This superficially convincing definition has a problem. If I hypnotised you into wanting to rob a bank, and you went ahead and robbed it, you would, according to most people's common-sense, be acting under my coercion But by your definition, the robbery would be what you wanted, and therefore voluntary.
The question this essay addresses is whether our choices are caused completely by internal and external forces or whether we are free to choose a course of action regardless of those forces.
Since libertarians regard their actions as being caused (at least in part) by their choices, a choice for them is an (internal) cause. So libertarians do not want to be entirely free of causes. However it is important that a choice is an internal cause in the right way. In the hypnosis example, the internal choice to rob the bank had an external cause in hypnosis, and it was not therefore an example of volitin, or free will. So it looks like libertarians are actually people who believe their choices are internal causes which are not (entirely) traceable to external determinants.
In sum, when we act voluntarily, it is the result of our conscious thoughts, beliefs, etc., as well as unconscious ones which play a role we do not even experience contemporaneously (perhaps the role may be inferred in hind-sight).
The fact that our acts are the result of the conscious belief we have at the exact moment we make the act (time T, say) does not strictly imply that our behaviour is always determined by *prior* events, since some of the determinants we have at time T could be genuninely novel elements, which are not traceable back to external factors prior to time T. Indeed, it seem that we need to suppose something like this in order to define voluntary action properly.
The reasons we act a certain way are beyond our control. As Shopenhauer put it, "a man can surely do what he wills to do, but cannot determine what he wills.
To will is to determine one's actions according to a free choice.
Schopenhauer misses the point:Will is something that determines, not something that is, or needs to be, determined.
A deterministic understanding of humans does not equate with a view that our lives are predetermined, or fated, by some outside being.
It does equate with the view that every single thing we 'do' was a foregone conclusion before we were born.
Do You Believe in Magic? Is it credible that some part of us (our free will) permits us to act free of our determinants in at least some instances?
If our determinants -- or as I would rather put it, influences -- determine us, then no it is not. If, on the other hand, determinism is false, then it is credible. I agree with the hypothetical argument that 'if determinism, no free-will', ( because I am in incompatiblist) but nothing has been said so far which adds up to a categorical and conclusive proof of determinism.
if so, how and why doesn't everything in the universe -- atoms, cells, dogs, cars -- possess this unnatural quality?
Which is only unnatural if determinsim is true, which the author has assumed rather than proven.
Why don't atoms, cells, or cars posess memory, or intelligence, or consciousness ? Because they don't have the right structure and composition. Likeise, free will.
For free will is unnatural, or perhaps more accurately supernatural or magical as its existence would violate the law of causation.
Is free-will magic ? If determinism is true, then there is only one possible outcome to a given state of affairs. To exercise ones free will and do something else would be to do the impossible, and therefore would indeed be magic. -- IF determinism is true. If indeterminism is true there would still be impossibilities (indeterminism is not pure chaos or randomness), but there would be more than one possibility. Choosing between these multiple possibilities would not be magic. I can't freely will to fly to the mean or speak chinese, because these are not possibilities, but I can choose between the possibilites available to me at the moment.
another interesting question is when does free will develop? We all accept that babies don't have it. Does a one year old beginning to talk have it? A two year old who can say "no"?
When do consciousness or memory develop ? All of these faculties have fuzzy boundaries -- that does not mean they do not exist.
and if we don't have it as a baby, then where does it come from? Does it just appear in different people at different times, and perhaps never appear in others such as the severely retarded?vWhat if it misses and lands on a comatose person, but not on a Ph.D. candidate?
This assume that free will is completely disconnected from other mental faculties, and from the overall pattern of human development. No libertarian would define free will in this way, so it is a straw-man argument.
some argue that free will gives one moral accountability. Similarly, it necessitates guilt, seen by some free will proponents as a healthy, controlling emotion. The lack of free will also makes pride a myth, for how can we have pride when our behavior is forced? This may trouble some individuals. However, these arguments miss the point. They address only the desirability of a belief in free will, not whether it exists.
Exactly the same could be said of many of the arguemnts for determinism I have seen.
The physicist may point out that, as far as we understand such things, the laws of causation do not seem applicable to quantum mechanics and that random theory instead appears to be at work there. However, it is well accepted that nature has different rules for sub-atomic objects than it does for larger objects.
No it isn't. For one thing larger bodies are made of sub-atomic objects, so whatever laws they follow emerge, presumably, from more fundamental quantum laws. For another it is possible to detect sub-atomic particles using macroscopic instruments, so there is no absolute causal barrier betwween the very small and the everyday world. It is also important in this connection to note the difference between the idea of a law as a governing principle of reality. and that of a law as a theoretical description of observed regularities, the latter being a mere approximation to the former.
we humans are much larger than sub-atomic structures and, like other things in the larger physical world, are subject to different principles. In any case, if we are governed by the laws of quantum mechanics then this is an argument that our behavior is random, not that it is self-determined ALthough it is commonly believed that quantum mechanics provides proof of randomness, it in fact does nt , since no such proof is possible.
(alternatively, it could mean that quantum objects that appear to be acting randomly are in fact intelligent like us and governed by their own free will).
More alternatively still, physical indeterminism is a necesary but insuffcient condition for free-will -- other things are required such as consciousness and intelligence.
quantum mechanics does not advance the argument in favor of free will.
The argument against free will is almost entirely based on determinism. Quantum mechanics disproves the usual conception of determinism and thereby removes the deterministic objection to free will. Since disproof of conventional determinism is not proof of randomness, another objection is removed. Therefore, free will is possible.
Conclusion:
Most of us believe, explicitly or implicitly in free will, and have no compelling reason
to change our belief, since the objections case against free will is based on: