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INTRODUCTION

Minority issues in the post-cold war era

The post-cold war era in international relations is characterized by apparently contradictory trends. On the one hand, there is a movement towards the internationalization of environmental, resource, humanitarian and rights issues which transcends cold war inhibitions. On the other hand, both within and between states, virulent forms of ethnocentrism, hatred of diversity and previously buried antagonisms are re-emerging, occasionally culminating in the obscenity of  'ethnic cleansing'.1

The minority issue is inextricably linked to these broad movements. A positive implication is that as rights questions in general become increasingly internationalized so do the rights of minorities. A negative tendency is that the current upsurge in ethnonationalism (or nation-state ideology) deliberately attempts to discriminate and repress minorities. As is evident from past and present experiences, such acts create and nurture grievances for the future so that the children of today's victims become tomorrow's agents of revenge. The detrimental consequences are the all too well-known vicious circles of mutual recrimination. It is natural that people of similar origin, language or culture, who were kept apart by political and ideological frontiers for many years, should want to live together once more. Yet, in some cases, they are inflicting the very oppression they experienced on the new minorities, who are emerging as borders are recast.

It is imperative to avoid such developments and to ensure the respect for, and implementation of, human rights in general and minority rights in particular, at both national and international levels. And this is not only necessary for those directly concerned. The extensive political, economic and social changes in Central and Eastern Europe over the past five years have brought minority and nationality issues to the top of the international agenda.

We have already seen devastating conflict in certain cross-border regions, such as the former Yugoslavia (FYR). The propensity for such conflicts in the multicultural and multi-ethnic regions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union is acute, as shown by the violent conflict in Chechnia.

There have been numerous other instances of tension in these countries, all of which threaten to destroy reasonably stable relationships between individuals and communities of different backgrounds in such multi-ethnic areas. These also contain serious threats for the relationship with neighbouring states, and directly and indirectly (migration, refugee flows, asylum seekers etc.) for the wider international community with potentially serious implications for regional and international stability and peace.

European Union member states ought to be particularly concerned with the development of minority protection legislation and policies of their eastern neighbours. Some conflicts and tensions concerning minority communities in CEE involve countries at the border of the European Union (EU), some of which may become members of the EU in the near future. (Current estimates for the first stage of the EU's eastward enlargement cite the year 2010.) Thus, it is important to ensure that effective mechanisms and structures for peaceful and constructive cohabitation of different societal groups are established so that peace and stability in Europe can be assured in the present and the future.

Furthermore, since 1989, EU states have increasingly felt the impact of migration flows of members of minority communities, which continue to suffer from political and social discrimination and/or are exposed to severe economic difficulties in CEE countries.2

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have various legal guidelines and precedents, some of which may be  worth preserving with some modification. However, it should be remembered that in the past, the practical application of these laws tended to be seriously flawed, to the extent of entirely discrediting these paper directives. In the post-communist era, the task is to re-assert the validity of these legal prescriptions and to assure their lawful, responsible and effective full implementation.

Who are today's minorities?

There is no internationally agreed definition of minorities. The United Nations (UN) in the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities3 refers to 'national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities'. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) emphasizes national minorities, but in neither of these frameworks are the terms precisely defined.

MRG, in all its work, focuses on non-dominant ethnic, religious or linguistic communities, which are not necessarily a numerical minority - including indigenous and tribal communities as well as such communities as migrant workers and refugees. Self-identification is an important perspective, as some communities do not wish to be classified primarily as minorities, for various reasons, usually because this implies marginalization and lesser rights.

In the context of this study, the focus is upon national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.There has been no intention of extrapolating  the conclusions of  the five or so studies to make recommendations on  migrant workers, refugees or indigenous communities since their circumstances are different,they were not part of this study and are governed, additionally by other international standards.


Minority rights

The rights of minorities broadly cover three areas:

· civil and political rights;
· Socio-economic and cultural rights (including land rights, which are sometimes of particular importance in the current economic transformation process in the former communist countries: privatization, repatriation and restitution of property may threaten minorities' rights);

and are enshrined in various international standards, the most important ones being:

· The 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities;
· The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Copenhagen Agreement, 1990 (Articles 29-35); Helsinki, 1992 (legitimate concerns for the international community), and the Stability Pact;
· The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;
· The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 27);
· The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination;
· The Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 2, 29 and 30).

