Dimitris N. Chryssochoou and Dimitris K. Xenakis*
At a time when power is
becoming more widely dispersed and low politics areas acquire greater salience
for students and practitioners alike, the Mediterranean finds itself in limbo between order and change.
Against the background of unprecedented global transformations that redefine
the conditions of international politics, this article aims at assessing
developments in Euro-Mediterranean relations with a view to conceptualising
their intrinsic properties. Its principal aim is to draw normative and
empirical insights from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP),[1]
as well as to investigate the extent to which the Partnership has been able to
ascribe new meaning to regional order-building.
Over the last few
years, Mediterranean politics has come alive, rising from the lethargy of some
fifty ‘cold years’, which resulted in a fixed conception of (world) order.
Underlying the conduct of international politics within the inelastic ‘images
of polarity’ during Cold War diplomacy was the preservation of the status quo in Europe and of a relatively
stable and even predictable international system, as compared with the dynamism
of the post-1989 era. Today, the critical question is whether the EMP can meet
its prescribed ends, without having first to transform itself into a system of
patterned behaviour; that is, without generating a particular notion of rules
of the game.
The Mediterranean has always occupied a prominent role in the attainment of European peace due to its critical geopolitical position, representing the crossroad and natural bridge between three continents. Much like Europe itself, it remains a composite of different cultures, each sharing some portions of a distinctive sense of being and belonging, in turn based on a rich body of histories, traditions, philosophies and values. But the extent to which old images are replaced by new in the region’s cultural tapestry is an open-ended question, depending on different religious and secular understandings of its sense of unity and identity, diversity and differentiation. Mythical constructs aside, the Mediterranean is characterised by a pluricausal dynamism pushing towards a new mapping of its component parts, reformulated through a dialectical union of old stereotypes, novel ways of life, modified perceptions of belonging and an ascending pluralism in its emerging governance structures. Indeed, changes in patterns of thinking and acting are in the air, finding expression either in the form of new social movements that cut across pre-established boundaries or in the formulation of institutionalised rule.
In this rapidly changing scenery, the time seems ripe to revisit the region’s social structures, cultural distinctiveness, economic orientation and, crucially, political future. Although current discourses reach different conclusions as to the existence of an identifiable Mediterranean ‘entity’, the bonds of unity and diversity among its segments continue to form part of an open-ended debate. It is to this evolving debate that this article aims at contributing by asking whether the EMP, rising from the legacy of previously uncoordinated European policies towards the Mediterranean (largely pursued on an individual basis through separate foreign policy agendas), will prove able to give birth to a co-ordinated regional regime with an institutional life of its own, based on clearly defined rules of the game, as well as mutually reinforcing norms and principles.
Arguably, the stability and development of the Mediterranean is not a new theme in the history of international relations, let alone of European diplomacy. Yet, it rests on considerable variation and often on poor results. The extent to which the Mediterranean can be really seen as a distinct region further complicates the discussion about the appropriate scope and level of a common European policy towards the Mediterranean. Partly as a result of the Community’s Mediterranean enlargements in the 1980s, and partly due to the changing conditions post-1989, Mediterranean affairs have come to occupy a significant amount of the external relations of the European Union (EU). But important questions are raised as to whether the new regional process will be crowed with success; what the EU can deliver in terms of furthering democracy, pluralism and liberalisation in the partner countries; which norms are likely to emerge in the security-building aspects of the Partnership (especially in the area of conflict-management); whether a more equitable regime of economic exchange will be established between the two shores; and what the prospects of a new politics of institutionalised accommodation are, given the existing levels of complexity, heterogeneity and fragmentation that for centuries now shape the physiognomy of this ‘unique body of water’. Added to the above are questions of good governance, civil society formation, respect for human rights, the promotion of multiculturalism, and the potential for inter-faith dialogue.
To achieve intended outcomes, the EU necessitates the identification of a commonality of interests, aspirations and a shared Mediterranean vision. For their part, southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries would also have to employ strategies capable of mobilising their energies towards a balanced network of relations in their dealings with the EU, able to alleviate historically rooted prejudices and misperceptions. For it is this ‘capacity for dialogue’ that remains crucial for opening up a range of possibilities for regional peace and stability. Such a capacity, however, in an era of greater structural complexity, requires the search for a new legitimacy based on the partners’ capacity to resist segmentation and to rediscover a new sense of process.
Of importance here are the EU’s strategic choices for the promotion of norms of good governance, given the tensions arising from different conceptions of democracy and democratisation. Equally crucial is to assess whether there are any insurmountable socio-cultural barriers to furthering the prospects of a meaningful inter-civilisational dialogue, keeping in mind the recent re-embrace of radical Islamism. Above all, the question is whether the co-operative ethos embedded in the new regional setting can go beyond the level of contractual interstate obligations and closer to a genuine partnership of states and societies within a transformative order. It is only in this sense that the new Euro-Mediterranean process will act as a prelude to new and far-reaching beginnings.
Democratisation vs. Good Governance
Clarifying some
conceptual problems confronting the ‘good governance’ approach is central to
developing a deeper understanding of the Mediterranean condition. Post-1989,
‘good governance’ became a term in inflationary use by comparativist and
international relations scholarship. Although its longevity may be questioned
by those adhering to the conventional schools of economic liberalisation and
democratisation, its pertinence has been hailed by those subscribing to
flexible but value-driven patterns of shared-rule.
Distinguishing
between democratisation and good governance is of importance. The former refers
to the process of attaining a democratic end-product with reference to the
actual governance of a given polity or system of governance. Drawing from the
experience of the EU qua polity, the
democratisation debate has been greatly enriched by the task of transforming a
system of democratic governments into a democratic, albeit multistate and
plurinational, system.[2]
The democratisation strategy emphasises the institutional means by which
democratic principles and procedures become part of a polity’s modus operandi, establishing conditions
of public accountability (through parliamentary scrutiny), political legitimacy
(input- and output-oriented) and active citizen participation (through the
institutions and processes of civic inclusion). Although no consensus
definition of democratisation exists, central to its respective goals are the
praxis of competitive periodic elections, collective executive accountability,
meaningful legislative representation of the demos (whether single or
composite), a participatory civil society, and the rule of law (with or without
formal constitutional expression).
The above list could well be extended to include other good democratic practices in the workings and composition of domestic institutions of governance, principles referring to some form of separation of powers, citizenship rights (and duties), respect for human and minority rights, promotion of associational-type organisations (as a means of institutionalising the representation of citizen groups), policy responsiveness, and so on. The problem associated with the democratisation approach to the promotion of political change in a state or a group of states is that its substantive component and desired end-situation - democracy - draws heavily from the Western (liberal) tradition. Hence, employing the language (and assorted value spheres and normative orientations) of democratisation is not entirely appropriate as a guide toward the promotion of change in North Africa or the Middle East, whose component polities are characterised by different belief-systems, cultural traditions, political practices, civil arrangements, military doctrines, principles of economic organisation, social structures, and conceptions of the ‘good polity’, as compared with the average Western liberal state.
