The following article was originally published in Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Volume 4 Number 4 Oct.-Dec. 1998, Copyright © 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Used with permission of the Publisher.
In January 1999 the The Norwegian Nobel Institute Library announced that it was placing a copy in their collection of historical works.
In the late 1930s, as it became apparent that the world was once again about to experience war on a global scale, a small group of people in the United States and Great Britain viewed this event as an opportunity to create a world government. They referred to this global system as the "New World Order". 1 Among the supporters of this concept in the United States, were holders of some of the top political offices in the federal government, including: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt2, Secretary of State Cordell Hull3 and Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.4
To facilitate the creation of this world government several organizations were established. They were closely associated with one another and many of the people involved served on several committees simultaneously.5 The nature of these groups was chameleon-like, and organizations would change their names and objectives at the drop of a hat.6 One such group was the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP). Its members included people who were considered top in their respective fields--professors from Ivy League universities, officers of large corporations and attorneys from some of the most respected law firms in the country.7
The commission was aided in its efforts by many highly placed individuals in the U.S. government, particularly in the Department of State.8 President Roosevelt also took an interest. Commission member Clark Eichelberger met with the President on more than eight occasions to discuss the organization's work on behalf of world government.9 At two of these meetings, Eichelberger reported that he personally handed F.D.R. copies of commission reports outlining their ideas of what this new world order should look like.10 Eleanor Roosevelt agreed so completely with the ideas and goals of the commission that she eventually became a member.11
Money and other kinds of support flowed freely to the commissions coffers.12 The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) agreed to air, free of charge, weekly addresses by commission members and their guests. CBS also offered them two full days of free air time, over its Columbia Network, to broadcast to the entire nation the results of their work.13
The commission's influence on the soon-to-be-created UN is beyond question. In 1949, John Foster Dulles remarked, "...that the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace made an indispensable contribution to the creation of the United Nations."14 The introduction to Building Peace, an anthology of the commission's reports published in the 1970s, accounts for the group's influential role as follows:
It might not have been a mere coincidence that when the conference to establish the United Nations took place in San Francisco in 1945, forty-seven members of the commission were there as members of the International Secretariat, members of the United States Delegation, or consultants to the United States Delegation. The Chairman of the commission presided at the meetings of the consultants, and the director of the commission chaired a committee of consultants representing various national organizations which were especially interested in problems of human rights and dependent peoples. It is not surprising, therefore, that when one compares the commission's report with the final text of the Charter of the United Nations, one can find a remarkable resemblance between a number of the commission's proposals and the text of the Charter, especially with respect to maintenance of international security (e.g., international air-force contingents), trusteeship (including the special problem of strategic areas), human rights, and economic and social cooperation.15
The four individuals most responsible for the formation of the commission were: James T. Shotwell, Quincy Wright, Clark Eichelberger, and Clyde Eagleton.