International standards and their implementation in Central and Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union

1. International standards on minority rights protection

Until 1989, most international organizations had been satisfied with enumerating the 'negative rights' of members of minorities.4 The 1990 CSCE Copenhagen Document developed the principle that protection should be considered not just in negative terms but should involve positive rights to identity and enumerate the rights of minorities to association, to mother-tongue education, to participation in government and policy-making, to functional or territorial autonomy  (although these include important qualifications), and to affirmative-action policies. The subsequent CSCE meeting of experts held in Geneva in 1991, resulted in the compilation of recommendations for enhancing minority protection, the right to identity and to political participation.

Part of the concern of the CSCE was that minority problems, if left unresolved, might create instabilities and threaten regional security. In 1992, the office of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was established with the purpose of providing 'early warning' with regard to the 'nature of tensions' and 'the potential consequences for peace and stability within the CSCE area'.

Other international organizations have joined the CSCE in the task of standard-setting and monitoring. In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation 1201, which elaborated rights to public information and education in the mother-tongue and, although this is guardedly put, to autonomous self-government.5

Two additional Council of Europe documents, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, have recently been opened to signature by member-states.

The Framework Convention on National Minorities was signed by 32 states and ratified by four of these by April 1996. It comes into force when it has been ratified by 12 states. The implementation mechanism for the states' compliance to the Framework Convention is still to be determined, though in recent representations to the Human Rights SubCommittee of the Parliamentary Assembly, MRG has argued for an open, transparent and independent mechanism.

In 1993, the Central European Initiative, a regional grouping established in 1989, which now has ten members6, agreed in principle special measures for the protection of minorities, including self-government, and subsequently opened to signature an Instrument on the Protection of Minority Rights.The European Union Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, published in 1991, also include clauses on the safeguarding of the rights of minorities in accordance with CSCE standards.

The UN and the EU have additionally set international standards with respect to conditions affecting minorities. The first article of the UN 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities obliges states not only to protect but also to promote identities of minorities.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of ..... Minorities was adopted by the General Assembly without the agreement of any implementation mechanism. Like many other declarations of the UN, it may have had little worth and may have been quickly forgotten. However, concerted endeavours by a number of governments, mainly Nordic and Central European, have led to the establishment of a Working Group on Minorities, a Working Group of the UN SubCommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. One of its responsibilities includes promotion of the implementation of the Declaration and the Working Group has already held two meetings. However, it does need more sustained contributions from governments and funding put aside to facilitate minority participation.

In March 1995, 52 states signed the European Stability Pact, establishing the inviolability of borders and containing various clauses protecting the rights of minorities. The signing of this document was accompanied by a hundred regional and bilateral agreements, including the Hungarian-Slovakian inter-state treaty.

The failure of the European Stability Pact to draw in the Balkans and put an end to rights violations, such as 'ethnic cleansing', indicates the limits of the present transnational regime. International standards of minorities protection are primarily enforced by governments. No adequate mechanism for enforcing compliance with these standards has yet been established, with the consequence that basic rights of members of minorities may still be violated with impunity.

Although much has been achieved since 1989 with regard to the protection of minorities in Eastern Europe, the continued disregard of basic freedoms in parts of the Balkans sets both a limit and a challenge to the effectiveness of international human rights organizations.

2. The situation in post-communist Eastern Europe: A 'Northern' and a 'Southern tier'

The present condition of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe reflects the different experiences of post-communist transition.

Following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90, democratically-elected governments took power throughout the region. Democratization, the rule of law, the restoration of civil society and the institution of the 'self-limiting state' have permitted the emergence of space, in which minorities can organize, publish, establish their own cultural and educational facilities, and apply pressure on governments.

Farther south, however, the end of communism has not resulted in the secure establishment of liberal democratic government. In much of the former Yugoslavia, a tragic deterioration is evident. In an atmosphere of embittered and intolerant nationalism, the rights of minorities have been abused on a scale unknown in Europe since the Second World War and have led to genocide. In large parts of the Balkans, governments have adopted repressive solutions, and the rule of law has often been suspended in favour of discretionary justice, often meted out by paramilitaries. 'Ethnic cleansing' has become an instrument of policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. The inability of the Serbian authorities to resolve the problem of Kosovo continues to threaten the stability of Albania and Macedonia and hinders a complete democratic transformation in these countries.

