Forms, ideas and representations

        

There is no reason why 
the representation need be the same kind of 
entity, ontologically speaking as what it represents 
-- representations only need to occur and vary in a systematic way in 
accordance with what they represent ('covariance'). 
I have a map of Birmingham in my pocket 
which represents post-offices as little 
black stars. Post offices are not, ontologically 
speaking, little black stars, but that does not destroy 
the effectiveness of the map. 
Therefore it is possible to 
assert that predicates, or concepts represent 
or correspond to universals, whilst rejecting 
the idea that we can discover the nature 
of universals in themselves by contemplating 
our concepts. Of course it is very much 
a part of the Platonic theory of universals 
that the idea contemplated in the mind, 
and the form or property repeated in the 
world are one and the same, but it is 
possible to have non-Platonic realism 
about universals in which this identification
is not made. Moreover, we have positive 
reason to reject the concept-universal identification 
in the ubiquity of human 
error and misunderstanding, which would be 
unlikely if we all had direct inner insight into 
the essence (or essences) of reality.