James T. Shotwell, Professor of History at Columbia University, was the founder and chairman of the commission.16 Shotwell, along with most of the other commission members, was involved with several internationalist organizations. In addition to his duties as commission chair, he was also president of the League of Nations Association17 and director of the division of economics and history of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.18 (By coincidence, the president of the Carnegie Endowment was a Columbia University colleague of Shotwell's, Nicholas Murray Butler.)19
After World War I, Shotwell served as a delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference. He also helped outline the terms of the Pact of Locarno in 1925, the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 and from 1927 to 1930 he was a director of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Eventually he would be appointed as an assistant to President Roosevelt for organizing the United Nations (1943) and was the chairman of consultants to the United States delegation at the San Francisco UN Charter Conference in 1945.20
Quincy Wright, professor of international law at the University of Chicago, supervised the section of the commission that explored the creation of a political international organization.21 He served on the central committee of the World Citizens Association, along with Frank Aydelotte, another member of the commission .22 In addition to these organizations Wright served on the executive committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.23
Thanks to his prominence as a professor of international law at the University of Chicago, Wrights' opinions on matters of international concern were widely respected. This was particularly true at the Department of State in Washington. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's Wright corresponded with Secretary of State Cordell Hull on topics of international law. Hulls' respect for Wright was such that--in January 1939, on the Secretary's recommendation-- President Roosevelt offered Wright the post of U.S. national commissioner on an international commission.24 After the United States entered into the war, Wright became an official consultant to the Department of State.25 Wright is recognized as the author of one of the most important pieces of work ever written on the subject of international relations.26
Clark Eichelberger was the director of the commission.27 A former student of Wright's at the University of Chicago28, Eichelberger was director of the League of Nations Association.29 He also helped form the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.30 During the war, he worked for the State Department and afterwards was a consultant to the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference.31
Clyde Eagleton served as chairman of the Studies Committee.32 He was a professor of international law at New York University and served on the executive committee of the League of Nations Association. Eagleton was also a consultant for the State Department during the war.33
Wright, Shotwell, Eichelberger and Eagleton began recruiting members for the group in early January 193934 Recruitment efforts continued throughout the spring and summer of 1939. The commission had more than sixty members by September.35 Among the group were:
The entry of Britain into World War II gave the project a new sense of urgency. On 02 October 1939, its members announced their plans to form a commission of enquiry on the organization of peace.46 By 02 December 1939 the administrative structure of the organization was in place, with Wright, Eagleton and John Foster Dulles serving on its studies committee.47 This committee outlined four areas in which they would concentrate their efforts;48 the so-called problem before us; principles and institutions for organizing peace; transition problems following the war; and the role of the United States.
The Problem Before Us
"The problem before us", looked at the world of 1939 as the commission members saw it. In their view, the world had become a much smaller place,49 and that the ways in which people and governments interacted with each other had also changed. They believed, as a result, that the world was becoming more interdependent in many ways--in economics, society, religion, and the sciences.50 They considered nationalism to be the single greatest threat to this new interdependence: "Our general thought was that we must recognize the inadequacy of the sovereign state as it has been under the present conditions of economic and cultural interdependence and that consequently the world faces the alternatives of empire `a la Hitler or world federation, which is the only method compatible with democracy."51 Wright summed up the commission's feelings on this subject when he wrote: "My point was that excessive loyalties to certain sacred cows, such as sovereignty, nationality, neutrality, and domestic jurisdiction is ruining civilization."52 They also studied the effects of war in general, World War I and its aftermath, and existing international organizations.53
Principals and Institutions for Organizing Peace
Under the heading of principals and institutions for organizing peace, the commission outlined its plans for the future. The topic was further broken down into four areas of study: The world we want, political international organization, economic international organization and social and cultural organization54
The world that they wanted was to be a socialistic paradise. Social and economic justice would apply not only to individuals but to nations as well. In their view, the state that "has resources, whether by fortune or conquest, must share them with others less fortunate."55 They also noted that, "the day of laissez-faire is as far gone in the community of nations as within the state."56
The section on political international organization, supervised by Wright, was one of the most important areas of the study. It was here that the structure of the world government was outlined. Having learned their lesson from the League of Nations debacle, the commission, approached this attempt at creating a global government more cautiously. Rather than trying to simply create a political world body as in the case of the League, this time economic and social issues would be treated independently of the political union. This was done to permit these areas to develop without interference from those who would oppose a world government.57
Interviewed by William Lovell of the United Press Association, in early November 1941, Wright described the new world order that he and the commission envisioned.58 The world organization that Wright described was to be similar in some respects to the League of Nations but much stronger because not only would the United States be invited to join, but this time it would participate.59 In fact, all nations would be invited to join, and those that declined would be subject to certain disadvantages.60 Like the League, the new organization was to have three branches: legislative, administrative and judicial.