In formal institutional terms, Central and Eastern Europe may now have overtaken Western Europe as the pace-setter for minority protection on the continent. This development owes much, however, to the pressure exerted on states by international organizations. In order to hasten their integration in Europe and their membership of the EU, states in Central and Eastern Europe have had to make commitments with regard to minority protection which often involve more extensive obligations than those entered into by many West European states. The leading role in this development was played after 1989 by the CSCE and more recently, by the Council of Europe.



The application and exercise of minority rights


1. Mechanisms at the national level in a pluralistic liberal democratic state include:-

· effective political and economic participation;

· constitutional and legislative arrangements;

· governmental strategies and policies;

·    governmental administration and funding;

· recourse and conciliation mechanisms (including Ombudsmen);

·    human rights NGOs;

·    free responsible press and vibrant civil society.


2. International and regional arrangements include:-

· bilateral agreements (e.g. Hungary and Slovakia);

· implementation of regional and international instruments of the OSCE, the Council of Europe (e.g. Roma, North Caucasus) and the UN;

· UN human rights bodies (e.g. Macedonia - especially because of  the UN peacekeeping force installed on the scene) and the OSCE Spillover Mission on the border of Serb Kosovo and Macedonia;

· specialized agencies and other organs of the UN;

· International NGOs and human rights monitors;

· bilateral and multilateral donors.

I. THE ROMA (GYPSIES)

With 70 per cent (6 million) of Europe's estimated 8.5 million Roma (Gypsies) currently living throughout the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Roma community is one of the most complex minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.

Who are the Roma?

Roma communities have been present in Europe since at least the beginning of the fourteenth century. They were originally from Northern India, yet were wrongly perceived by many to have been of Egyptian origin, hence a variety of appellations, still used today, reflecting this + Tsigan, Zigeuner, Gitano, Gypsy etc.

Upon arrival in Europe, the Roma came into contact with indigenous European groups such as the Tynkers (Ireland), Quinquis (Spain) and the Jenisch (Germany). These encounters led to cultural and social exchange, to stratification, and to vast linguistic and cultural diversification, both within a given region and from one region to another. The Roma community therefore has a complex identity, despite attempts over the centuries to categorise them as an alien group which needs to be contained and controlled. The Roma speak many dialects but share common cultural and ethnic characteristics, and a common history of exclusion and persecution which has continued to this day.

Appellation

The name 'Rom' or 'Roma' is increasingly being used in the political sphere. It has the advantage of clear demarcation from terms imposed from outside. It is the self-designation of a significant number of these groups, and that which best corresponds to the sociocultural reality and political will of groups in Central and Eastern Europe.

The term 'Gypsies' is not generally viewed in a pejorative sense, despite some negative overtones in Germany and the negative stigma attached to the term 'Zigeuner' during the Nazi period. Insofar as the communities covered by these designations have no collective term for themselves and use these terms in the political context (for example 'Tsiganes' in French, 'Gypsies' in English, etc.), they are all acceptable options. 

Historical background

Since their arrival in Western Europe, Roma have been universally subjected to negative stereotyping, often perceived to be criminals, or social deviants + inspiring mistrust, fear and rejection. Consequently, policies towards Roma by national and local authorities have always constituted a negation of the people, their culture and their language, ranging from outright persecution and exclusion to attempted containment and forced integration and assimilation. Not mutually exclusive, these policies can operate side by side during the same period in different states, or even simultaneously, seemingly in mutual contradiction within a given state.

Assimilation policies have been most evident under the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. Typically, the Roma were regarded as a social problem, who by virtue of their distinct nomadic lifestyle do not fit into the settled structures of the state. Bans were imposed on their nomadic lifestyle, they were forced to settle according to strictly controlled residency policies and, in some cases, their language, traditions and way of life were outlawed. Often restrictive policies imposed on Roma communities were inherently contradictory: for example, they were subjected to legislation limiting the duration and location of their stay in urban areas while at the same time being legally obliged to send their children to school.



At no point during the conduct of these policies has there been any major attempt by governments to understand the Roma, their culture and way of life. Lack of understanding and prejudice remain at the root of many discriminatory policies directed against them.

Only recently have others attempted to understand the Roma as a distinct ethnic group with a multi-faceted identity, a unique culture, and specific problems and needs related to centuries of discrimination and prejudice. Over the past 25 years, attempts have been made by various institutions + notably the Council of Europe and the European Union + to understand the problems faced by Roma communities throughout Europe, particularly in the sphere of education.

