper end forming a delta and steadily raising the level of the upper reaches of the reservoir." This sedimentation causes flooding due to its backwater effect, and in the case of the NSD and SSD it seems that, "no proper study of this has been done" (McCully 1994). Siltation also occurs as silt is deposited at the bottom of the reservoir, further reducing the dam’s useful life. The estimated siltation rate for the NSD was initially set at 1.55 (hectares/metres of silt) per 100 km² of catchment area. Table 1.2 shows the estimated siltation rates for various dams in India. From the table it is evident that all of the siltation rates have been underestimated. The same is true for the NSD, as observed surveys show a siltation rate of 5.62 (hectares/metres of silt) per 100 km² of catchment area (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 69). This greater observed siltation rate means that the useful life for the NSD is going to be shorter that expected. Siltation rates for the SSD could not be located, but it can be assumed that they have been underestimated as all the other dams have shown.

Waterlogging

Large-scale irrigation schemes in India have been shown to cause waterlogging. Rich soils in the states of Punjab and Haryana have been robbed of their use because of waterlogging (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 69). The Indian Institute of Science estimates that 40 percent of the command area for the NSD will become waterlogged (Jayaraman 1988, 583). A similar estimate can be expected for the SSD, because both command areas contain, "black cotton soils which are particularly prone to waterlogging under perennial irrigation" (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 69). Waterlogging from the overall Narmada Valley Dam project has already been observed as, "irrigation from the first two dams in the scheme has caused soils to become waterlogged and crop yields to fall" (Jayaraman 1988, 583).

Destruction of Forests

The destruction of forests is another inevitable consequence of both projects. Table 1.3 shows the sizes of the areas to be submerged by both dam projects. It can be seen that of the close to 40,000 hectares to be inundated by the SSD, close to 35% of it will be forest land, and of the close to 90,000 hectares to inundated by the NSD, close to 44% of it will be forest land. The MEF has policy in place that requires that for every hectare of forest destroyed, an equivalent hectare of trees must be planted in a non-forest area, or twice as much degraded forest lands can be replanted instead. Since there is not much land even for resettlement let alone forestation, officials have proceeded with the second option of reforestation. Critics, however, cite the fact that, "it is the duty of the Forest Department to afforest degraded forest lands anyway," and that, "the department of Environment and Forests [MEF] has not even examined whether afforestation can be carried out in degraded forest lands" (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 66-67). In recent years, pressure from environmentalist has caused the government of Gujarat to agree to afforest 5,000 hectares in the Kutch region of Gujarat, and to plant 30 million trees along the irrigation canals and on the shores of the reservoirs of the dams (Wood 1993, 979). The destruction of forests is a direct consequence of the dams, but of equal importance is the destruction of wildlife in those forests. The scope of the environmental catastrophe that will be caused when entire species of life will be wiped out by these dams is beyond this paper. All that can be said is that officials have not made any plans of adequate relocation for people, let alone wildlife.

Water - borne disease

Water- borne disease is a health hazard that is related to large-scale irrigation projects such as the SSD and NSD. India has had experience with water-borne disease as shown by the increased incidence of malaria in the command area of the Tawa project. The Madhya Pradesh Council of Science and Technology has predicted that, "the incidence of malaria, filaria, cholera, gastroenteritis, viral encephalitis, goitre and some other water borne diseases is likely to increase," due to the SSD and NSD projects (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 70). Apparently there are measures that could be taken against these water-borne diseases, although no examples could be found. This assumption is made evident by a report to the World Bank that states, "the existing threat from malaria within the [irrigation] area is serious, and the project has not built in ‘appropriate safeguards’" (Hattangadi and Ichniowski 1992, 11). This statement implies that there are "appropriate safeguards" that could be applied and should be if the project is to be of benefit.

How much will the projects cost and where has funding come from?