In the judicial branch, a world court was to be given compulsory jurisdiction over national governments and would have subordinate courts to assist it.61 Existing international law provided that a treaty between nations could only be changed with the consent of all signatories. Under the new system any nation that objected to all or part of a treaty-- whether or not the nation was party to the treaty--could ask the world court to change it.62 In another radical departure from the norm, it was suggested that the world court's jurisdiction should be extended to include the regulation of individuals in certain criminal matters.63
The new world government was also to have the power to make laws, that all nations would be bound by, without the unanimous vote of the nations involved. No state would be able to legally reject such laws.64 It was also asserted that, "It would be desirable to bind states by votes taken in the international organs, without awaiting ratification by the states through their legislatures or other slow-moving process, within certain fields."65
The question of who was to be given representation in this world organization was another issue addressed by the commission. Some felt that national governments should not be represented at all.66 Wright, however, was a little more liberal on this point. He said that, "Although I believe that nations should also be given a representation and perhaps functional international organizations, my conception of an assembly would be that every important group with a distinctive public opinion ought to have some representation whether that group is national, regional or universal."67
Some areas in which the world organization was to have jurisdiction included: communications, markets, health, money and exchange, social, barriers to trade, raw materials and armaments.68 Curiously, the commission also stated that its authority should extend to "control of economic depressions".69 The edicts of this world body were to be enforced by a joint U.S. - U.K. naval force.70
In addition to the the global system, Wright promoted the establishment of a number of regional systems, including a United States of Europe71 (also referred to as a European Union72 ), an Asian co-operation and an organization of American states. He did not forsee including the Soviet Union in any part of the system.73
The commission proposed this regional system because of a perception that countries close to one another would be more interested in and likely to respond to events occurring within that region.74 They expected the regional systems, as a result, to have a more direct influence over their member nations than the world system.75 They also thought that the regional systems could be used to further break down the concept that a nation could act independently of the world organization.76 Membership in more than one regional system would be permissible.77 This was not a new concept, however: The League of Nations had also been developing an idea along these lines.78
Each of these regional systems was to have its own military force. National forces were either to be reduced to a point that they would no longer be able to function as a military force or simply outlawed. Members of the regional military forces were to owe their allegiance to their regional system and not to their national governments.79
The commissioners believed that the troops for these international forces could be found with no trouble. Citing the foreign legions as an example they maintained: "There are always many men whose love of adventure or idealistic interest will draw them into such a career. Such men have motivations which make it easy for them to be loyal to the international authority irrespective of national origin. There should, however, be regulations such as distribution of men of several nationalities even in the smaller units to assure that such recruits would retain their loyalty to the world order."80
The regional systems, modeled after the British Commonwealth, were to be primarily juridical in nature with few other governmental organs. Commissioners wanted these courts to have extensive jurisdiction in matters of controversy between nations and the power to declare null and void any national legislation that contradicted international law.81 Wright, originally, was opposed to the idea of creating a regional system of the Americas. In a letter to Cordell Hull, he expressed his concern that Latin Americans, whom he considered to be peculiar people, would naturally dominate such a system, particularly its courts. This, he felt, would result in undesirable ideas being given sanction in its courtrooms.82
Transition Problems Following the War
The commission realized that the existence of a new world order and the demise of national sovereignty could not simply be announced at the end of the war. They envisioned a period of transition during which the national, regional and global institutions necessary for the operation of the world government were to be established. To ensure a peaceful transition of power from national governments to the world body, the commission concluded that those countries that made the largest contributions to the war effort would have political control of the world during the transition period. In its second report, the commission named four countries that would fulfill this role: the U.K., the United States, China and Russia.83
War torn areas were to be completely rebuilt. Political order would also have to be reestablished in much of the world. In many cases whole national governments would have to be constructed; in others it would be a question of which government would be returned to power.84 The commission noted that, "a wide choice is left to peoples as to the form of government which they wish, but it cannot be an unlimited choice; it cannot be a government which would be independent of international law or free to employ its resources against the world government."85
Social and economic reconstruction would also be necessary. National borders could no longer be used to protect the economic interests of its citizens. In the view of the commission, "the economic changes required may indeed mean temporary loss for some groups, but they will mean rescue for many, and in the long run gain for all. Groups which anticipate loss through such change should consider the needs of human beings everywhere, and seek compensation where they can show losses, rather than attempt to block necessary international arrangements."86
The duration of this transition period was not specified in the commission’s early reports. It simply stated that, "It is not necessary to estimate in advance the time required for this process, but it is essential to establish the community means of control for the period"87
The Role of the United States
The commission realized that, "Nations, like individuals, will unwillingly give up their liberty;"88 This was particularly true in the case of the United States. The League of Nations failed, in the view of the commission, because the United States did not participate in it. And they placed the blame for this solely on the United States Senate stating that, "An opinionated Senate has been the chief obstacle to the establishment of a universal rule of compulsory jurisdiction."89 Not wanting to repeat the mistakes made after World War I they decided to pay very special attention to the United States.