Good governance on the other hand, seen primarily as a flexible policy structure, aims at distancing itself from absolute notions of democracy and democratisation, focusing instead on a set of norms and rules that are associated with what can be taken to denote a system of working relations based on the constitutive elements of openness and transparency; public accountability; lack of corruption; the institutionalisation of civil society; the socio-political dimensions and, crucially, sources of legitimacy; civic competence (defined as the institutional capacity of citizens to be actively engaged in the political process); individual and collective liberties; civic entitlements; minority and human rights; efficient public-sector management; equitable distribution of public resources; deliberative political processes; the independence of the judiciary; the conception and enactment of well-articulated laws, and so on. What it lacks, as opposed to the democratisation strategy, is a clear focus on a final product of the process of change, be it transitory or transformative, linear or erratic, domestically driven or externally controlled. Instead, good governance may well focus on issues of political and economic liberalisation, inter-faith or inter-cultural dialogue, and socio-economic governance, without however democracy being either logically or necessarily located at the end of a continuum, whose poles are represented by the likes of ‘non-democracy’ (encompassing a variety of autocratic, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes) and ‘full-blown democracy’ or, as some realist democratic theorists would have it, polyarchy.
Grosso modo, the good governance approach forms the basis of a particular type of socio-political agenda, rather than by the universal applicability of liberal-democratic ideals in the sense of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisation’ thesis. Its an instrument for capacity-building in furthering inter-systemic convergence, without subsuming the parts into an absolutist ideology of good (or better) democratic practice. Thus, central to the development of a more profound understanding of the EMP is the need to acknowledge both the normative and procedural qualities of embedded diversity and flexibility, as opposed to cross-systemic uniformity and, as the liberal-democratic canon implies, principled universality. Above all, good governance does not easily become ‘subject to allegations of cultural bias’.[3] Finally, although, much like democratisation, no general agreement exists as to what good governance comprises, unlike democratisation, it ‘constitutes a more diffuse and less directly challenging manifesto … emphasise[s] values and practices which are not absolutes … [and] enables concern with democracy to find expression through less direct but nonetheless significant channels’.[4]
Defining the Mediterranean Space
It is fair to say
that the Mediterranean constitutes an interactive system of states and
societies, whose mapping remains nebulous. Although ‘different definitions and
different criteria often produce different regions’,[5]
most Mediterranean analysts fail to agree on a geographically bounded unit of
analysis. Yet, the task of defining the Mediterranean requires taking into
account that ‘mental maps’ and ‘imagined spaces’ are those that ultimately
define communities and political regions.[6]
Pre-1945 maps of the region may look today particularly archaic, while broad
concepts such as the ‘West’ or the ‘Orient’ that continue to divide the region
cover no well-delineated territories. Their appeal is in the associations they
conjure up, mixing geographical space with socio-economic interaction, as well
as with political and cultural identity to draw an imaginary divide.[7]
A more studied analysis reveals that the Mediterranean offers an efficient line
of contact. After all, in the disorderly universe of politics, perceptions
generate reality. The ability to manage such perceptions is thus crucial,
especially given that there is hardly another topic that has caused such a clear-cut and long-standing, if
not perpetual, split among its students; namely, Christian Europe and the
Islamic world. Tempting as it is to characterise the Mediterranean as ‘a
kind of horizontal dividing line’ between the European North and ‘an arc of
crisis’ located in the South, its division into Europe and ‘other’ fails to
capture the dialectic between distinct, yet intertwined, geographical spaces. A
North-South conflict theoretical framework underestimates the realities of both
North-North and South-South frictions and the sympathies that not only prevent
the outbreak of autochthonous conflicts but also underlie Western European
efforts to develop harmonious, yet not symmetrical, relations across the
Mediterranean.[8]
From
the prism of international regionalism, although sub-regional constellations
need a complex re-conceptualisation of regional dynamics, it is still useful to
think of the Mediterranean as a single system (or totality). Some security considerations around the basin
derive from similar trends such as unresolved questions of political
legitimacy, slow growth to resurgent nationalism, religious radicalism, social
unrest, the search for regional dominance, arms supplies, strategic balances,
etc. Another paradox arises when considering that it is security, rather
than societal, economic or cultural considerations that legitimise a holistic
approach to the study of Euro-Mediterranean politics.[9]
True as it may be that security problems in the area can best be handled at the
regional level, the question is how to achieve coherent patterns of interaction
among Mediterranean states, as well as between them and the rest of the world
so as to enhance regional stability.[10]
The
Mediterranean is often described as a dense network of diversities and dividing
lines among different political and socio-economic (sub)systems, cultures,
civilisations, languages, forms of association and expression, and religious
denominations. For a penetrating understanding of the Mediterranean to be
reached, one has to recognise that the region has always been a crossing point
for conflict and co-operation, unity and diversity. Current discourses assert
that the Mediterranean exists as an ‘entity’ or ‘unity’; a view which chimes
well with Braudel’s, in that the Mediterranean formed a large-scale unity,
whose history could be understood only by looking at the factors that tied its
coastal parts together.[11]
As Aliboni asserts, the special bonds of Mediterranean solidarity will continue
to form part of an open-ended debate.[12]
In this context, Lister argues that the question of a Mediterranean ‘ideal’ of
unity is rarely explicitly spelled out; rather, ‘it is usually a vague
expression of goodwill and shared history’.[13]
Being a heterogeneous synthesis of religious and ethnic groups along the lines
of a ‘heterarchy’, unequal socio-economic development, a plurality of regimes,
divergent perceptions of security, and uneven demographic growth, the
Mediterranean occupies a prominent position between order and disorder,
transformation and affirmation. For our purposes, the Mediterranean is defined
as a heterarchical regional space, where geography, history and politics
intermesh with culture and religion, resulting in a composite system of partial
regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging.
Security (Mis)perceptions
As Jervis
asserts, in international relations, it is the threat itself as much as its
perception that guide policy-makers.[14]
Today, most would agree that, even after the horrific events of 11 September
2001, the Mediterranean does not present Europe with any major military threat,[15]
as the growing arms races in the
region and its militarisation are mainly intended for use on a south-south
scale. Instead, EU states are concerned with losing control over their energy
supplies and growing illegal migration. Similarly, they are preoccupied with
increased instability in parts of North
Africa and the weakness of democracy. Although issue-specific disputes are not
to be ruled out, the main security risk is now linked with radical movements
and the enduring north-south economic asymmetries. Nor do southern
Mediterranean states perceive any direct threat from Europe, for they associate
‘security’ chiefly with domestic concerns. Still though, the international
management of domestic crises exacerbates anti-Western feelings: ‘Even talking
about it may have a destabilising effect’.[16]
This perception stems from a chain of events that has fuelled the Arabs with a
deep sense of strategic insecurity. The Gulf War, the international isolation
imposed on Iraq and Libya, and the overwhelming US preoccupation with Israeli
security, both pre- and post-September 11, have convinced the Arabs that the
West will not hesitate to strike out against them should its interests require
so. Most North African regimes are sceptical of Europe’s willingness to play a
decisive role in Mediterranean security,[17]
while they are suspicious of NATO’s involvement in the region,[18]
despite its initiative for a ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’.[19] For their part, EU states exhibit a
relative difficulty in dealing with Mediterranean security issues, in contrast
to dealing with similar problems in other transformative regions.