The plight of the Roma in Europe has become increasingly visible since the collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. The majority of the region's 6 million Roma live well below the poverty line. While the communist system was far from perfect, it did provide the bare minimum of social provision. Today, their economic, social and political situation is often aggravated by the lack of financial resources necessary to implement non-discriminatory and affirmative policies in housing, health, education and employment.

Current situation of Roma in CEE - three exemplary case studies7

Bulgaria

Roma are first mentioned in Bulgaria in the fourteenth century, but may have entered the country much earlier. Most Roma embraced Islam; presently about a half are Muslim.
The 1992 census recorded 313,400 Roma in Bulgaria (3.69 per cent of the total population), although the real number may be twice this figure. The Roma community is deeply segmented and divided by religion, clan-affiliation, language and traditional occupation.

The Roma were an early target of communist assimilation policy which included name-changing and forcible settlement in fixed communities. After 1989 several Roma political organisations were established, most notably the Roma Democratic Union and the United Roma Organisation. Since 1989, Roma newspapers have resumed publication and cultural activities have recommenced. From 1992, Roma children have been able to study the Roma language and culture in schools, although it has proved hard to find qualified teachers.

Roma continue to suffer sever economic and social disadvantages. Only seven or eight per cent of Roma attend secondary schools compared to 54 per cent of ethnic Bulgarian. The literacy rate for the community as a whole may stand as low as 16 per cent. The unemployment rate for Roma is about 60 per cent and Roma villages and quarters in towns frequently lack adequate sanitation and housing. A high incidence of crime is recorded among the Roma population. According to the Ministry of the Interior, 37 per cent of crime is committed by Roma. In 1990, 80 per cent of the prison population was reportedly Roma.



Slovakia

Slovakia still lacks a dedicated minorities-protection law. The Slovakian government is aware that its minorities policy will influence the speed of Slovakia's accession to the European Union.

The 1991 census recorded 80,627 Roma (1.53 per cent of the population), but the minority may in reality number over 300,000 people. Although Roma suffered severe discrimination in Slovakia during the Second World War, most (unlike those in the Nazi Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) avoided extermination. After the war, many Slovak Roma settled in the Czech lands.

Under the communists, Roma were forbidden to travel and the majority were settled in dispersed accommodation blocks. Even in the late 1980s, however, one-third of Slovak Roma continue to live in shanty-villages. Although a gradual improvement in employment opportunities was recorded (by 1981, 75 per cent of the active adult Roma population was employed), Roma were officially held responsible for 50 per cent of robberies and 60 per cent of petty thefts. On the basis of intelligence testing, Roma children were frequently educated in separate 'special schools'. From the 1970s, Roma women were encouraged to volunteer for sterilisation.

Flagrant human rights violations largely ceased after 1989, but Roma still endure considerable discrimination with regard to employment, accommodation and access to services. An attempt to alleviate the housing crisis among Roma had to be abandoned in 1992 on account of financial constraints. Segregation is, additionally, reported in classrooms and maternity wards, and Roma have been the targets of violence from right-wing thugs and of constitutionally illegal measures introduced by several local authorities. No special Roma-language schools have yet been established, allegedly because no Roma have requested them. Nevertheless, government funds have been allocated to support Roma publications and cultural activities and a Romani language centre has been established at the University of Nitra.

Macedonia

The preamble to the Macedonia's 1991 constitution states that ' Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people in which full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia'. The constitution permits the official use of other languages and alphabets in areas where minority populations are concentrated (Article 7). The constitution additionally provides minorities with the right to 'free expression of national identity' (Article 8) and 'to instruction in their language in primary and secondary education' (Article 48). There have, however, been substantial complaints at the slow pace at which minority-language facilities have been instituted. The Council on Inter-Ethnic Relations, established in accordance with Article 78 of the constitution, has also been criticised as under-representing the Albanian minority and as being essentially powerless to influencegovernment policy.

Since the October 1994 general elections, Macedonia has been ruled by a multi-ethnic coalition.

The 1994 census listed 44,000 Roma (2.3 per cent of the population). This represents a substantial decline from the 56,000 recorded in the 1991 census and may reflect a growing tendency among Roma to identify with other national groups, particularly the Albanians. Unofficial estimates put the real number of Roma at 200,000 with 40,000 Roma in Skopje alone. It is thought that 80 per cent of Roma have a Romani dialect as their mother-tongue, although many also speak Albanian. The majority of Roma are Muslims.

