Time for Change

• Introduction: Theories of Time.

• Does Time Exist At All?

• Flow I; Subjective and Objective Time.
• Flow II: The Rate of Flow.
• Interlude: Relations
• Flow III: McTaggarts arguments against the Flow of Time and the Relational Growing Universe.
• Flow IV: Time Capsules: No Flow in a Block Universe.

• Time, Endurance and causality

• Kant Was Wrong About Time

• Time and Possibility

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Does Time Exist At All ?

Stemming from the recent discussions on time travel, I am presenting some of some of the commonly used arguments against the existence of time as an objective aspect of reality, with attempted refutations.

0. Definition of Time

FLOW	-- Events are succesively replaced by other events, whether we like it or not.
LINEARITY	-- Events are replaced in a linear A,B,C sequence.
UNIDIRECTIONALITY	-- The relation between B and A is not the same as the relation between C and B -- we call one relation the 'past' and the other the 'future'
COHERENCE	-- There is a certain regularity to events e.g. if B1 is simultaneous with B2 and B2 is simultaneous with B3 then B1 is simultaneous with B3

1. Argument that time is measured by man-made units therefore it is man made.

1.1

2. Argument that time is a just a concept we use to organise phenomena.

2.1

3. Argument that Time is just movement/change

The objections are :

3.1

In other words "time is just movement/change" just replaces the *word* time with other words -- the concept of time is still hidden in there.

3.2

Let's pretend that time is 2-dimensional. then , starting with event "A" each dimension leads off in 2 directions like this:

                      |   ---- time 1 ------>
               time 2 |   A,   A01, A02, A03
                      |   A10, A11, A12, A13
                      V   A20, A21, A22 ,A23

Ok, this is all a fiction -- but that's the whole point. Time doesn't work this way -- it has LINEARITY -- and the fact that it doesn't work that way is an objective, empirical fact. It isn't *just* events or changes or motions -- it's the way they're structured, in objective reality.

4. Argument that time is just a property of matter

The argument goes "If there were no matter, we would not need to suppose time Therefore time is just an aspect of matter"

Arguments 3.1 and 3.2, already given, plus:

4.1

We have a strong in-built prejudice to regard matterial objects as being self-subsistent -- this causes us to doubt other elements of reality which aren't so tangible. But the hallmark of reality is 'not going away when you stop thinking abut it".

5. Argument that only the present is real

This argument assumes that the 'existence' of past and/or future events is a *necessary* feature of time.

The assumption comes about because: Subjectively, our storehouse of memories lead us to suppose an objective storehouse of events -- the real past. Objectively, we tend to picture time as analogous to space. Since things which are behind us continue to exist, we assume that past events continue to exist.

But these are just over-extensions of analogies.

5.1

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Subjective and Objective Time

If we deny the reality of the flow of time, we still have the problem of explaining the *appearance* of a flow to us humans. If we suppose that humans are unique creatures with immaterial souls, then we could just say that the illusion of flow is one of the soul's mysterious attributes -- but most adherents of the Block Universe view (according to which, time exists as a dimension, but does there is no change or flow) are also adherents of some kind of physicalism or materialism, and therefore need to explain how the the appearance, the illusion comes about in sufficiently materialistic terms.

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The Flow of Time and the Rate of FLow

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Relations

If John weighs 200 pounds and Mary weighs 150 pounds, then there is a certain relationship between John and Mary -- that of 'weighing 50 pounds more than'. The relationship is discoverable by taking the facts about John and and the facts about Mary separately. In a sense, it is manufactured, although based on real-world facts which are not human-made. Many thinkers -- most notably Leibniz -- have taken this type of relationship (which modern metaphyscians call an internal relation) as the paradigm of all relationships. Relationships, as a species, they declare, are products of the mind.

However, there is another kind of relation, which is a real-world fact over and above the facts which can be ascribed to individuals separately. An example would be John's distance from Mary. That John is 2 miles (or whatever) from Mary is not a fact that can be discovered given all the information about John and all the information about Mary. Just as John's height belongs to John, so John's distance from Mary (and vice-versa) is a fact about the John-Mary dyad which cannot be reduced to facts about either of them separately. Metaphysicians call this kind of relation an external relation. External relations tend to be spatio-temporal (I cannot think of any examples which are not ... can you ?). This does not weigh against their reality, and it possibly tells us something about what sopace and time are, metaphysically speaking: they are the sum total of the external relations holding between things.