Mediterranean
security is full of misunderstandings about distorted perceptions and images of
Islam, as it is about the threat of terrorism used by extremist groups. Other
issues stem from the appropriation of Islam for political ends and the tensions
arising from questions of universal values and human rights norms. Such
misunderstandings emanate as much from mutual ignorance, as they do from
intended confusion. One should also guard against the simplification often
suggested in the media that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is a violent and merciless
force orchestrated by Iran with the help of other radical regimes.[20]
As Essid rightly points out, ‘there is still a need to define and redefine
terms which reduce dialogue to a series of parallel monologues and, at several
levels, reinforce misunderstandings’.[21]
It is, then, of great value that any
meaningful debate about (political) Islam should dispel the clouds of
deliberate myth-making and revengeful rhetoric that are particularly
detrimental to a mutually rewarding dialogue.
During
the Gulf War, the West was seriously concerned with the possibility of a
militant Islamist backlash against intervention, unveiling several fault-lines
between and within Mediterranean polities and societies. This signalled the
re-arrangement of world order, reducing East-West antagonism to a minimum,
while re-emphasising the Orient-Occident and North-South divides, offering
useful ammunition to those arguing that the dominant conflict post-Cold War is
between Occidental and Oriental values, or between a technological
‘post-historical’ world and a ‘historical’ one.[22]
Rather effortlessly, Huntington depicted multiple (sub)regional ‘clashes’ as a
result of the existence of different civilisations, projecting a historical
Mediterranean fragmentation.[23]
His Clash of Civilisations raised the
question of security’s cultural dimension, in that the ‘clash’ occurs along the
lines of religiously inspired militancy against Western liberal values. But his
analysis missed the underlying causes of Islamic resurgence, as it is obsessed
with the cultural symbols or the retrieval of collective historical memories. A
related criticism is that, by rewriting Muslim history, he failed to encourage
intelligent dialogue between the two cultures. As Sachedina asserts, such
scholarship effectively corrupts the common moral and political language of the
two cultures, fosters confrontation, and prolongs historical stereotypes.[24]
Arguing that the notion of ‘Islam vs. the West’ will not represent the arena of
the next ideological struggle, Fuller and Lesser suggest that a comprehensive
reform to break away from authoritarianism is imperative, that political Islam
threatens the established order in Muslim countries far more than the West, and
that confrontation can best be prevented by integrating Islam into the global
process.[25]
Nevertheless,
concern of an Islamic ‘threat’ to the West increased after the Gulf War, by
creating a new enemy stereotype after the demise of communism, preparing a
climate for a ‘new cultural war’.[26]
Rising anxiety in international relations is, according to Blunden, contagious.[27]
All too often, Western policy-makers have exploited a general public ignorance
about ‘Orientalism’ to advance self-serving objectives. Since ‘Islam is both a
religion and a polity’,[28]
many extremist groups have used it for radical purposes. The traditional view
of ‘Orientalists’ in the West is that the Arabs ‘show lack of coordination and
harmony in organisation and function, nor have they revealed an ability for
cooperation. Any collective action for mutual benefit or common profit is alien
to them’.[29] Crucial to
the creation of such stereotypes has been the role played by the Western media
in equating Islam with ‘fundamentalist Islam’ and, hence, with a direct threat
to the liberal-democratic West. In this context, Said notes, ‘there is a
consensus on Islam as a kind of scapegoat for everything we do not happen to
like about the world’s new political, social, and economic patterns’.[30]
Likewise, Esposito suggests that the selective presentation of facts and biased
analysis have contributed to a negative perception of Islamic religion by
mainstream Western society, reducing Islam and its revivalism to stereotypes of
‘Islam vs. the West’, ‘Islam vs. modernity’, ‘Muslim rage’, etc.[31]
Similarly, Roberson argues that ‘the Islamic threat is essentially a
counterfeit issue imbued with stereotypical misperceptions and a casual
commitment to analysis ... in some cases, a conscious exercise in image creation
for tactical political purposes’.[32]
With
the majority of pre-liberal images being influenced by the pre-eminent role
attached to a value-driven distinction between the individual and the
collective, it was thanks to the legacy of the Enlightenment that certain
notions of ‘civility’ were linked to a more normative discourse. Such a legacy
has largely survived the present era, with the West aiming at monopolising
global discourse on democracy and human rights. But much like those in the West, Muslims believe that their faith has a
divine purpose too, motivating them to set the world straight. More than religion and polity, Islam is also a culture
with a different perception of church-state relations. Although the roots of this
discourse can be traced to the revival of classic Greek ideas and the
Renaissance, the coming of modernity clearly exposed the differences between
the two cultures.[33] Most Arab
societies were introduced to the logic of modernisation under the heavy
pressure of colonial Europe. As Soltan notes, modernisation was more successful
in dismantling the traditional structures than in setting up their modern
replacements.[34] Doubtless, the process of adapting to a largely
Western image of modernity is still going on for a number of Islamic countries.
Although Gellner argued that Islamic culture is endowed with features
that are congruent with the requirements of modernity,[35] many Muslim leaders still fight for a line ‘back
to the roots’. Arab political elites are rather eclectic in picking out those ‘values
of modernisation’ that best fit their aims for maintaining power such as modern
weapons, surveillance technology and consumer goods. Such processes of
‘selective adaptation’ make it particularly difficult for the Western value
system to be accepted by these societies. Instead, modernisation and its
assorted philosophies are often reduced to symbols of moral decay, with Western
influence thus having to be controlled as it steadily increases the
technological, military, economic and scientific superiority and/or hegemony of
an ever-more globalising capitalist world.
In Western polities, a separation of state and religion
(secularism) was necessary to safeguard the modernisation project and its
properties of industrialisation, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, technology,
growth in communications, and so on; but Islam is still against any such
separation.[36] According to
Islamists, modernity may only be reached through indigenous values and not
through their assimilation to Western culture. As Aliboni states, modernisation
through Western imitation leads to subordination.[37]
In this context, Huntington notes that, ‘to the extent that governmental
legitimacy and policy flow from religious doctrines and religious expertise,
Islamic concepts of politics differ from and contradict the premises of
democratic politics’.[38]
This view accords with Diamond, Linz and Lipset’s earlier analysis that ‘the
Islamic countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa ... appear to have
little prospect of transition even to semi-democracy’.[39]
But it comes in direct opposition to Pool’s assertion that ‘the view that Islam
is utterly incompatible with democracy, whatever form the latter takes, is to
view Islam from a limited and simplistic perspective. Contemporary Islam can be
democratic, undemocratic and anti-democratic and the political orientations of
Muslim and Islamic movements have exhibited similar variations’.[40] Although
Curdy makes the point that democracy and Islam ‘are contradictory only if
democracy is defined by certain Western standards’,[41]
Pool is right to suggest that ‘presidents and kings remain in charge of a
state-controlled process of democratisation as part of strategies of ... regime
survival’.[42]
The revival of Islam per
se, of political Islamism, and of Islamic radicalism are products of these
antitheses. Fragmented and struggling with modernity, Islam faces a variety of
challenges including potentially violent movements. The threat of radicalism
currently manifested in the southern Mediterranean rim lies in the fact that
many of its essential aspects are a reaction to years of intolerable political
and living conditions. Thus, the fundamentalist threat is not merely a
symptom of deeply rooted differences between the West and Islam, but also a
means of responding to post-colonial pressures towards liberalisation,
perceived as a threat to the ‘inner cohesion’ of Islamic tradition. Here, religion is used to cover other deficits like
economic, social and political, pointing to an alleged inferiority in
self-perception, dissatisfaction of social development and the rejection of an
organisational/technocratic problem-solving capacity of ‘the other’. Thus
the creation of a climate of open dialogue in the Mediterranean may not be an
easy task given the tendency by both sides to fuel prejudices, but as long as misperceptions persist, the
existing tensions between Islam and Europe will be offering an apology for
inaction. All the above necessitates a new ‘hermeneutics of civilizational
dialogue’;[43] a dialectic
of cultural self-realisation through reciprocal exchanges based on a philosophy
that does away with any subjectivist view that wants the ‘West’ to act as a
universal civilising force based on an almost metaphysical obligation to
humanity.