The commission was unsure the American people would have the foresight to see that a world government was necessary. So they decided early on that, "One of the purposes of the Enquiry is to help the American people think their way through the problems of the fundamental bases of world peace and the responsibility of the United States." Thus they determined that, "conclusions cannot be given to the country before they are ready; but the problem can be stated and progress can be reported."90
To accomplish this goal the commission would use the free air time given to it by the CBS to instruct the American people in the necessities of world government.91 Transcripts of these broadcasts were to be printed and distributed at no cost. Local groups were to be encouraged, with cash prizes as an incentive, to evolve their own ideas on world peace.92
The commission had nothing but contempt for the U.S. Congress, particularly the Senate, 93 because of the Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and with it the League of Nations. Yet the Senate was the one group most feared by proponents of the new world order--it had the power, once again, to prevent the United States from submitting to a world government. Several ideas were suggested to address this problem. One idea was to try to educate Congress on the benefits of world government. Another was to set aside lucrative political jobs in the new international government for its congressional supporters. Perhaps all proposals concerning the world body should be presented to Congress in such a way that a simple majority vote would suffice. Or bypass the legislative process altogether, if the Constitution needed alteration, and have the people vote on it.94
The problem of circumventing the Constitution plagued Wright for years. As late as 1947 he was still trying to figure out how to get by it. In May of that year, Wright wrote to John Sloan Dickey, President of Dartmouth College, to congratulate him for an idea that he had come up with to navigate around it. Dicky's idea was that, with a majority vote in Congress, the president had the constitutional power to make international agreements. Although Wright liked the idea he went on to say: "The main argument against developing it as a practicable agreement-making procedure is the prejudice which the Senate and some public opinion has in favor of the two thirds rule method. It occurred to me that possibly a joint resolution of Congress, recognizing the constitutionality of this procedure might be an adequate substitute for a constitutional amendment, and might be much more easy to achieve"95
By February of 1940 historian, Harry Elmer Barnes and others had gotten wind of the commission and its activities and had written an article denouncing it, "TIN CANS AND PEACE." The outcome of any work produced by the commission was predetermined, they wrote, because its membership was made up entirely of people with interventionist convictions. After naming several of the commission members--Shotwell, Eichelberger, Lamont, Aydelotte and Wright-- they went on to say "these names stand for the League and collective security. They are to be found on the interlocking directorates of the numerous committees and associations mothered by Nicholas Murray Butler and his Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Though their views have never been shared by a majority of the American people, they have tried with unlimited funds to set themselves up as the sole guardians of peace."96
Although Barnes and his associates were correct in their assertion that the commission's membership was entirely made up of supporters of U.S. intervention in the war on behalf of Britain, there was more to it. Throughout Wright's papers and the commission reports, one theme is sounded again and again--Anglo-American Union. Many of the commission members, including Wright, were active in the Anglo-American union movement. Wright first became involved in it in 1934, when fellow University of Chicago professor Charles E. Merriam introduced him to B. Hubert Cooper of The James Bryce Fellowship and its related association, The English-Speaking Union.97 Commission member Clarence Streit, author of a book called Union Now,98 headed up a project from 1938 to 1945 called Union Now with Great Britain.99 Dana Converse Backus advocated a political union between Britain, the British Dominions and the United States.100 In February 1941, he stated these views explicitly in the section he wrote for the commission about postwar conditions:
Clark Eichelberger was invited to visit the U. K. in late summer of 1941. His travel expenses were covered by the British government and the American Embassy arranged for him to stay in a first class room at the Savoy Hotel in London. While there, he was able to confer with members of British organizations that paralleled the commission and the League of Nations Association. Eichelberger attended a meeting of the British Research Sub-Committee on International Organization, for example on 20 September. Historian Arnold Toynbee was one of the more vocal members of this group and Eichelberger noted afterword that their ideas were very similar.102
In his book, Tragedy and Hope Georgetown University professor Carroll Quigley discussed in detail the history of what he called Anglo-American power structure. The British half of this power structure came from what was called "The Round-Table Groups" the American side from what he referred to as the "Eastern Establishment" . According to Quigley, the idea of creating an Anglo-American union originated with them. Not surprisingly, most of those he names as being associated with this power structure also happened to be members of the commission.103
The Anglo-American union that was planned never came to fruition, at least not as a political entity. There are several probable explanations for this, including the fact that the United States came out of the war in a much stronger position than Great Britain. It is also possible, however, that its proponents believed that the goal of an Anglo-Saxon dominated international superstructure had been achieved, thus making the political union unnecessary.
The Commission To Study the Organization of Peace was formed almost 60 years ago in order to facilitate the creation of a somewhat socialist world state. This is still the goal of its members. After World War II, the commission survived with about 90 people on its membership rolls.. Their backgrounds are similar to those of the original members--university professors, lawyers, business executives and experts in the field of international relations. The current chairman is Louis B. Sohn.104
Richard N. Gardner is one of the more recent members of the commission to have risen to a position of prominence. He was U.S. Ambassador to Spain from 07 October 1993 to 12 July 1997.105 His professional background and his views on world government reveal a striking similarity between his personal profile and that of Wright and the other early members of the commission. Gardner is a recent holder of the chair in law and international organization at Columbia University. He held State Department posts in the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton administrations. In addition to the commission, Gardner has been associated with several other internationally oriented organizations, among them; the International League for Human Rights, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral commission.106
Gardner's view of national sovereignty also reflects those of his predecessors on the commission. In an article for Foreign Affairs, he stated that: "In short, the 'house of world order' will have to be built from the bottom up rather than the top down. It will look like a great 'booming, buzzing confusion,' to use William James' famous description of reality, but an end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much more than the old-fashioned frontal assault."107 On 17 September 1996 at a conference on the legacy of FDR, then Ambassador Gardner, gave a speech entitled "Franklin Roosevelt and World Order: The World We Sought and the World We Have".108 In this speech, the Ambassador outlined the new world order that he says FDR hoped to implement following the war. What he described was, in reality, this was nothing more than a restatement of the findings from the commission reports.
The commission's plan for a socialist world state has not yet materialized. Roosevelts' death in April 1945 and Stalin's distrust of the West delayed it. Many of the international organs that were to serve as the enforcement tools of the global government were put in place, but the administrative and military powers necessary to enforce this version of world socialism were never granted to the U.N. as planned.109 This may have not have been to the liking of the overwhelming majority of the members of the commission but there was one individual that desired exactly this outcome--John Foster Dulles.
In letters to Wright in December 1939 and February 1940, Dulles outlined a world order that consisted of a global organization that was to be consultative in nature and a place for heads of state to meet. He also thought there should be regional arrangements and monetary agreements and he supported the concept of free trade. But he envisioned no world police force and he considered a world socialist system impossible to operate.110
It is the Dulles vision of world order that Gardner described as "The World We Have". And it is the plan for a new world order described by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace that he and many others today, want to replace it with.
The Quincy Wright Papers, reports of the commission, and other sources cited in this article pose an interesting question for scholars of international relations today: What is the true nature of the driving force behind the ongoing globalization process?
My reading of the wartime reports suggests that Carroll Quigley came close to the mark in his description of an Anglo-American power structure dominated by the big banking houses in the United States and Great Britain. Large universities and media conglomerates such as CBS also appear to have been major players in this game of global domination.
One of the more intriguing aspects of this group is just where it actually stands in the political spectrum. Is it communist, capitalist or somewhere in-between? Quigley thought that the commission was capitalistic--in the tradition of the British roundtable groups--but that it would cooperate with Communists or anyone else if it would further their ends.111 I'm not convinced of this. Wright and his colleagues were, with a few notable exceptions, center-left and socialist in nature and their world view was one of extreme internationalism. In this respect they more resembled followers of Fabian Society philosophy than the roundtable groups.
Finding the answers to these and other questions concerning these people and the new world order that they advocate will not be easy if Quigley is correct in his assertion that this group wishes itself to remain anonymous.112 In this case, we will have to go elsewhere to find the information that we are looking for. One excellent source is the personal papers of the individuals who designed the new world order earlier in the century. But these are scattered across the United States and the U.K. Some are easily accessible, including the Quincy Wright Papers (at the University of Chicago Library), The James T. Shotwell Papers (at Columbia University Library) and the Nicholas Murray Butler Papers (also at Columbia University Library) . Others may still be in the possession of family members, and some may no longer exist. In any case it will require a joint effort on the part of international relations scholars in both the U.S. and the U.K. to piece this puzzle together.
Robert P. Hillmann is a graduate of Loyola University of Chicago, with a bachelor's degree in history. He studied the Quincy Wright Papers in 1997 and 1998 at the University of Chicago Library, where they are held in the university's archives.
1. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), BUILDING PEACE: Reports
of the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, Volume 2, A STATEMENT OF
AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER June 6, 1941 (Metuchen, N.J.:
The Scarecrow press, 1973), p.795.
2. COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY October 2, 1939, p. 1, box, 5 folder 12, Quincy Wright
Papers, University of Chicago Library
3. Cordell Hull to Quincy Wright, November 3, 1938, box, 13 folder 19, Wright Papers
and Wright to Cordell Hull, October 27, 1938, box, 20 folder 2; Wright Papers
4. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP), Building Peace, Vol. 1 p.
xviii
5. Clark M. Eichelberger, ORGANIZING FOR PEACE: A Personal History of the Founding of
the United Nations (New York: Harper & Row 1977) p.114
6. Ibid, pp. 125-26
7. Members of the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace box, 5 folder 12, Wright
Papers, /Structural organization of CSOP, December 2, 1939 box, 5 folder 12, Wright
Papers
8. Letter from Eichelberger to Wright February 8, 1940 box, 5 folder 12; Wright Papers /
Cordell Hull to Wright November 3, 1938 box, 13 folder 19; Wright Papers / The U.S. Foreign
Service (American Embassy - London) August 10, 1942 box, 5 folder 12; Wright Papers
9. Eichelberger, ORGANIZING FOR PEACE, pp. 224-248
10. Wright Papers, Eichelberger to Wright, January 16, 1941 box, 5 folder 12;Wright Papers,
Eichelberger, ORGANIZING FOR PEACE, p. 115
11. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1
p.xvii
12. Harry Elmer Barnes et al., "TIN CANS AND PEACE", February 24, 1940, box, 5 folder 12;
Wright Papers
13. COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY, pp 2-3 / box, 5 folder 12, Wright Papers "TIN CANS AND
