Conclusions

End of the Resistance:

The fortress of Ličge fell mostly because of the firepower of the 42 cm's. While the forts themselves were a disappointment becuase of design weaknesses (which will be discussed at length later), the courage of the defenders stands out; those men who fought on under deplorable conditions.

The Army of the Meuse was dissolved, integrated into 1st and 2nd Armies. General Von Emmich took command of Xth Corp. On 16 August, at 0530, the citadel of Huy, undefended, was taken. The Meuse valley from Huy to Holland was in German hands. The fortress of Namur would soon suffer the same fate as Ličge.

Finally, on the 17th, Von Kluck and Von Bulow were able to move into Belgium to make the swing to the channel to descend on Paris, a move that was to begin on the 13th. The holdout of the forts from 13-16 August allowed the French and British to improve their defensive positions, especially Lanrezac's 5th Army. More important, the Battle of Ličge showed the German army to be less than invincible.

Conclusions Concerning the Fortress:

The fortresses of Ličge were built to withstand projectiles of 21 cm, projectiles whose destructive element was gunpowder. From 1888 to 1914, even though artillery had evolved to the high explosive type, no serious upgrades to the fortress had been made, including armaments.
Field artillery was lacking. It consisted of 114 pieces - 12 cannons of 150mm in cast-iron; 8 cannons at 120mm, model 1862, in steel; 16 cannons at 8.7cm, 12 howitzers at 8.7cm, 48 cannons of 8cm, and 18 75's. There were enough guns for 24 batteries, but only enough artillery officers for 4.
Interval artillery should have constituted the principal defense of the position.
The forts of Ličge could have been constructed as delaying forts surrounding a central node of communications. In order to fulfill this, they should have been given equal protection on all sides, capable of withstanding attacks from the rear. The gorge front was weaker than the other fronts, 1.5 meters thick versus 2.5. This shows that they were not constructed to be delaying forts.
The forts were poorly adapted to the terrain. They could not fire on their attackers until they were within 600 meters. Lantin, Loncin, and Hollogne were the exceptions.
The fortress line had been built in place of the traditional, though ancient, curtain wall. As such, it should have afforded much greater protection than a curtain wall. The perimeter defense of Ličge was weaker than the curtain wall that it replaced.
There were gaps of up to 3000 meters in the intervals where the guns could not reach. This was the case in 2/3 of the line. On the right bank, there were deep valleys which allowed the enemy to creep up undected to the glacis of the forts.
For counterbattery fire, the large caliber fortress artillery used observatories only 3000 meters in front of the lines of defense. When the observatories fell, the forts were blind. The observatories should have been able to withstand shelling by artillery at least as strong as the forts.
The hygienic condition of the interior of the forts was terrible. They were plagued by poor design in ventilation, making them humid and causing terrible odors within the close galleries.
Once it became impossible to cross the ditch, the men were separated from their supplies and from latrines (except Loncin). The men were therefore forced to live among their own excrement, and major reason for the fall of the forts.
The gravest shortfall was the absence of an interior enceinte, not only to protect the interval troops but to prevent the enemy from establishing himslef in the city to bomb the forts from the rear.
The forts were built to withstand 21 cm shells with black powder. But high explosive powder replaced that in the late 1800's. High explosive shells increased the energy of the projectile to the point where the cupolas and vaults could not longer withstand the force. Furthermore, delayed fuses were added to the shells. These shells would penetrate the target and explode inside rather than on the surface, increasing the extent of damage.
General Leman and the Belgian staff knew for some time that Germany possessed 28 cm guns capable of creating large craters in concrete. They also had the report of General Deguise who had observed the effects of 28 cm, high explosive projectiles on the Russian fort of Otchakoff in late 1912. Those who read the report could no longer have the slightest confidence in the Liege forts and could only hope that the Germans would leave these guns behind or use them on the French.

Other Shortfalls:

Each fort was equipped with only a single armored searchlight. If this failed or was put out of action, it shut down night operations.
The interval positions did not possess searchlights.
There were no electrical communications between the forts. Communications by signals between the forts could only be done with the aid of a searchlight.
The fortress lacked a central nucleus or redoubt to centralize correspondence. For example, General Leman, at his command post, could only speak to one of the forts by telephone by going through the central telephone office. The operator was a civilian who did not work for the military. Communictions took an enormous amount of time to reach their destinations. Also, the Germans had spies in all of the public services. Many false reports were received by the Belgian Army, prompting false army maneuvers.

General Leman concluded that the main reason for the fall of each fort was asphyxiating gases from the shelling (not to be confused with poison gas, which had not yet been used - this was gas emitting from the chemicals in the explosives) and from the odor of human waste. As mentioned previously, the latrines were located in the counterscarp. Once they were destroyed or cut off, the men had no choice but to use whatever location they could. There was no ventilation in the forts, thus the smell was awful. Also, the water cisterns were located in chambers around the central massif. During the shelling, the poor quality concrete cracked and the water drained away. Gas and foul odor caused the fall of Evegnče, Pontisse, Embourg, Liers, Fleron, Boncelles, Lantin, and Flčmalle.

Fort Loncin fell after the disastrous explosion in the powder magazine. Chaudfontaine fell for the same reason but to a lesser degree. Barchon and Hollogne's fall can be attributed to the poor morale of the garrisons and their commandants.

Conclusions Concerning the Strategic Situation:

It is uncontestable that the resistence of Liege, and especially of the forts, had an effect on the German timetable. Estimates run from no effect at all, according to the German High Command, to from 2 to 14 days according to allied reports. This delay gave the allies the opportunity to make some strategic shifts that had an effect on the outcome and success of the initial German attack. I will give an account of each of these estimates and its source.