The
Declaration underlined that ‘the reinforcement of democracy and respect for
human rights’ are the essential elements of the entire project. But
co-operation in these areas is also the project’s most sensitive dimension, for
the debate on democracy and human rights in the region is linked with issues of
identity, rights and inter-civilisational dialogue. Certain sectors of North
African and Middle Eastern public opinion suspect that the West wants to impose
its civilisation and hegemony under the guise of universal democratic
principles, whilst in the North, in parallel to the explosion of racism and
xenophobia, the preconceived idea of an intrinsic incompatibility between
(political) Islam and democracy has developed at grassroots and elite level.[48]
As Fahmy notes, potential differences may emerge in the various conceptions of
democracy and human rights, and the only way for their resolution is through a
cultural dialogue to reconcile the contending interpretations.[49]
The EMP aims to bring Mediterranean peoples closer together, promote shared (or
compatible) understandings of governance, eliminate discomforting cultural
stereotypes and project positive images among the partner-states.
Such
a ‘pro-active’ approach to fostering a sense of Euro-Mediterranean security
challenges the islamophobic ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. The means for
bringing the component collectivities closer together with a view to setting
the scene for a ‘new cultural order’,[50]
rest on an inter-cultural hermeneutic dialogue in a wide range of issue areas
like cultural heritage, media, inter-faith communication, and so on. For the
third basket highlights common roots (as part of a common experience) and the
richness of the region’s cultural diversity, in an attempt to do away with
negative pre-conceptions. But building the EMP is a delicate process due to
difficulties involved in sustaining a constructive cultural dialogue among
distinct units. All the more so, if such a dialogue aims at transcending images
from the region’s colonial past, feelings of intolerance and xenophobia, as
well as a narrow view of national, and in some cases ethnic, identity. An
additional obstacle is that any inter-civilisational dialogue implies cultural
exchanges and mobility that are not always easy to achieve in the southern rim.
What is then needed is a new hermeneutics of north-south perceptions, together
with the inclusion of religious and socio-cultural rights in the debate on
democracy and modernity. Although the third basket is often projected as being
only of secondary importance to the other dimensions of the EMP, it is
potentially the most revolutionary outcome of the regional process: a
recognition that trade, investment and economic assistance are part of an
evolutionary process that incorporates a human dimension. It identifies the
need for human exchanges between the two shores, while touching upon the
sensitive issues of illegal immigration, organised crime and drugs trafficking,
as well as on co-operation between local authorities, trade unions, interest
associations, and public and private companies. But let us now turn to the task
of conceptualising the regional process itself.
Jünemann
defines the EMP as ‘the climax of a political process that started shortly
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but more than that it marks the starting
point of a new era of interregional relations’.[51]
Keeping in mind Edwards’ and Philippart’s view that the EMP has led to a
process whose analysis encompasses different theoretical possibilities,[52]
its philosophy has been termed by Derisbourg as non-paternalistic, based on
recognition of interdependencies, shared interests and the right to development
and freedom, the need for decentralisation, as well as the importance of the
private sector and of a continuous dialogue at both intergovernmental and civil
society levels.[53] A new phase
in Euro-Mediterranean relations has thus emerged, consisting of openness, prior
dialogue and joint tasks from policy-design to implementation. As Jünemann
reiterates, however, ‘the Barcelona concept aims at a careful westernisation of
the Mediterranean, gradually converting it into an area of economic and
political influence’.[54]
Regarding the commitment to democracy and human rights, it seems that some
non-EU partners will at some stage face the reality that the other participants
might insist on the preservation of the Barcelona principles. But although the
political conditionality norm underlying the economic and financial Partnership
‘allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of failure concerning
democracy or respect of human rights, offering an apparently effective
instrument to influence the process of democratisation ... it exposes the MPCs
to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their demand for equal
partnership’.[55]
As
Fahmy notes, the EMP resolved the major question of whether regional security
would be addressed within a strictly Mediterranean context or within a wider
framework encompassing EU security concerns.[56]
Although the Declaration did not linger over the meaning of security and
stability, it produced a Eurocentric perspective of the ‘common threat’.[57]
The EMP was a collective attempt to redefine European threat perceptions by
addressing issues of social unrest and economic underdevelopment, rather than
by detecting a direct Arab military threat. Although the target date for the
establishment of a free trade area in the region is the year 2010, EU states
made no secret of the fact that the aid plan for the transition period intended
to contribute to the slowing of migratory flows to their respective societies.
With trade growing, jobs will be created in southern Mediterranean countries
and immigration will slow down. Political change in the south is also expected
to result from extended economic liberalisation. According to Kienle, this
approach is a retouched version of the theory of markets as a democratising
force.[58]
This
‘automatic pilot’ theory of the market is a basic tenet of liberalism, implying
a spontaneous sense of social harmony. It does not require coercive force to be
produced or maintained. Laissez-faire,
defined in the context of pursuing individual goals, the argument goes, is
capable of producing co-operation in other fields automatically. But the idea that
this theory applies to international markets consisting only of independent
agents trading for their own account is questionable. For it may well be that
economic rationality continues to play a central role in the economic
governance of a globalising market, but this is not the case in the
Mediterranean, where elements of economic rationality coexist with a struggle
for power. It is, then, highly unrealistic to subscribe to the view that an
automatic governance regime could emerge from the EMP process. From an economic
angle, the Declaration does not represent a radical break with past European
policies towards the Mediterranean, but rather ‘a deepening of past efforts’,[59]
in that it incorporates clearer global objectives. The entire project was a
sign of the EU’s willingness to play an increasingly active economic role in
reducing political and social sources of conflict and instability. But building
the free trade area requires that partners will come to understand each other
and at some point share the same practices. Since 1995, any rigid distinction
along economic, political and socio-cultural lines is at the cost of avoiding
the reality of regional complexity. Herein lies the innovative aspect of the
EU’s new policy approach: in addition to the traditional economic pattern of
intra-regional relations, there now exists a link between security and
socio-cultural arenas.
According
to Marquina, no existing notion of security gives backbone to the EMP, while
its founding documents contain incoherence and imprecision about the concepts
of co-operative security, preventative diplomacy and ‘good neighbourliness’.[60]
He also claims that these principles remain under-explained in both conceptual
and operative aspects. Despite such views, there exists a degree of coherence,
albeit not organisational symmetry, let alone isomorphism, in the EU’s
intention, in that economic problems can only be tackled once issues of
political legitimacy are properly addressed. Ultimately, most Mediterranean
players agree that institutionalised co-operation would have to involve, least
of all in terms of implementation, the private sector, business enterprises and
individuals.[61] Aliboni
argues that such an initiative on the part of the EU is a move towards a
‘structured strategy of regionalism’ marked by elements of change predicated on
the establishment of a free trade regime and the search for a common area of
peace and stability to offer support for economic development.[62]
But the economic objectives, which are to be met via a series of institutional
reforms, hide security risks since accelerated market liberalisation in the
South could produce greater societal instability. Moreover, the EMP has not
operationalised or regularised political co-operation, something that may prove
vital in case of further economic recession in the southern rim. These
mechanisms are cited in the Barcelona text (information exchanges and dialogue
mechanisms) and in the Action Plan set out at the beginning of the process.