It is sometimes objected that relations must be somehow unreal because they are ontologically dependant on their relata -- that John and Mary's distance form each other cannot exist without John and Mary. But this applies just as much to their intensive properties, such as mass. If we were to apply this principal consistently, we would end with a radically idealistic view of the universe. Modern metaphysicians tend to yoke intensive properties and external relations together as 'predicates', with the difference that properties are 'one-place' predicates (eg the mass of X), whereas relations are n-place predicates (eg X is 1 mile from Y).

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McTaggarts arguments against Time and the Relational Growing Universe

He believes that if he can disprove the A Series, he can disprove time (although Block Universe Theorists accept the B series without the A series).

To summarise:

• a) (A-series) pastness, presentness, etc are properties of moments.
• b) they change over time -- what is now present will be past
• c) (b) involves paradox or regress.

However, I think this difficulty can be resolved by regarding pastness (etc) as relational properties, not properties intrinsic to a moment of time. A man becomes a father the moment his child is born, but that does not require any intrinsic change in the man himself. Likewise, a moment becomes past when a subsequent (in terms of the B series) moment becomses existent. Pastness is not an intrinisc property which the earlier moment acquires, it is rather a relationship to the later moment. Presentness is an existing moment's lack of such a relationship. (Futurity would appear to be non-existence plain and simple, which I do not think is problematical). Although something happens when a moment becomes past, nothing changes, as opposed to simply coming into being where it did not exist before. Note that the 'direction' is supplied by the changeless B-series. Pastness is constructed out of B-series "earlierness" and becoming, with no need for an A-series as McTaggart conceives it.

(7) The argument that the A series cannot exist is as follows: On the one hand, (a) past, present, and future are incompatible determinations (whether relations or qualities) of an event; if any event is present, it cannot be past, nor be future. On the other hand, (b) every event has them all; if any event is past, it has been present and future. These two, (a) and (b), are simply inconsistent, and therefore the A series, and consequently change and time, cannot exist. (468) Notice that we cannot presuppose the existence of time, in order to evade this argument.

(8) An obvious objection against this argument is that (a) or (b), or both, involves equivocation in terms of verb-forms for tense; the determinations as past, present, and future are only incompatible when they are simultaneous, and there should be no contradiction when an event has all of them successively. However, this objection involves a vicious circle, because it presupposes the existence of time, in that those determinations are supposed to be taking place in time. (468)

(9) Thus the previous conclusion cannot be evaded. Since the notions of A series and of time contain a contradiction, they cannot be applied to reality, and hence time is unreal. (470-471) It must be remembered that this whole argument is taking place within the context of attributing time to the reality itself, not to subjective consciousness. (471-472)

My basic point is that it is only contradictory for a thing (in this case an event, or moment-of-time) to be variously past, present and future if those are intrinsic properties. There is no contradiction in having different relational properties, scuha s being both a mother and a daughter!

Some people might be temtpted at this point to accuse me of 'begging the question' in that I am assuming that such a thing as becoming is possible without describing or explaining it. However, McTaggart's argument is to the affect that a dynamic theory of time is inconsistent and contradictory, and I am only seeking to show the exact opposite; that it can be supposed -- posited, hypothesised -- consistently. To do that it is perfectly legitimate to simply assume things, since I am not going on to argue that what I am saying is actually true, as opposed to merely consistent.

However, other considerations, such as the inability of the static, Block view to account for the *appearance*, albeit an illusory one, of temporal flow, might lead one to accept the view I have outlined.

Peter D. Jones Sussex 15/4/2005-18/7/2006

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Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence.

Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option. The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity. I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness.

The objection that being arrayed along the 4th dimension would split consciousness up is week; we don't have a micro-conscousness associated with each neuron, despite their spatial separation. Why should temporal separation have ant atomising, fragmenting effect --when B-series time is so similar to space anyway ?

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Time, Endurance and causality

Philosophers define time as the dimension of change. Physcists treat time as the 'direction' along which mass/energy is conserved.

Consider change. A difference between two parts of the same object is not change. A poker which is hot at one end and cold at the other is not an example of change. A poker which is entirely hot at moment T1, and entirely cold at moment T2 is. (another perspective on this topic can be found here.

However, that presents a problem. Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indistinguishables tells us that if two things differ in any of their properties, they must be two different things. So the poker at time T1 and at time T2 are simply not the same individual. The common-snse poker is a series of poker-stages. Poker-stages are parts of the poker. But this reintroduces the problem that a difference in parts does not explain change, and therefore does not explain time.