From 1983, the Roma language has been taught in some state schools. In 1980, a publishing house in Skopje brought out the first Romani grammar written entirely in Romani script and orthography, and since then there have been a number of publications in the Romani language. Romani television and radio broadcast currently for half an hour a week.

Since at least the 1930s, a number of Roma in Struga and the Lake Orchid  region have repudiated Roma identity and redefined themselves as Egyptians. The Egyptian Association of Citizens founded in 1990 claims 30,000 'descendants of the Pharaohs' in Macedonia. The Party for Complete Emancipation of Roma and the Democratic Progressive Party of Roma in Macedonia, the two leading Roma political organisations, have both supported the establishment of a separate Roma state, Romanistan, in the Balkans which would include parts of Macedonia.

Current issues

Housing, employment, and health

Many Roma endure appalling living conditions, with attendant problems of sanitation, chronic illness, poor life expectancy, high infant mortality rates and higher instances of alcohol and drug abuse than in society as a whole. In Central and Eastern Europe, they have often been among the first to suffer in the economic restructuring that has taken place since the collapse of communism, and this has resulted in high unemployment levels among Roma. For example, in Bulgaria, the unemployment rate among Roma is about 60 per cent. Adjustment and retraining is difficult for all in these circumstances, but Roma face additional difficulties elsewhere.

Prejudice and stereotypes

Often stereotyped images are used by the authorities to justify their actions towards the Roma they are seen as having no linguistic, cultural or ethnic roots and judged as a 'social problem' requiring rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Such stereotyping has led, in many cases, to an inability to address the root causes of the problems faced by the Roma. In extreme cases, negative imagery has led to a growing incidence of racial attacks and scapegoating of the Roma for problems experienced by society as a whole. Due to this persecution and violence, some Roma have sought asylum in Western Europe.




Discrimination and violation of rights

The great majority of Roma are citizens of the state in which they reside. In theory, therefore, they have the same rights and duties as any other citizen. Many of the Central and Eastern European countries have adopted constitutions which specifically mention the protection of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Yet, virtually all relevant minorities-protection legislation tends to be based on area concentration, permanent settlement, permanent residence and land rights, effectively penalising non-sedentary and geographically dispersed groups. Thus, the Roma are often not recognized as a minority.8 Until recently, there was no recognition of the Roma as a distinct ethnic, linguistic and cultural group and hence a lack of recognition that many of the problems they encounter result from the violation of their rights as a minority. Recently, however, some positive measures have been taken towards such recognition - at both national and international levels.

Basic legal protection is essential for Roma. In most countries, it does not appear necessary to undertake major modifications of existing legislation in order to achieve this. Even as it stands, present law tends to favour Roma over those who inflict violence upon them. The problem arises in connection with the arbitrary interpretation and/or application of these laws, and it is here where change must occur.

The authorities' apparent toleration of anti-Roma violence makes it impossible to enforce civil and criminal liability and bring those involved to justice. This cannot but encourage the frustrations of the public, bewildered by the transition period, to project its malaise onto Roma and make them the scapegoat9.

In some countries, special government bodies have been established to address Roma issues and Roma are represented at parliamentary level, yet others have no specific provisions. Roma have to contend with specific violations of their rights. For example, in the Czech Republic and Romania, the authorities are imposing limitations on the travel and residence rights of Roma who have been established there for generations.

In general, Roma are still faced with a variety of rules and regulations which are often contradictory. While the will may exist to change circumstances on the national level, it is at the local administrative level that more radical change is needed.




Migration and refugee issues

Migration or nomadism has been a way of life for Roma for centuries. However, in the 1990s, migration has taken on a new significance. The 1990s migration to Western Europe is, in many instances, manifestly linked to the frequency with which they encounter violence, the passivity of local and national authorities, and the absence of judicial response. An additional contributing factor has been the war in former Yugoslavia and specific acts of anti-Roma violence before and during the war.

However, Roma also move on for social and economic reasons: to undertake seasonal labour, to exercise their trade and traditional occupations, and to maintain family and clan ties. For example, significant numbers of Romanian Roma travel to Poland and/or the Czech Republic for the summer, and Roma travel within the Balkan countries in connection with commerce and seasonal agricultural labour.

Roma migration may also take place in highly organized forms. For example, Romanian Roma have tended to emigrate in family groups rather than individually, congregating in the same towns or regions abroad, thus recreating their original kinship networks.