Both the SSD and NSD projects have costs that go beyond financial costs of the dams themselves. Some of these costs include the loss of forests and wildlife, the loss of agricultural lands due to waterlogging, the loss of land submerged, the costs associated with resettlement of oustees, and the costs of the irrigation canal system. It is difficult to obtain estimates for such things as the monetary costs of the loss of forests and wildlife, and so the costs that have been estimated will be discussed.

The World Bank has provided funding in the form of loans for the SSD project, and figures for this project are readily available. Funding for the NSD has not come from the World Bank and as a result, the NSD’s costs are not readily available, but since the two dams are similar in size, the costs for the dam alone can be assumed to be of the same magnitude as the SSD. Estimated costs for the SSD have climbed steadily over the past two decades. In 1983, authorities gave the World Bank an estimate of Rs. 42,020 million ($1,400 million U.S.) for the dam and irrigation canal system, while in 1985 the World Bank estimated the cost at Rs. 136,400 million ($4,547 million U.S.). An estimate of Rs. 342,000 million ($11,400 million U.S.) was cited in, "A 1994 World Bank publication" (McCully 1994). Funding for both projects has been provided primarily by the state governments involved in the projects and the Government of India, with the exception of the SSD, which has had funding provided by both the Indian governments and by a loans from the World Bank and the Japanese government.

The cost of relocation and "human suffering" is a great one that has in fact been estimated. The Narmada Valley Dam Authority (NVDA), which oversees the overall damming of the river, has estimated the "human suffering" by, "determining two years annual income of the family [oustees], multiplied by a factor of 1.5," and this has yielded an estimate of Rs. 200 million ($6.7 million U.S.) (Alvares and Billorey 1987, 64). This was estimated prior to 1987, and since the estimated costs of the dams have increased since that time, this estimate can be assumed to have increased since then. The Indian government’s Department of Forests has also given an estimate of the "social cost" of the projects at about $3 million U.S. (Rs. 90 million) (Jayaraman 1988, 583).

The unseen environmental costs that will likely arise from these projects have been identified in this paper. One such cost is that of medical care for those inflicted with water-borne diseases from the irrigation canal system. Officials do not consider this when calculating the cost of the projects, and this could prove to be a major cost. The environmental and social costs of the projects have lead to loan contributors pulling out of the SSD project. For instance, the Japanese government cancelled funding for the SSD after concluding that, "even under heroic assumptions, the largest dam being built on the Narmada, the Sardar Sarovar, is environmentally destructive and uneconomic" (Esteva and Prakash 1992, 48).

What has The World Bank’s involvement been in these projects?

World Bank funding for the SSD project has amounted to $280 million U.S. (Rs. 8,400 million) and the bank has officially pulled out of the project as of 1993 (Young 1994, 2). In 1985 the bank committed $450 million U.S. (Rs. 13,500 million), but following increasing pressures from environmental and human rights agencies, the World Bank commissioned a four member review committee in 1991 to investigate the SSD project (McCully 1994). Ten months later, the review committee submitted a 363-page report that commented on the resettlement and environmental aspects of the project. The report cited that, "neither the Indian governments nor the World Bank carried out adequate assessments of the human impact of the Sardar Sarovar," and that, "there was no recognition of the special needs of the tribal populations involved." In addition the report stated that, "the compensation packages for MP, Maharashtra, and some Gujarat ‘oustees’ did not meet WB standards." With regards to the environment, the report stated that, "impact studies were inadequate and that no plan had been prepared to mitigate environmental damage," and that, "the existing schemes for compensatory afforestation, prevention of waterlogging and salinification in the command area, distribution of drinking water, malaria control came under strong criticism" (Wood 1993, 979-980). These concerns brought to light by the review committee lead the World Bank to ask the Indian government to cancel its loan for the project, and it did in so in 1993. With the cancellation of the World Bank loan, critics have said that, "a cash shortage has meant that there is no way the project will be completed before the year 2010, if at all" (Sen 1995, 5).