We can get round this difficulty by making a distinction between the actual state of an object and its potentialities or dispositions. Even if a poker is not actually red-hot , it has a disposition to glow red-hot when heated (as opposed to melting or burning. Its dispositions are part of its properties, its characteristics, even if they remain latent and unactualised. So, if we define a poker as a bundle of dispositions, we are quite entitled to say that is quite the same at time T1 when it is hot, and T2 when it is called. We are also entitled to say that it is different, in that different dispoitions are being manifest or actualised at those two times.

The difference is a difference of actualisation, which is a second-order property, like existence.

Let us call this the Aristotoelean or Endurance solution, and turn our attention to the alternative -- let's say Heracleitian or Perdurance solution, the solution in terms of poker-stages which are temporal parts of the poker. A scientifically-minded Heracleitian might object that we have been unfair to his position. He does not think that the poker is JUST the sum of various poker-stages, he also thinks that poker-stages are bound together by cause-effect relations, so that the poker is a process and not a mere collection.

What is the diffence between A just happening to happen, and B just happening to happen -- and A causing. One way of explaining that is to say that 'A causes B' is an example of a general law -- a law that means that whenever A occurs, B follows.

The original case for Heracleitianism seemed to be saying that: since the state of the universe at time T1 is different from its state at time T2, they are simply two different individuals. However, this will not work if causality is introduced into the picture. The hypothetical 'If A, then B' must be true at all states and stages of the universe -- that is to say, there are true facts about the universe that may not be reflected in its state at any one time. Even if there are no A's or B' included in the current state of the universe, it is still true that 'if A, then B' -- and that remains true at all stages and states of the universe. At this point, it should be clear that the Heracleitian or Perdurance theory, when combined with causality amounts to pretty much the same thing as the Aristotelean or Endurance theory. The main difference is that the Aritotelean theory allows different things to have different sets of dispositions, whereas according to the Causal-Heracletian theory, there is a single system of Universal Law which fulfils the same function.

To summarise:

1. The Aristotlean/Endurance theory exlains time.
2. The plain Heracletian/Perdurance theory does not.
3. The Heracletian/Perdurance with added casuality theory does -- but amount to 1).

Earlier, we mentioned that the physicist's view of time is connected with the conservation of energy: varying the temporal parameter leaves the total energy the same, which is not true if one of the spatial parameters is varied. A plausible candidate for an ontological interpretation of the physicist's mass/energy is potential of a general kind. Where energy is present, there is the possibility for something to happen. Where energy is absent, nothing can change. So the Conservation of Energy turns out to be another variation of the Aritotelean/Endurance theory. The theory that the possibilites of an object are the same at times T1 and T2 is the metaphysical equivalent of the total energy of a system being the same at times T1 and T2.

Peter D. Jones Birmingham 20/1/02

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Kant Was Wrong About Time

Hypothesis 2:The temporal sequence of observed events is
imposed by the human mind on observed events having no given order.

Hypothesis 2 can be broken down into two further possibilities:

Hypothesis 2.1: The order imposed by the mind is random.

Hypothesis 2.2: The order imposed by the mind follows a set of rules.

Now, if Hypothesis 2.1 were true, the order imposed by one indivdual would generally vary from that imposed by another individual. Yet two individuals invariably agree about any sequence of events
they have witnessed.

So 2.1 cannot be true.

As for Hypothesis 2.2, consider:

Scenario 1. You are sitting in your garden, and an apple falls of the tree (A). Then a bird flies overhead (B).

Scenario 2. You are sitting in your garden, and a bird flies overhead (B).Then an apple falls of the tree (A).In each case, the same event happens twice, and in each the order is different. In X, B follows A, and in Y, A follows B.

If you were following a rule that says "A always follows B'
you would not have been able to witness scenario 1, and vice versa. Therefore, there there is no set of rules that can impose a temporal sequence on a set of observations. Therefore, there can be no rule saying that A's are followed by B's, nor can there be any rule that B's are always followed by A's. There can be no rule that allows you to impose an temporal
sequence on an arbitrary set of observed events. (Of course we expect *certain* subsets of events to follow
sequences -- e.g. smoke follows on fire. But we have no way of expecting *any* set of events to follow
a certain order -- yet, as we witness them, they always do). So Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2 both fail, which means Hypothesis 1 is left as the only possibility:
events occur in a temporal sequence which is independant of the human mind. Since there is no possibility of time existing anywhere
except in objectivity, there is no need to verify this fact empirically, and the problem of verification does not arise. Peter D. Jones 30/1/02

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Time and Possibility

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