However, fears of an invasion from the East have induced many Western states to impose new restrictions on migration. In some cases, this has lead to repatriation of Roma to countries where they have real grounds for claiming persecution and discrimination. In particular, in the former Yugoslavia the future of 40-50,000 Roma in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone appears insecure. 

Education

Roma have often perceived the formal education system to be hostile and a potential means of undermining their cultural values. However, there is also the recognition that in today's society, illiteracy is a serious handicap and that their future depends to a large extent on the schooling available to their children.

Several initiatives have been undertaken by the European Union, the Council of Europe and national governments over the past two decades, which do offer hope for a better understanding of the educational needs of the Roma and for an improved provision of multicultural education, which can play an important role in combating prejudice.  Projects are being undertaken which seek to value in-family education as an integral part of the education process, and teaching materials are being developed which present positive images of Roma culture, combating negativity both within and outside the community. To date, no coherent education policy has been implemented, although important progress is being made in this area.

Prospects for the future

It is clear that the Roma community is at a critical period in its history following the transformations in Central and Eastern Europe.

There is a growing political awareness across Roma communities of the need to organize and lobby effectively for Roma recognition. While the community naturally may not always agree on what is the most appropriate course of action, this in itself demonstrates the growing maturity of the Roma political movement. There is an increasing awareness of ethnic identity as Roma, of human rights and of minority rights. Roma are also affirming their diversity as well as their core cultural values in the important process of gaining recognition of their unique contribution to European culture.

There have been a number of initiatives at the United Nations (UN), in the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which are attempting a more integrated approach to an improvement of the legal and social situation of Roma throughout Europe.10 Roma organizations have themselves played an important part in lobbying the international community, and national and international meetings of Roma are taking place with increasing frequency.

Areas of recommended policy action

i. Confidence-building
The multicultural education of young people, and the population as a whole, should be encouraged as a vital component of combating prejudice and negative stereotypes. An integrated approach to the various measures adopted by a variety of European institutions should be adopted. MRG welcomes the creation of a Roma contact point under the auspices of the OSCE and calls for cooperation of all institutions and NGOs in sharing of information and expertise.

ii. Non-discrimination
Roma are entitled to equal treatment before the law and have the right to expect that those guilty of perpetrating violence against them be brought to justice. They should enjoy full and equal rights both as citizens of a given state and as a recognized group.

iii. Equality of treatment
Roma should receive the same treatment as other refugees when seeking asylum. The basic principles of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness should be applied to Roma when they do not have the nationality of the state in which they reside.

iv. Protection and promotion of identity
All minority communities have the right to choose their own identity. No country has the right to change the appellation of a particular community without their consent.

v. Participation
Roma NGOs should receive financial and institutional support. Their work should be promoted and recognized as a way of enhancing Roma participation in devising and implementing policies which affect them. Informed consent of the population should be sought before entering into implementation phases of projects.

vi. Employment
Traditional Roma activities should be encouraged and better vocational training needs to be offered.

vii. Education
Multicultural approaches to Roma education must be encouraged. Improved vocational training and economic opportunities are needed, including the encouragement of traditional occupations. An emphasis should be placed on Roma languages through mother tongue education.



II. THE HUNGARIANS IN SLOVAKIA - A Minority on the Border of the European Union11

To date, it appears that the Slovak government's treatment of the country's Hungarian minority has been directly dependent upon its relationship with Hungary. So far, Hungary seems to have been relatively successful in exerting pressure on the Slovak government to observe its obligations towards the ethnic Hungarians living on Slovak territory. However, it should be noted that the Hungarian-Slovak treaty of October 1995, containing important articles on the protection of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, has yet to be ratified by the Slovak Parliament.

Hungarians in Slovakia have benefited significantly from Hungary's advocacy. The minority currently suffering most discrimination in Slovakia are the Roma. In the region, ethnic Hungarians' situation is worst in Romania, where they have been subjected to outright discrimination both against minorities in general and against them in particular.

Historical background

Slovakia is bordered by Poland in the north, Hungary in the south, Austria and the Czech Republic in the west, and Ukraine in the east. For most of the twentieth century, Slovakia has been part of Czechoslovakia (created in 1918), although a separate Slovak state was briefly established as a satellite of Nazi Germany after 1939. During the war, the southern portions of Slovakia, together with Ruthenia were occupied by Hungary. At the end of the second World War, southern Slovakia was incorporated into the Czechoslovak state, and Ruthenia was ceded to Ukraine, which was then part of the Soviet Union.

