City of Whiteacre Bluffs
V
K. S. Tyler
At the time of her arrest, defendant K.J. Tyler was engaged in an effort
to convince youth gang members, specifically Jamie Grayan and Lee Sullivan,
that the benefits of gang life, the camaraderie, the close personal relations,
the protection, could be obtained through other means such as the Light
in the Windows Program (LWP), without the risks of drugs and violence that
so often accompanied the gang lifestyle. In order for her to engage in
the advocacy of such alternatives, it was necessary that K.J. Tyler be
able to meet gang members on their own turf without fear of arrest or official
reprisal. Her right to advocate, her freedom to associate with gang members
for this purpose is, and will continue to be, abridged by the terms of
WBMC sect. 9-5-014.
The Supreme Court has identified two kinds of associations entitled
to First Amendment protection: those with an intrinsic or intimate value,
and those that are instrumental to forms of religious and political expressions
and activity. Defendant does not contend that gangs are the type of intimate
association contemplated by the Court. The instrumental right of protected
association is directly related to the individual's freedom to speak, to
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances because,
without it, these liberties themselves could scarcely exist, much less
thrive. Roberts V. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984).
Defendant Tyler's efforts to promote the Light in the Window Program is
the type of instrumental association protected by the First Amendment.
This freedom of instrumental or expressive association permits groups
to engage in the same activities that individuals may engage in under the
First Amendment. An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition
the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those goals were not also guaranteed. According protection
to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important
in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident
expression from suppression by the majority. Consequently, the Court has
long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. Section 9-5-014
abridges this fundamental right.
In the City ofChica2o V. Youkhana, 277111. App. 3d 101,660 N.E.2d 34
(1995) the court struck down a city anti-gang loitering statute that authorized
police to order those loitering to disperse if one member present was a
gang member and to arrest those who refused. The court stated: The City's
ordinance infringes upon first amendment freedoms in several obvious ways.
We read the ordinance to mean that when one gang member stands in public
with a group of innocent non-gang members, all can be ordered to disperse,
and all can be arrested for failing to disperse. The ordinance is triggered
when a gang member is observed loitering; the innocent person's conduct
is irrelevant. In other words, the ordinance gives the police power to
order dispersal and arrest those who associate with gang members in public
places. This smacks of a police-state tactic and clearly violates the first
amendment rights of the innocent persons.
Similarly, sect. 9-5-014 infringed upon K.J. Tylerts right to
associate with gang members and others for the purpose of advocating alternatives
to the gang lifestyle.
B. Because 89-5-014 Infringes Associational Rights Under the First Amendment. It Cannot be Upheld Unless It Is Supported by Compelling Governmental Interests.
Defendant Tyler acknowledges that the right to associate for expressive
purposes is not absolute; infringements may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms. Roberts V. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,623 (1984)
while local governments are permitted to exercise their police powers In
order to regulate conduct that jeopardizes the public welfare, they cannot,
in the process, strip fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. In applying the Jaycees test, we look first to
the interests that the City has asserted as justification for the ordinance.
Those interests fall into three broad categories: the health and safety
of the public, community, and tourists; public morality and decency; and
economic development. Id. While these interests are the same as those spelled
out in the ordinance, City Council cannot demonstrate that the ordinance
is the only ready means of obtaining this goal.
The City of Whiteacre Bluffs has failed to demonstrate that the problem
of youth loitering it is experiencing, as opposed to the showing made with
respect to the problem in Gateway City, Chicago or New York, presents a
significant or expanding threat to the citizenry. The evidence of record
does not support a finding that Whiteacre Bluffs is overrun by street gang
violence. More importantly, there is substantial evidence that, at least
in Whiteacre Bluffs, there are less restrictive, publicly-funded alternatives
proven efficacious in reducing the type of loitering activity the statute
was intended to reach.
Contrary to what the City has argued, the mere fact that the ordinance
also requires that the officer have a reasonable belief that there exists
an imminent threat to the public safety, peace, or order does not save
it. First, it permits the officer to make a determination that a threat
is imminent where, as in the present action, no such threat exists. Second,
it permits the officer to quell public discussion of important social issues
if, in the officer's view, the discussion is getting out of hand. The interests
purportedly being safeguarded by this ordinance, the right to walk to a
restaurant without being exposed to foul language or jostled by a group
of youth, do not justify the infringement of important First Amendment
interests. The regulation in our case fails because it is readily apparent
that there are means of achieving the stated goals that are
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. Jaycees at
623. Indeed, most if not all of the evils the council associates with the
gangs can be or have already been addressed by criminal statutes targeted
directly at the evils themselves.