Joffé
makes the point that the EU, in seeking to employ a meaningful global and
comprehensive approach, should provide the following set of mechanisms: support
for responsive and participatory political processes sustained by the
encouragement of economic transparency and accountability within a codified and
independent legal structure; collective co-operative security alongside viable
economic restructuring; and a financial commitment to the creation of a vital
human and physical infrastructure that will make the economic refashioning of
the region into a ‘win-win situation for all’.[63]
In general, the EMP aims at correcting the structural deficits evident in past
European policies and can be seen, in Gillespie’s words, as ‘emblematic of a
process’ being constituted from a dynamic set of international exchanges, but
still falling short of a meaningful Partnership.[64]
At the same time, it is a vital step in the process of animating some confident
expectations towards the emergence of a common ‘Euro-Mediterranean
consciousness’, laying the groundwork for the creation of an international
regime.[65]
This point brings us to the task of defining the EMP through the lens of regime
theory.
The argument
advanced here is that the EMP can be seen as a regional regime in statu nascendi. The core claim is
that states obey the rules embodied in international regimes due to the
functional benefits the latter provide. For the moment though, the Partnership
represents a balance of separate national preferences, rather than a common
Euro-Mediterranean interest per se.
Although it sets up a system of flexible regionalisation, the differentiation
of the ratio with the EU budget for the economic reconstruction of Eastern
Europe has been the major reason for attracting the interest of the southern
partners.[66] The EMP is
propelled by a certain ‘economism’ whose financial implications are favourable
to non-EU partners. In return to the above, EU states linked issues of economic
liberalisation to a set of political principles and norms of good governance.
Keohane,
in an influential study that straddled the lines of realist and neoliberalist thinking, suggested that international
regimes are ‘institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon governments that
pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations’.[67] This is of importance considering that the EMP combines power politics
considerations and questions of complex interdependence. Keohane’s ‘lean’
definition of regimes has the advantage of relieving scholars from the burden
of justifying their decision to call a given injunction a ‘norm’ rather than a
‘rule’.[68] The above definition is helpful since
norms are not explicit in the EMP context and since no substantive level of
institutional autonomy characterise the operation of its mechanisms. Although
the EMP offers some general rules of conduct, it remains weak in relation to
the development of an identifiable set of norms. Ceteris paribus, it can be seen as a case of regime formation,
albeit one that accords with Keohane’s ‘lean’ definition of the term. Without a
better, or less nebulous, definition offered by the acquis académique, such a claim remains valid.
Almost
a decade since its inception, the EMP remains in limbo between a loose association of states and a regional
regime ‘proper’. The question is whether it can sustain itself for any length
of time without becoming first a system of patterned behaviour, generating a
notion of rules of the game to guide and structure international behaviour.
From a linear projection of Euro-Mediterranean governance, the EMP could
evolve, in time, into a full-blown regional regime with an institutional life
of its own. At present though, given the rather discomforting empirical
developments in the process, no such entity has fully come into being, in terms
of complying with the basic analytic tenet of rule-governed behaviour. Yet, the
fascinating element in the Partnership from a macro-political perspective is
that it may prove able to instrumentalise the principles and norms embedded in
the Barcelona Declaration and transform them into concrete rules of the game
based on shared beliefs, standards of behaviour and decision-making procedures
for implementing collective choices. Keeping in mind Olsen’s point that
‘[w]righting rules for a large number of heterogeneous countries is no easy
task],[69]
especially with a view to making these rules fit the special conditions of each
country, implementation is central to the viability of regional regime
formation, for such a process emphasises the need for institutionalising an
international co-operative culture. It is the combined effects of
institutionalisation, in the sense of ‘learning one’s place in a larger order’,[70]
and of international culture, in terms of developing repertoires of shared
understandings, that bring about a purposeful system of mutual governance. The
point being made here is to regularise a form of regional co-operation that, as
Jervis asserts, is more than the following of short-term self-interest (or
power maximisation).[71]
But
it would be wrong to equate the end-result of the EMP with the formation of a
regional regime per se. For these
constructs are not regarded as ends-in-themselves. As Krasner states, ‘[o]nce
in place they do affect related behaviour and outcomes. They are not merely
epiphenomena’.[72] From this
angle, regimes impact on policy outcomes and related behaviour, thus
transcending ‘structural orientations [that] conceptualise a world of rational
self-seeking actors’.[73]
In short, regimes make a difference, in that they often transcend a
state-centric realist perspective that primarily reflects calculations of
self-interest. The relationship between patterned behaviour and convergent
expectations is key to our understanding of international regimes: those
aspects create an environment of ‘conditionalised behaviour’ that ‘generates
recognised norms’, transcending national boundaries and nurturing a broader
social space.[74] Contrary to
structural realist views, international regimes have an independent impact on
behaviour and are a crucial part of patterned human interaction. The latter
view is drawn from the Grotian tradition, where ‘regimes are a pervasive and
significant phenomenon in the international system’.[75]
In
the case of the EMP, it could be argued that regime-creation is directed at
setting the limits of acceptable behaviour within a nascent and flexibly
arranged structure of governance. Noteworthy in that respect is that the
Partnership addressed the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality as an overlap of
different regions bringing together different dimensions.[76]
The flexibility of the EMP sets the limits of ‘consciousness-raising’ in issues
of Euro-Mediterranean governance and the possibility of the regional formation
to acquire operational capabilities. Its weak institutional structure makes it
difficult for individual actors to transcend the pursuit of short-term
interests. But regimes also deploy a system of interconnectedness among
different arenas of collective action that helps explain the nature and
complexity of interdependence among the actors involved who, in turn, are
conscious of the need to achieve mutually rewarding outcomes. Yet, being a
highly fragmented system of policy interactions, any future attempts to
navigate the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean governance need to be
differentiated according to the specific conditions of co-operation embedded
within its structures. In particular, the EMP encompasses a multiplicity of
norms of behaviour, which in the end determine the degree and intensity of
actors’ involvement. Further, a partial conceptualisation of its component
baskets as separate pillars is not particularly helpful when assessing its
cross-sectional political properties - i.e., what defines it as a nascent
regional system.
Conceptualising
the EMP through the lens of regime theory has the advantage of moving away from
a formalistic approach to multilateralism, institutional linkages and the
impact of domestic politics on regional affairs: it could set in train a
process for the internationalisation of issues and their inclusion under a
flexible management system. But it is still questionable how far the EMP can
realise its objectives under its currently weak institutional structure, and
without investing in partnership-building measures on questions with the view to
developing a credible socio-cultural dialogue and a Charter for Peace and
Stability with proper compliance mechanisms.[77]
The envisaged Charter will be an exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy in the form
of an institutionalised alliance of co-operative states. In addition, it can
provide the levels of transparency necessary for a continuous and structured
political dialogue among distinct socio-cultural settings, along with the
necessary machinery for managing endemic crises and often-protracted conflicts.