There are several minorities in Slovakia. The Hungarian population of Slovakia, currently estimated at between 566,741 (1991 census figures) and 700,000 (Hungarian estimates) people12, is traditionally concentrated mainly in the southern part of the country in the regions adjoining the Danube River and the border with Hungary, where it accounts for the highest percentage of the local population.

Mutual relations between the present Hungarian minority and the Slovak majority have a unique historical background because Slovakia was a part of Hungary in the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy in the nineteenth century, and as such suffered strong pressures for 'magyarization'.13

Czechoslovakia 1918-38, 1945-48
Although minorities suffered discrimination during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-38), the most flagrant violation of their rights occurred during and after the Second World War.  After this war, the Hungarian population's properties were confiscated, 70-90,000 were expelled to Hungary, and a further 44,000 were resettled in Bohemia and Moravia (today: Czech Republic).

1948-89
Minority rights for the Hungarians and other minorities were constitutionally guaranteed since 1969 with formal representation in legislative bodies at all levels, but the problems of ethnic Hungarians  - as well as of other minorities in Slovakia - were hidden for years, to emerge in ethnically mixed regions only after the political changes in 1989. Contacts with the Hungarian Republic were restricted before this year. In accordance with the overall urban policy of integration or fusion into larger entities and the centralization policy, the development of the Hungarian community was strongly affected by the fact that up to 1986 no house construction was permitted in smaller villages, but only in the so-called 'central settlements'. In the field of education this resulted in school mergers, with many schools in the countryside closing, a trend which particularly affected schools for  ethnic minorities. Hence the number of pupils in schools having Hungarian-language teaching almost halved between 1970-89. Aditionally, no Hungarian-language universities have existed in Slovakia. Finally the dismal economic situation in Southern Slovakia is particularly affecting all minorities.

Post-1989
The collapse of communist rule in 1989 promised a rapid improvement in the rights of minorities in Slovakia. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, adopted by the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly in January 1991, prohibited all forms of discrimination and reaffirmed the right to higher education in the mother tongue.

Current issues

The 1991 census registered a Hungarian population of 566,741 people, living mainly in the southern part of the country in the regions adjoining the Danube River and the border with Hungary. Some Hungarian sources put the true number of Hungarians closer to 700,000. Within the former Czechoslovakia, Hungarians constituted only about 3 per cent of the overall population, against 10.8 per cent,  by far the largest ethnic minority of the Slovak Republic's population.14 Thus the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 had the immediate consequence of making Hungarians far more visible as a minority.

In 1993 however, there are indications that Hungarian marriages are exogamous, suggesting that the minority may in time become assimilated.

There are 13 mixed Slovak-Hungarian districts. The proportion of Hungarians varies from 4.1 per cent in Kosice to 87 per cent in Dunajska Streda - 70 per cent of Hungarians live in relatively homogenous areas where they account for 60 per cent of the population; while 60 per cent of them live in villages of less than 5,000 inhabitants.

Constitutional short-comings in minority rights protection

After the June 1992 Czech-Slovak talks, rapid developments lead to the Slovak Republic's formal independence on 1 January 1993. In September 1992, the Slovak National Council endorsed a Constitution for an independent republic based on principles of parliamentary democracy. The Constitution reiterates that state power is derived from citizens and that citizens are permitted to do all which is not prohibited, whereas the government is permitted to do only what is explicitly allowed under the law. The principle of the separation of the executive and legislative powers and the judiciary was also endorsed. The Slovak language is the official language and the use of other languages would be regulated by a separate law.

The constitution recognizes the right of members of ethnic minorities to develop their culture as well as disseminate and receive information in their mother tongue, establish and maintain educational and cultural organizations and the right to education in ethnic minorities' own languages. The use of minority languages for official matters, as well as participation in decisions concerning minority issues, is recognized subject to conditions to be regulated by law. The exercise of rights by members of ethnic minorities is restricted by the condition that it must not endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Slovakia and not discriminate against the rest of the population. In contrast to the former situation, the Constitution does not guarantee that the Hungarian educational and cultural institutions will continue to be fully funded by the State, nor does is guarantee proportional representation of minorities in elected bodies.

Implementation
The implementation of the Slovak Constitution may be problematic as it is a Constitutional Law whose adoption requires a majority of two-thirds of all elected deputies.