Conclusion

The NSD and SSD projects have complex social, environmental and economic implications for the citizens in the dams’ target area. The interplay of these implications is very complex and makes it difficult to assess the projects’ benefit to development.

Both projects have been designed to provide water for the irrigation of severely drought prone areas of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, and the estimate that 40 million people will benefit from this water and the hydroelectric power provided by the dams is a considerable one. The state of Gujarat also endured great financial burden during the droughts of the 1980’s, and the dams could potentially save the state millions of dollars.

Who will benefit and suffer from the dams also needs to be considered. Some have said that wealthy farmers and factories depending on cash crops will benefit, while the poor who need relocation will suffer. It is difficult to say if it is only the rich who will benefit because other factors might justify the building of sugar processing factories in the command area, such as cheaper labour. It is clear that a large number of tribals will suffer from the dams because they will have to relocate out of the area to be submerged and this will disrupt their livelihood. Resettlement plans are not adequate and have not even satisfied World Bank regulations, especially for the tribals who have special needs. Since the estimation of the Narmada River’s flow has been overestimated, and since reducing the dams’ heights will greatly reduce the area to be inundated, dam authorities should seriously consider lowering the proposed heights of both the NSD and the SSD.

The environmental implications of the dams are critical to the evaluation of the dams. Sedimentation and siltation will no doubt reduce the dams’ useful life as siltation rates have been underestimated for the NSD and for many other dams in India. The land the surrounds the dams and the irrigation canals is prone to waterlogging and some land will lose its agricultural use, as has been the case in the states of Punjab and Haryana. Forests will be inundated and as a result, a large population of wildlife will be destroyed. Plans for reforestation seem to be inadequate and regulations for reforestation only seem to shift the responsibility of the reforestation of degraded forests from the MEF to the dam authorities, instead of actually creating new forests. Authorities have also neglected to address the problem of water-borne diseases such as malaria. Even the World Bank’s independent review strongly criticized the dam authority’s plans for disease control.

All of these social and environmental implications add to the cost of the dam projects. The cost of resettlement and "human suffering" is very high and contributes negatively to these projects. The loss of agricultural lands due to waterlogging and the loss of this land in addition to forests due to submergence have not been incorporated into the stated costs of the project. No one has even tried to estimate the associated costs due to the increased incidence of water-borne disease, and these costs are undoubtedly high. The unaccounted costs in the plans for the projects, and the SSD project in particular, have lead to the withdrawal of major capital lenders for the project. As a result of the World Bank’s independent review, the bank stopped its funding for the project. This withdrawal of the World Bank, in addition to the withdrawal of the Japanese government, are key indicators for the Indian Central and state governments that the projects have not been adequately assessed and that re-planning needs to take place.

Weighing all of the costs that have been identified against the potential benefit of the projects to development and for irrigation and electricity for over 40 million people is difficult. Some can argue that the benefit of 40 million outweighs the costs for relocation and human suffering to an estimated 250,000. Others can argue that the "human" costs of suffering override any benefits that are potentially available from the projects. An even others (and they already have) can argue that the costs to the environment are too great to justify the benefits. No absolutely correct answer can be offered for the question of the benefit of the project. What can be said is that there are many factor involved and they all are complexly related. It is obvious that mistakes have been made, and people are paying for it right now. The building of the SSD is at a standstill because the Supreme Court of India wants guarantees for the relocation plans of oustees. If assessments had been made before the plans for the projects were approved, then modifications may have been made in time, such as the lowering of the dams’ heights.

The future of these projects is unclear, but it is clear that they will not be completed on time. Are they beneficial to development? They may be, but at a great cost. These costs should have been considered before construction of the dams, and hopefully the governments within India and the World Bank will learn to complete assessments before any future projects are undertaken.

Table 1.1 Villages and Population to be affected by submergence due to the Sardar Sarovar and Narmada Sagar dams

Source: Alvares and Billorey 1987, 66.