Also, the Parliamentary Forum endows the EMP with a legitimising platform from
which to promote a regular dialogue for engendering the awareness of common
interests and the creation of symbiotic governance structures. Both
agenda-identification (the acknowledgement of legitimate claims) and
agenda-setting functions (the way in which such claims are included) could be
achieved through the institutionalisation of the Forum and thus the
proliferation of legitimate arenas with a domestic policy impact. All the above
raise the question of why states are bound by certain norms, principles, rules
and decision-making procedures. International regime analysis offers a
plausible answer: whether or not international co-operation is an a priori objective of states, the latter
pursue their interests more effectively by being members of a larger
association.
Prospects for the Future
‘Current
political transformations and reforms in Europe as well as in other parts of
the world’, writes Olsen, ‘are redefining the terms of political life’,[78]
reactivating basic questions of governance. Fundamental changes in the
conditions of shared rule pose new challenges to the search for viable orders
based on stable authority patterns within and between states and societies.
These ascending challenges offer the formative context for the integration of
domestic and international politics and the conditions for developing a better
understanding of global changes. At the same time, the struggle for social and
political equality, the ever widening chasm between rich and poor, and the
displacement of bipolarity by deep divisions of socio-cultural values point in
the belief that defining elements of separateness proceeds hand in hand with
the need to identify degrees of common understanding among public, semi-public
and private actors operating under conditions of complex interdependence and
global interconnectedness.
Against
this swiftly changing background, whose intellectual outcome has been the
ascendance of ‘identity politics’ and new, non-territorial and even
post-national forms of fellowship and representation, the Mediterranean refers
to a heterarchical regional space, which continues to spark the interest of
international scholarship. Such composite mosaic of self-images, belief-systems
and identities results, as noted earlier, in a composite system of partial
regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging. This rather
constructivist definitional approach is specific enough to map the
peculiarities of the region and broad enough to allow for complementary
variables. The relationship
between complexity and reality in the region can be understood as having
developed from a uniquely Mediterranean
context. The above views are testimony to the enduring influence of cultural distinctiveness
in the politics of order-building, with the Mediterranean remaining a divided
(social) construct within a transformative globe.
The
active engagement of multiple actors in Euro-Mediterranean politics post-1995
may thus exacerbate the possibilities for reaching substantive agreement on
many good governance issues, including transparent policy-making, economic
security-building, civil-military relations, respect for human rights,
co-operative conflict management and, crucially, intra-regional (sub-systemic) reconciliation. As Zartman and Bergman
note, successful negotiations change established perceptions of conflict from a
‘zero-sum’ to a ‘win-win’ situation.[79]
Partnership-building and a shared commitment to mutually rewarding outcomes can
feed into this process, constituting a crucial adjunct to inter-segmental
accommodation and the emergence of a sense of security at the grassroots. Central
to that is the institutionalisation of the EMP and ‘the emergence of enduring
practices and rules, structures of meaning and resources’.[80]
This is all the more so, given the need for a new civilisational dialogue to do away with the subjectivist approach
that wants the West to act as a universal human rights protector based on fixed
notions of democratic governance and a predominantly liberal understanding of
political order.
Limited
as it may be, the potential for systematising a new politics of institutional
accommodation in the region awaits utilisation. Working on the concept of a
socially viable Euro-Mediterranean order implies maximum use of civil society
mechanisms and monitoring structures with the view to improving, as opposed to
merely increasing, the levels of transparency in the workings of common
institutions. An assorted difficulty here is that the socio-cultural
Partnership has not yet operationalised the normative ambitions of the
Barcelona Declaration. The levels of complexity stemming from the nature of
protracted conflicts and threat (mis)perceptions constrain the implementation
of agreed principles. Linked to that is the claim that effective order-building
cannot be realised under the present institutional configuration of the EMP.
Although its flexibility is a positive element in managing interdependence, its
weak institutional structure makes it difficult for partners to sacrifice the
pursuit of short-term interests on the altar of substantive co-operation. But
what model of institution-building should the Partnership proceed with so as to
reorganise the regional order? A plausible answer is that the partner-states
should foster an atmosphere where norms of good governance act as a
system-steering agency in the construction of a pluralist order. Here, the
envisaged Charter of Peace and Stability may lay the groundwork for legitimate
patterns of shared rule, while provide the levels of transparency, stability
and trust-building needed for any meaningful regional partnership to
consolidate itself. But it must be flexible enough to allow the southern
partners to develop their own ‘styles’ of political liberalisation.
Although
the regional process cannot but go ahead by trial and error, it is crucial to
keep a fundamental direction: designing efficient systems of internationalised
shared rule requires a maximum of what might be called ‘capacity for governance’.
At the macro-level, such a capacity is presently lacking, not only due to
various institutional weakness per se,
but also due to the absence of credible political commitments by the partners
to make effective use of existing arrangements. Perhaps the idea of
interest-convergence around economic tasks may contribute to a relaxation of
tensions in areas where controversy is likely to arise. The composite nature of
the EMP offers a wide range of opportunities for the functionalist expectations
of the partners to form the basis of a consensually pre-determined set of
policies, which are crucial to overall systemic stability. The Partnership can
thus be taken as a system of rules governing the interaction of interdependent
actors around functional tasks. By elevating the creation of rules of
transaction to a systemic property of the regional process, a certain economic
bias may prevail, whose liberalising effects could offer a platform from which
substantive rewards can be gained for all. This points to a preference for a
functionalist strategy that is nevertheless embedded within the practise of
market-oriented regimes.
Be
that as it may, central to the need for accommodating dialogue in the region is
the role of institutions. The problem is one of organising Euro-Mediterranean
politics out of the systemic complexity of a
heterarchical regional space. But to break down such complexity, one has
first to realise the importance of diversity as an essentialistic principle:
the regional system is itself constituted in the clash of different
sub-systems. A heterarchical order minimises homogeneity/universality as the
principal referent for sub-systemic co-operation. This form of enhanced
particularity through a reflexive appropriation of difference becomes the basic
normative unit of the system itself. This resonates with a broader aspiration
of partnership that transcends any mono-dimensional configuration of power,
stressing the complex nature of a common destiny. This is exactly where a
heterarchical regime is better equipped to manage the existing levels of
Mediterranean complexity. The plausibility of this claim to the importance of
reflexivity as opposed to co-ordinated hierarchy rests on a systemic
perspective, whereby ‘sub-systems do not [necessarily] join together into
higher level systems ... nor can they be conceived of as instances of a
totality’.[81] Although
some hierarchy of norms may prove necessary, this should also reflect the
praxis of mutualism and respect for the ‘other’. Indeed, the aim is for
‘others’ to be brought into the management structures of the EMP, and for
regional diversity to transform itself from a self-referential property of
distinct units into an identifiable pluralist order. Whatever the legitimising
ethos of the prevailing worldviews, trust-building through cultural pluralism,
symbiotic association and an open inter-civilisational dialogue is central to
revitalising a cross-fertilisation between highly heterogeneous, yet
increasingly intertwined, states and societies.