PEACE", Wright Papers
14. Louis B. Sohn, introduction to Building Peace, Vol. 1, by Commission To Study the
Organization of Peace, pp xii-xiii
15. Ibid., p. xii
16. Ibid., p. xi
17. See letterhead of League of Nations Association in Eichelberger to Wright, 8 February 1940
box, 5 folder 12;Wright Papers, box, 5 folder 12;
18. See letterhead of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Shotwell to Wright 1 April
1940, box, 5, folder 12, Wright Papers
19. Who's Who in America Vol. 20 1938-1939, p. 471
20. See entry on Shotwell, James Thomson in Britannica Online
21. Wright to William Rice of the University of Wisconsin, dated 1-29-40, box, 5 folder 12,
Wright Papers
22. See letterhead of World Citizens Association, in Roger S. Greene to Wright 28 December
1939, box, 5 folder 11, Wright Papers
23. See letterhead of Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in Adlai E. Stevenson to Wright
19 December 1939, box, 20 folder 2, Wright Papers
24. Hull to Wright, 24 January 1939, box, 20 folder 2, Wright Papers
25. Forward to index, p. 2, Wright Papers (The index runs 55 pages)
26. William C. Olson & A.J.R. Groom, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEN & NOW
(London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991) pp. 114-115
27. Structural Organization of Commission To Study the Organization of Peace 12-02-39, box,
5 folder 12, Wright Papers
28. Wright to Committee on Admissions Cosmos Club, 2 February 1943, box, 13 Eichelberger
folder, Wright Papers
29. See letterhead of League of Nations Association in Eichelberger to Wright, 8 February 1940
box, 5 folder 12, Wright Papers
30. Townsend Hopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the U.N. New
Haven and London: 997), p. 18
31. Who's Who in America, vol. 25, 1948-1949, p. 724
32. Structural Organization of Commission To Study the Organization of Peace 12-02-39, box,
5 folder 12, Wright Papers
33. Who's Who in America, vol. 25, 1948-1949, p. 706
34. Professor Charles G. Fenwick of Bryn Mawr College to Quincy Wright, January 15, 1939
box, 5 folder 11, Wright Papers
35. Members of the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace box, 5 folder 12, Wright
Papers, This list does not name all those who were on the commission
36. Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A history of the World in Our Time (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1966) p. 952
37. Allen Dulles to Wright December 11, 1939, box, 13 Dulles folder, Wright Papers
38. John Foster Dulles to Wright December 19, 1939, box, 13 Dulles folder, Wright
Papers
39. Members of the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace box, 5 folder 12, Wright
Papers; Quigley, Tragedy and Hope p. 944
40. Wright to Eagleton, 8 December 1939, box, 5, folder 11, Wright Papers
41. Members of the Commission To Study the Organization of Peace box, 5 folder 12, Wright
Papers
42. Report by Corliss Lamont, 28 December 1942, box, 5, folder 14, Wright Papers
43. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1
p.xvi
44. Ibid., p. xvii
45. Ibid., p. xviii
46. Commission of Enquiry, Wright Papers.
47. Structural Organization of Commission To Study the Organization of Peace 12-02-39, box,
5 folder 12, Wright Papers.
48. General Outline of Studies, 26 December 1939, box, 5, folder 12, Wright Papers.
49. Second Draft of Statement, 22 June 1940, p. 4, box, 5, folder 12, Wright Papers.
50. General Outline of Studies, pp. 1-2, Wright Papers.
51. Wright to Shotwell, 1 July 1940, box, 23, Shotwell folder, Wright Papers.
52. Wright to the Daily Maroon 16 February 1940, box, 94 Maroon folder (The
Daily Maroon--now called the Chicago Maroon--is a student newspaper published
at the University of Chicago).
53. General Outline of Studies, p. 1, Wright Papers.
54. Ibid.
55. Second Draft of Statement, p. 21, Wright Papers.
56. Ibid., p. 10.
57. Shotwell to Wright April 1, 1940, box, 5 folder 12, Wright Papers.
58. "Sees U.S.-Britain Union For Peace", Baltimore News-Post, December 8, 1941,
WAR EXTRA edition, p. 2 The war extra edition may not appear in microfilm collections of the
News-Post but is available in reprint from M-C Associates-Gateway Books, Mile Marker
104, Rte50, Salisbury, MD 21802, tel. (410) 860-9750.