If the council is seeking to reduce the number of youth drawn into
gangs, then it can provide alternatives to gang membership. Indeed, the
LWP was a stellar example of the effectiveness of such programs to stop
the evil this statute purports to address. Assuming, arguendo, that the
ordinance is constitutional, K-J. Tyler's conduct on the night in question
did not violate its terms. Accordingly, defendant Tyler respectfully submits
that WBMC sect. 9-5-014 be struck down as an unconstitutional violation
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
C. The Citv of Whiteacre Bluffs Lacks Sufficient Evidence to Establish Probable Cause to Believe That K.J. Tyler Violated Section 9-5-014 of the Whiteacre Bluffs Municipal Code the So-Called Anti-Gang Loitering Statute; Therefore. the Charges Must Be Dismissed.
Less than one month after its effective date, defendant K.J. Tyler was
present at the Worldwide Pizza Restaurant, a place known to her to be one
in which members of the Double Deuce often gathered on Friday evenings.
Often, as was the case on September 25, 1998, anywhere from ten to twenty
kids were gathered talking, smoking, and generally having a good time.
The crowd did, on occasion, become boisterous; at times the language the
youth used was profane or might otherwise be considered objectionable.
Certainly, their behavior was not so boisterous that it could reasonably
have been viewed as presenting a threat to public safety.
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on the 25th, K.J. Tyler was present during
a conversation in which one of the Double Deuce's leaders, Ronell Grayan,
a.k.a. Big G, was boasting about an altercation he and some of his gang
were involved in with members of the Fuchsia Posse the night before. K.J.
Tyler spent several moments observing the interplay between Ronell Grayan
and several youth who were not gang members. These wannabes were precisely
the kind of youth Tyler knew would most benefit from the activities and
opportunities available at the Light in the Window Program (LWP) with which
she was associated. Indeed, two in particular, Jamie Grayan, a.k.a. Baby
G, and Lee Sullivan, were of special interest to Tyler. After a period
of observation1 Tyler began to talk with Baby G and Lee Sullivan. She attempted
to engage them in a conversation about their gang lifestyle and alternatives
to it. Big G was upset that Tyler was trying to diss him, not only by interrupting
his colloquy on the previous night’s gang bang, but by trying to draw Baby
0, his younger sibling, and Lee Sullivan, away from the periphery of the
gang lifestyle.
Sgt. Johnson grabbed at his/her first opportunity to make an arrest
under the new ordinance, one s/he her/himself was instrumental in having
enacted. That statute specifically criminalizes the associational activities
of persons present who are in the presence of one or more persons believed
to be gang members when any one of the persons present engage in conduct
that intimidates, obstructs, or otherwise harasses others, or where there
is potential drug trafficking activity taking place. If such conduct is
observed, and if there is a reasonable basis upon which to believe that
there is an imminent threat to public peace, safety, or order, a police
officer is permitted to order those gathered to disperse or face arrest.
The evidence will show that the defendant, K.J. Tyler, had lawful reasons
to be in the public area adjacent to the Pizza Palace where she intended
to order pizza; that her discussions with Lee Sullivan, Jamie Omyan, and
Ronell Orayan are not loitering within the terms of the statute; that the
group was not obstructing or intimidating pedestrians or motorists; and
ironically, that she was arrested for doing anti-gang activities; and that
Sgt. Johnson lacked any objectively reasonable basis to believe that, at
the time of Tyler's arrest there existed an imminent threat to public peace
or safety. Rather, the arrest was premised upon a preconceived determination
that Tyler and others were prime targets under this new ordinance when
Sgt. Johnson approached the group of youth, ordered them to disperse and,
when a few failed to do so, arrested them. Sgt. Johnson's actions pursuant
to the statute were therefore not based upon a reasonable belief of an
imminent threat to public safety, peace or order. In so doing, Sgt. Johnson
cut short any opportunity defendant Tyler had to spread the message about
the LWP. The evidence will show that the City of Whiteacre Bluffs cannot
establish probable cause to believe that there has been violation of the
ordinance and, moreover, that the arrest infringed upon her right to associate
with members of the Double Deuce for that purpose. Accordingly, the charges
against her must be dismissed.
Counsel For Defendant
1705 Highland Street
Whiteacre Bluffs, Ohio
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Certificate of Service
The undersigned certified that true copies of the foregoing memorandum
were served upon the City Attorney
on the 27th day of January, 1999.
Blaine Justice
Counsel for Defendant