In the book, "How Belgium Saved Europe," the author concludes that France made a disastrous error by concentrating on the right flank in Alsace and Lorraine for a thrust to Mulhouse, leaving the north undefended. Liege gave the French time to reposition their forces on 5 August to face north.

"A History of the Great War" concludes that the resistence put back the German timetable 72 hours. It hindered Von Kluck from reaching the battlefield and had immense consequences to the allies and to the German plan. Without it, the British Expeditionary Force and the French army may have been destroyed.

"La Guerre en Belgique" - The resistence held up 100,000 men of VII, IV, and X Corps in front of Ličge and a half million men of the 1st and 2nd Armies at the border. Resistence retarded the German offensive by at least 4 days.

Barbara Tuchman, in "The Guns of August," concludes that Ličge held up the German offensive for 2 days because the German march of her main armies had not been scheduled to begin until the 15th.

General Normand made the following, more detailed conclusions:

Germany needed to pass rapidly through Belgium and strike at the weaker French left, where the border was more weakly defended. To enable the Army of the Meuse was carved out of six Army Corps. The Germans were highly confident of success against the position. What they ran into was a bloodbath. Any setback to their plan of march would be a disaster.
One mistake that the Germans made immediately was not bringing along their heavier artillery. Even if the city fell, the Germans would find themselves surrounded by forts. While they could fire on the weaker rear face, the forts were still capable of firing on the roads and railroads. Once the heavy artillery arrived, they fell quickly.
The slowness of the penetration of the German cavalry in crossing the Meuse allowed 3rd Division to escape and join the field army.
Ličge caused the Germans a delay that is difficult to determine; it was 2 days at least. Without resistence, the Germans could have completed their concentration more in advance and they could have marched on France 2 to 4 days earlier. The German High Command predicted on 10 August that 2nd Army would reach the heights of the Meuse by 13 August. But on 10 August, the advance of 2nd Army was held at the eastern perimeter of the fortress line. The attack of 5-6 August was to be followed up by the advance of the main army. This did not happen.

Van Der Essen's conclusions are better presented:

The capture of the city was uselss if the forts held out.
The delay enabled other Belgian forces to concentrate on the line of the Gette.
The resistence hindered the enemy advance. Fort Pontisse destroyed pontoon bridges in the north, slowing Von Kluck's crossing to the left bank. Loncin blocked access to the central plain.
In the south, 2nd Army, coming from the direction of Malmedy on 9 August, marched on Namur via the Meuse valley. On 12 August it captured Huy and the Ličge-Namur railroad. But the Huy-Namur section was useless without Huy-Liege, whcih was under the guns of Forts Boncelles and Flemalle.
In Luxembourg, Von Hausen's and the Duke Albert's armies advanced toward Namur. Von Hausen's mission was to force the passage of the Meuse at Dinant so as to encircle Namur and block the retreat of the garrision. The two armies also had to seize the Verviers-Luxembourg and Ličge-Jemelle rail lines and especially Namur-Arlon-Luxembourg, all useless without the capture of Liege.
In reality, progress was slow. The transport of artillery and supplies was difficult on the roads of the Ardennes. Dinant was not attacked until the 15th, Namur the 19th.
Fort Loncin prevented the German army from attacking the Belgian army on the Gette and from attacking northern France. It was not until 18 August that Von Kluck's forces met the Belgians. The fall of Loncin opened up the railroads running from Ans to Namaur and France and Brussels/Antwerp.
Instead of advancing rapidly, the armies sat on the Meuse for 12 days. The delay permitted the BEF to disembark at Boulogne and concentrate behind Maubeuge on the 14th.
It permitted the French to change their concentration. Prior to 4 August, the French were facing Germany. When Belgian neutrality was violated, the 5th French Army moved northwest to the Belgian frontier. Also, 2 Corps from 2nd Army plus 2 divisions from Algiers and Morocco were moved to Mezieres and Hirson. Finally, General Sordet's cavalry penetrated into Belgium on 6 August to scout German columns and harass them.

Finally, General Leman makes the following conclusions:

The rapidity of the German thrust was essential to its success. The Germans must possess all Belgian lines of communication in able to make a lightening strike against the French frontier.
Had Ličge fallen immediately, the Germans would have continued to march on Brussels on the 7th or 8th. They would occupy the capital on the 10th or 11th and reach Tournai-Lille on the 13th or 14th.
The BEF could not intervene and France was concentrated in Alsace/Lorraine. The manuever would have been a success.
The Germans reported that their attack on Liege was a success, but events prove otherwise.
The Germans were unable to take the forts and had to move up their heavy guns which were not in place until the 12th, a considerable loss of time.
Had the Germans planned to use the big guns against the forts, they would have brought them with them. In other words, they expected Liege to fall immediately.
German mobilization on the western front began silently in July. They were much better prepared than France, which did not complete mobilization until 12 August. We can surmise from this that the German armies were prepared to march on France at the outset of the campaign and were fully ready by 8 August, a date on which Germany believed Liege would have fallen. But the march on Brussels did not take place until 16 August, thus the resistence of the forts produced a considerable delay in the German march. Instead of entering Brussels on 10-11 August, they entered on the 20th, and Mons on the 23rd, allowing time for the BEF to take up positions there.
The delay also gave the French time to move forces which were facing east to the north.
The delay gave the allies the first element of the victory on the Marne.
Furthermore, the immediate fall of Ličge would have produced a disastrous effect on the morale of Belgium and her army, and the allies.

Let us now examine perhaps the most important impact the resistence of Ličge had on the allies and the world - the morale factor.

NEXT PAGE-Conclusions Concerning Morale

GEOCITIES