Mediterranean
politics has gained higher profile since the launching of the Barcelona
Process, sparking new interest in issues of Euro-Mediterranean governance in
terms of studying the envisaged transformation of the region from a dispersed
system of bilateral (mainly economic) ties to the eventual framing of
institutionalised patterns of rule among distinct culturally defined and
historically constituted units. A new phase of intensified exchanges between
the European and southern Mediterranean economies has thus emerged, including
trade, financial investment and the initiation of new forms of industrial
relations. The aim of a free trade area will provide for the free circulation
of manufactured products, progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural
products, liberalisation of the right of establishment for companies,
trans-border services, and free movement of capital. The problem that still
persists is that the region’s economic accomplishments do not match its
potential for political governance. Regional complexity, different conceptions
of order and the ‘good polity’, and a multitude of distinct economic and
developmental strategies are the principal reasons underlying this shortfall.
Stimulating economic growth based on compatible schemes for collective action
requires a higher level of interdependence among partners and between them and
other, external actors so that economic activity is in the interest of
equitably distributed gains for all. The pursuit of an open trade and investment
regime, both within the region and with the outside world, points in the
direction of developing rules of the game based on transparency,
predictability, non-discrimination and progressive liberalisation.
As
the world economy will predictably continue to expand, for all the functional
and structural setbacks of the post-September 11 events, the Mediterranean will
become more important as a regional economic space as well as a channel for the
movement of vital economic resources. The emergence of globalised and
regionalised markets make the systemisation of Euro-Mediterranean relations
increasingly possible, yet not inevitable. While bright opportunities can be
said to exist post-1995, they could prove passing without adequate levels of
institutionalisation. Moreover, given that the EU has been more concerned with
the perceived threats of migration and radical Islamic activism, than with the
opportunities offered by shared interests, it is hardly surprising that its
Mediterranean policy has been criticised for being limited, betraying a lack of
long-term, credible commitment.[82]
Yet, should the Mediterranean continues to serve as a barrier rather than a
bridge between a prosperous and heavily institutionalised Europe and a poor and
fragmented Mediterranean South, it is likely that the resulting regional order
will be characterised by elements of tension and potential instability. Progress in developing co-operation is not always
irreversible. Failure to empathise with the other’s perspectives and security
needs could lead to an increase in hostility and mistrust. It is in this sense
that regional diversity should be seen more as an asset than an obstacle.
Moreover,
contrary to the expectations of their advocates, policies of internal and
external economic liberalisation are not likely to increase the performance of
southern Mediterranean economies.[83]
Reactions to socio-economic inequities and suspicions about the motives of both
Mediterranean rims could conceivably result in the resurgence of forces of
disorder. Thus, of particular importance in the years to come will be the
chosen institutional format to transcend the peculiarities underlying the
transformation of this complex regional space. But institutionalisation of
existing rules alone will not be sufficient to manage the Euro-Mediterranean
security agenda. New rules and norms on how to handle change and instability
should emerge given that behaviour, not just proclamations, will determine the
outcome of confidence and security-building in the wider region. In particular,
new methods of conflict-management like mediation and arbitration can also
become available and new techniques like third-party consultation and
problem-solving be established. In a nutshell, ‘a new era requires new ideas’.
As
noted earlier, nationalistic and religious cleavages are a major feature of the Mediterranean’s social structure.
Such fragmentation is responsible for the slowing down of democratic
consolidation and viable socio-economic reform. Beneath such tensions lie the
differences in the historical trajectories for constructing differentiated
identities in the region. These trajectories reflect different models of
socio-political integration underpinned by different philosophies that ascribe
different meanings to such general and contested concepts as democracy and
modernity. The search for a new
legitimacy in EMP structures depends on the partners’ capacity to resist the
forces of polarisation and segmentation, and on the credibility of their
commitment to discover a sense of process (and purpose) based on humanism,
pluriformity and social justice. The flexibility of the Partnership, the way in
which it is valued by the partners, and the means through which its
constitutive norms can facilitate agreement on the basis of mutualism and reciprocity
will affect its potential to acquire operational capabilities so as to adjust
itself to a creative politics of institutional accommodation. In conclusion,
what is most urgently needed is a set of system-transforming mechanisms to
alleviate Mediterranean complexity, absorb regional order-building vibrations
and set in train the conditions for a politically stable, socially vibrant and
economically enduring system of governance based on symbiotic legitimation
structures, thus reflecting and at the same time preserving the same sense of
being and belonging that for centuries now binds its respective populations in
an almost mystical, if not indeed all-Mediterranean, fashion.
* . Dr. Dimitris N. Chryssochoou is Reader in European integration at the University of Exeter. Dr. Dimitris K. Xenakis is Analyst on Mediterranean Security at the Defence Analysis Institute in Athens. We wish to thank Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Constatntine Stephanou, Kostas Ifantis, Yannis Mazis, Richard Gillespie, Fulvio Attinà, Peter Zervakis, Geoffrey Edwards, Michelle Pace as well as audiences in Athens, Rhodes, Rethymno and Halki for useful comments on earlier drafts. Responsibility rests with the authors.
[1] D. K. Xenakis and D. N. Chryssochoou, The emerging Euro-Mediterranean system (Manchester University Press, 2001).
[2] Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration (Sage, 2001).
[3] T. Niblock, ‘Good Governance: Towards a new Framework to Guide the European Union’s Involvement with Middle Eastern States’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Good Governance and “Emerging Democracies”, University of Reading, 15 January 2000, p. 3.
[4] Ibid, p. 4.
[5] B. Russet, ‘International Regions and the International System’, in R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz (eds.), Regional Politics and World Order (W. H. Freeman, 1973), p. 83.
[6] See also P. Gould and R. White, Mental Maps (Penguin, 1974); and A. K. Henrikson, ‘The Geographical “Mental Maps” of American Policy-Makers’, International Political Science Review, 1:4 (1980) 495-530.
[7] W. Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, (Pinter, 1990), p.8.
[8] N. Waites and S. Stavridis, ‘The EU and Mediterranean Member States’, in Stavridis, et al. (eds.), The Foreign Policies the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s (Macmillan, 1999), p. 29.
[9] D. Fenech, ‘Ways and Means of Security around the Mediterranean Sea: A Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Fondation Mediterraneenne d’Etudes Strategiques, Seminar de la Tour Blanche, Toulon, 21-24 June 1995.
[10] T. Niblock, ‘The Realms within which Integrated Communities Approach could be fostered’, in G. Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach (Federal Trust, 1992), p. 49.
[11] See F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Vols. I-II, 5th ed. (Fontana Press, 1987).
[12] See R. Aliboni, ‘The Mediterranean Dimension’, in W. Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration (Pinter, 1990), pp. 155-67.
[13] M. Lister, The European Union and the South: Relations with Developing Countries (Routledge, 1997), p. 72.
[14] R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).
[15] P. Moya, Frameworks for Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Atlantic Assembly, Civilian Affairs Committee, Sub-Committee on the Mediterranean Basin, AM 259, 7 October 1995, p. 12.
[16] R. Aliboni, ‘Introduction’, in Aliboni et al. (eds.), Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region (Frank Cass,1996), p. 10.
[17] G. Joffé, ‘Southern Attitudes Towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region’, Mediterranean Politics, 2:1 (1997) 18.
[18] See T. Greenwood, ‘US and NATO Force Structure and Military operations in the Mediterranean’, McNair Papers, 14, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, 1993.