59. Ibid.
60. Eagleton Outline, 9 March 1940, p. 1, box, 5 folder 12, Wright Papers.
61. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1 p.
42.
62. Second Draft of Statement, p. 22-23, Wright Papers.
63. "Sees U.S.-Britain Union For Peace", Baltimore News-Post; Commission To Study
the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1 p. 42.
64. Eagleton Outline, 9 March 1940, p. 1, Wright Papers.
65. Second Draft of Statement, p. 36, Wright Papers.
66. Frederick C. McKee to Wright, 18 March 1940, box, 5 folder 12, Wright Papers.
67. Wright to McKee, 20 March 1940, box, 5 folder 12, Wright Papers.
68. Eagleton Outline, p. 1, Wright Papers.
69. Second Draft of Statement, p. 23, Wright Papers.
70. "Sees U.S.-Britain Union For Peace", Baltimore News-Post.
71. Ibid.
72. Wright to McKee, 20 March 1940, Wright Papers.
73. "Sees U.S.-Britain Union For Peace", Baltimore News-Post.
74. Eagleton Outline, p. 2, Wright Papers.
75. "Sees U.S.-Britain Union For Peace", Baltimore News-Post.
76. Wright to McKee, 20 March 1940, Wright Papers.
77. Eagleton Outline, p. 2, Wright Papers.
78. Wright to McKee, Wright Papers.
79. "Sees U.S.-Britain Union For Peace", Baltimore News-Post.
80. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1 pp.
116-117.
81. Wright to Rice, Wright Papers.
82. Wright to Hull, Wright Papers.
83. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1 pp. 12-
30, 61, esp. 22.
84. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
85. Ibid., p. 45.
86. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
87. Ibid., p. 30.
88. Second Draft of Statement, p. 19, Wright Papers.
89. Ibid.
90. Commission of Enquiry, p. 2, Wright Papers.
91. Commission of Enquiry, pp. 2-3, Wright Papers; Barnes et al., "TIN CANS AND PEACE",
pp. 2-3, Wright Papers.
92. Barnes et al., "TIN CANS AND PEACE", p. 2, Wright Papers.
93. Second Draft of Statement, pp. 16, 25, Wright Papers.
94. Post War Condition, 15 February 1941, p. 3, box 5, folder 13, Wright Papers.
95. Wright to John Dickey, 12 May 1947, box 7, folder 14, Wright Papers.
96. Barnes et al., "TIN CANS AND PEACE", p. 1, Wright Papers.
97. Cooper to Merriam and Wright 5-28-34, 6-4-34, 6-12-34 box 7 folder 13, Wright
Papers.
98. Julius Elbau to Wright, 7 February 1940, box 7, folder 13, Wright Papers.
99. Quigley, Tragedy and Hope p. 582.
100. Post War Condition, p. 2 Wright Papers.
101. Ibid., p. 4.
102. Eichelberger, ORGANIZING FOR PEACE, pp. 160-161, 172-173.
103. Quigley, Tragedy and Hope pp. 130-131, 950-956.
104. Encyclopedia of Associations, 32nd ed. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1997) pp 1734,
2623.
105. Commission To Study the Organization of Peace, BUILDING PEACE, Vol. 1 p.
xvi.
106. U.S. Mission to Spain world wide web site,
"Former Ambassador Richard N. Gardner";
http://www.embusa.es/embajada/amboeng.html.
107. Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order", Foreign Affairs 52, no. 3 (April 1974):
558.
108. U.S. Mission to Spain, "Franklin Roosevelt and World Order: The World We Sought and
the World We Have"; http://www.embusa.es/embajada/turineng.html.
109. Ibid.
110. John Foster Dulles to Wright, 19 December 1939 and 19 January 1940, box 13, Dulles
folder, Wright Papers.
111. Quigley, Tragedy and Hope p. 950.
112. Ibid.
