There are three alternative reports of the russian losses:
Let's calculate the percentage of the military recruited from Tatarstan that has been killed (as of Jan.24): 21/601=3.5%. We can assume that this percentage is about the same for all other 88 russian regions, because it would be ungrounded to think that Tatarstanis are appointed into much more dangerous positions than those from other regions. If that were the case, it might distabilize situation in Tatarstan. At the same time, the russian military withdrew, at least officially, all Tatarstani new-comer recruiters in early Dec. 1999, upon Tatarstani parliament's controvercial decision that new-comer recruiters not be sent to Chechnya. This also means that actually percentage for Tatarstani recruiters might be lower than in other regions, all of which send freshmen recruiters.
Moreover, this percentage is likely to be underestimated because since russian military understaes the death toll of russian troops, Tatarstani branch is also likely to understate the actual death toll.
Still, let's move from this starting point. Given that we are justified in assuming approximately the same percentage of dead for all russian regions (actually it might be even higher), we reach the following equation:
If there are 100,000 russian troops in Chechnya, then the approximate death toll (as of Jan. 24) is=
100,000*3.5%=3,500 (THREE THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED).
This number is already large enough, however, one more variable should be considered-the allegedly 250,000-strong Interior Ministry troops in Chechnya. Let's assume that the percentage of those killed for the Interior Ministry is twice as low as of that for the military, namely 1.75%. In this case the approximate losses of the Interior Ministry are 250,000*1.75%=4,375 (FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE).
Thus total russian losses sum up to about 7,875, that is almost SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED.
This number might seem incredible, but besides the logic used before the calculations, it's to some extent supported by the average of the three alternative reports, which is 6,500.
However, the story doesn't end here. The russian military usually report 2-3 times more wounded than dead. Let's assume 2 times more are wounded, then the total number of wounded since the war started is about 7,875*2=15,750.
This puts the total debilitation of the russian army at about 23,625. Well, this figure seems to be absolutely incredible, and maybe we shouldn't assume as much as 15,750 wounded, but still it might point at what the potential losses may turn out to have been.
Whatever the number of wounded, we are left with the death toll of about between 3,000 and 10,000, with high porbability that the estimate of 7,875 is close to reality. In any case, the number of 3,000 seems to constitute the bottom line of the total loss.
No wonder the russian military hides such data from the public. This war appears to be much more costly than Afghanistan.
Now, the serious clashes started only in mid-October. Until January 24 (the date of the report referred to in the beginning of the article) 100 days had passed. Therefore, on average about 78 russian troops appear to be dying daily in the Chechen war.
If we assume that the war continues until March 26, 4,680 (60*78=4,680) russian troops more are likely to die, with those likely to be wounded even more dificult to estimate.
Russia should start negotiations before too late. The cost for Chechens, on the other hand, can hardly be described by words. There is no winner in this war, save for some dirty politicians.