[19] N. de Santis, The future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative’, NATO Review, 46:1 (1998) 32-35.
[20] P. Cuco, The Eastern Mediterranean, Report submitted on behalf of the
Defence Committee, Assembly of Western
European Union, Document 1465, 24 May (1995).
[21] Quoted in Faria and Vasconcelos, ‘Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality’, Chaillot Papers, 25, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1996, p. 1.
[22] F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992).
[23] S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Touchstone, 1996).
[24]A. Sachedina, ‘Religion and Global Affairs: Islamic Religion and Political Order’, SAIS Review, 18:2 (1998) 59-64.
[25] See G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Westview Press, 1995).
[26] M. J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
[27] M. Blunden, ‘Insecurity in Europe’s Southern Flank’, Survival, 36:2 (1994) 137.
[28] T. W. Lippman, Understanding Islam (New York, Penguin Group, 1990), p. 70.
[29] E. Said, Orientalism (Vintage, 1979), p. 310.
[30] Ibid.
[31] J. L. Espozito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse
University Press, 1998).
[32] B. A. Roberson, ‘Islam and Europe: An enigma or a Myth?’, in B. A. Roberson (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit (Routledge, 1998), p. 120.
[33] See C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (Harper and Row, 1966).
[34] See G. A. G. Soltan, ‘State Building, Modernization and Political Islam: The Search for Political Community(s) in the Middle East’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 37 (1997).
[35] See E. Gellner, ‘Up from Imperialism’, The New Republic, 22 May (1989) 35-36.
[36] P. G. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State (in Greek) (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1991).
[37] R. Aliboni, ‘Factors Affecting Mediterranean Security’, in Tanner (ed.), Arms Control.
[38] S. P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, in L. Diamond and M. F.
Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of
Democracy (The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 19.
[39] J. Diamond, J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries (Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. xx; quoted in D. Pool, ‘Staying at home with the wife: democratization and its limits in the Middle East’, in G. Parry and M. Morran (eds.), Democracy and democratization (Routledge, 1994), p. 197.
[40] Pool, ‘Staying at home with the wife’, p. 198.
[41] D. G. Curdy, ‘Security and Peace in the Middle East: Experiments with Democracy in an Islamic World’, Maxwell Papers, 4, Air War College, 1996, p. 4.
[42] Pool, ‘Staying at home with the wife’, p. 215.
[43] H. Köchler, ‘Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue: The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-comprehension versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict’, Occasional Papers Series, 3, International Progress Organization, 1998.
[44] See R. Gillespie, ‘Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 37 (1997).
[45] See J. Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
[46] See J. Marks, ‘High Hopes and Low Motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative’, in Mediterranean Politics, 1:1 (1996) 1-24.
[47] See E. Barbé, ‘The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process’, Mediterranean Politics, 1:1 (1996) 25-42.
[48] See A. de Vasconcelos, R. Aliboni and A. Monem Said Aly, EuroMeSCo Report 1997/98.
[49] N. Fahmy, ‘After Madrid and Barcelona: Prospects for Mediterranean Security’, paper presented in Conference on ‘Prospects after Barcelona’, organised by MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.
[50] We borrow this term from His All Holiness Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople - New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch. Speech delivered at the University of Exeter, 13 July 2000, on the occasion of the conferment of the degree of Doctor of Laws Honoris Causa.
[51] A. Jünemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept’’, Conference Proceedings, The European Union in a Changing World, Luxembourg, 1998, p. 365.
[52] G. Edwards and Eric Philippart, ‘Mare Nostrum - The European Union and the Mediterranean in the 1990s and Beyond’, paper presented at the Fifth Biennial ESCA-USA Conference, Seattle 29 May-1 June 1997, p. p. 18.
[53] See J. P. Derisbourg, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership After Barcelona’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Prospects after Barcelona’, organised by MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.
[54] Jünemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa’, p. 383.
[55] Ibid, p. 373.
[56] N. Fahmy, ‘After Madrid and Barcelona: Prospects for Mediterranean Security’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Prospects after Barcelona’, organised by MEDAC, MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.
[57] R. King and M. Donati, ‘The ‘Divided’ Mediterranean: Re-defining European Relationships’, in R. Hudson and A. M. Williams (ed.), Divided Europe: Society and Territory (Sage, 1999), p. 156.
[58] E. Kienle, ‘Destabilisation through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Barcelona Declaration’, Mediterranean Politics, 3:2 (1998) 4.
[59] S. M. Nsouli, A. Bisat, and O. Kanaan, ‘The European Union’s New Mediterranean Strategy’, Finance and Development, 33:3 (1996) 14-17.
[60] See A. Marquina, ‘Security and Political Stability in the Mediterranean’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 37 (1997).
[61] G. Luciani, ‘Where to Start with Multilaterism - An Agenda for Cooperation between Europe, the Middle East and North Africa’, Working Papers, Research Group on European Affairs, University of Munich, August 1996.
[62] R. Aliboni, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Interpretation
from Italy’, paper presented at the Conference on ‘Prospects after Barcelona’,
organised by MEDAC, March 1996.
[63] G. Joffé, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Today’, Informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar, Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue, Bonn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1999, EuroMeSCo News, 5, April 1999.
[64] R. Gillespie, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Mediterranean Politics, 2:1 (1997) 4-5.
[65] See D. K. Xenakis, ‘From Policy to Regime: Trends in Euro-Mediterranean Governance’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 13:1 (1999) 254-70; and D. K. Xenakis, ‘Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 10:4 (1999) 75-90.
[66] E. Barbé E., ‘The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process’, Mediterranean Politics, 1:1
(1996) 32.
[67] Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism’, in Keohane (ed.), International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Westview Press, 1989).p. 4.
[68] A. Hasenclever et al., Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 1997). p. 7.
[69] J. P. Olsen, ‘European Challenges to the Nation State’, ARENA Reprints, 97/11, 1997, p. 182.
[70] Ibid, p. 175.
[71] R. Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in S. D. Krasner (ed), International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 173-194.
[72] S. D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences’, in Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, p. 5.
[73] Ibid, p. 6.
[74] Ibid, p. 9.
[75] Ibid, p. 10.
[76] See A. Bin, ‘Mediterranean Diplomacy: Evolution and Prospects’, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, 5, University of Catania, January 1997.
[77] Concluding Statement of the UK Presidency by the Foreign Secretary Mr Robin Cook, Ad-Hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998.
[78] J. P. Olsen, ‘The Changing Political Organization of Europe: An Institutional Perspective on the Role of Comprehensive Reform Efforts’, ARENA Working Papers, 97/5, 1997, p. 1.
[79] See W. Zartman and M. R. Bergman, The Practical Negotiator (Yale University Press, 1982).
[80] J. P. Olsen, ‘European Challenges to the Nation State, ARENA Reprints, 97/11, 1997, p. 160.
[81] Z. Bankowski and E. Christodoulidis, ‘The European Union as an Essentially Contested Project’, European Law Journal, 4:4 (1998) 350.
[82] I. Romeo, ‘The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean “Safe” for Europe’, Mediterranean Politics, 3:2 (1998) 21-38.
[83] See Kienle, ‘Destabilization through Partnership’; and El-Sayed Selim, ‘Arab Perceptions’, in Black (ed.), Mediterranean Security, pp. 143-58.