In February 1993, the Hungarian minority's political representatives addressed these constitutional weaknesses in the 'Memorandum on the Slovak Republic's Future Admission to the Council of Europe', which provoked a counter document by 'Matica Slovenska' (the 'Mother of Slovak') - the 'Memorandum of Slovaks from Southern Slovakia', stressing the threat of assimilation of the Slovak population in Southern Slovakia.

On 30 June 1993, Slovakia was admitted to the Council of Europe, but its minority policy has remained a contentious issue.  Subsequently, in August 1993, the Hungarian minority's representatives submitted objections against the policy of the Slovak government towards minorities.15

Culture, education, media and employment

Discriminatory language legislation
Additional misgivings have been aroused by specific legislative measures.
In 1990, a new Slovak Language Law confined official use of a minority language to administrative areas where the relevant minority constitutes at least 20 per cent of the local population.  On 15 November 1995, the State language law was passed and came into force on 1 January 1996.  The Surname Law of 1993 made compulsory the registration of names according to Slovak linguistic norms, although concessions to minority languages usage were made in 1994. Most notoriously, the 1993 'Vertical Road Signs' decree prohibited bilingual signposts. This enactment was, however, overturned by new legislation permitting bilingual signposts in communities where the minority population exceeds 20 per cent of the population (currently 587 towns and villages). Proposals for new internal administrative boundaries seemed additionally intended to ensure that Hungarians would be unable to maintain a majority in any one district.

Lack of educational facilities
Few Hungarians progress to secondary education and only about 6 per cent of Hungarian students gain entry into higher education. As of 1994, about 70,000 Hungarian children were receiving instruction in their mother-tongue, amounting to 75 per cent of the relevant age group. Little progress has been made towards establishing bilingual facilities in higher education, and requests for a Hungarian-language university at Komarno have not been met. Hungarians in Slovakia have access to higher education but must speak Slovak. They may choose to study at a university in Hungary or elsewhere, but limited financial resources decrease their numbers. It is a vicious circle because the lack of opportunities for higher education in the Hungarian language contributes to the shortage of qualified Hungarian-language teachers. What remains unresolved is the question of higher education, as only 2.2 per cent of the Hungarian minority has university or college degrees compared to the national average of 5.2 per cent.

Discrimination in the media
The democratic transformation of the media has not been very efficient, partially due to lack of financial resources, especially for minority-language media. Furthermore, there has been particular concern over the decision-making process in radio and television, as it is entirely in the hands of the non-independent Television and Radio Council. With the exception of the state TELEVISION and radio, there are only private radio stations which have only partial access to the broadcasting network and can only broadcast locally due to the lack of financial resources. In 1994, Slovak television broadcast 30 minutes per week in Hungarian, and there were 36 hours per week of Hungarian-language radio transmissions.

Poor employment opportunities
Hungarians allege that a lack of educational facilities has resulted in low attainment of qualifications and poor employment opportunities. The Slovak economy's dismal situation (especially, when compared to the more prosperous Czech Republic), burdened by the communist legacy of a high concentration of heavy industry in Slovakia, makes competition tougher and the prospects for the future bleaker.

Prospects for the future

The Slovak government is aware that its minorities policy will partly influence the speed of Slovakia's accession to the European Union. Domestic legislation is being brought into line with European standards, and the 1995 Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia affirmed Slovakia's commitment to provisions of the CSCE Copenhagen Document, the UN Declaration on Minorities, the Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Framework Convention on the Protection of  National Minorities.

However, although a Minorities Council advises the government, Slovakia still lacks a dedicated minorities protection law. Furthermore, despite Slovakia's confirmation of the applicability of Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the nationalist undercurrent in Slovak politics makes it unlikely that this improvement will be accompanied by concrete measures on a large scale. In fact, when Hungarians called for it in 1993, tensions rose dramatically so they lowered their demands to cultural and educational autonomy, expanded language rights and a greater role in local authority.

The condition of the Hungarian minority has been steadily improving since 1990, partly on account of the pressure exercised by the government of Hungary through international institutions. Although statistics affirming this trend are incomplete, the number of minority educational facilities appears to be increasing. Official Slovak sources indicate the very substantial disbursements made to minority cultural foundations and publishers, but this information is outdated on account of severe cutbacks in funding during 1995.

Nevertheless, relations between the different groups to date are good, and apart from acts of racist violence against Roma, little other conflict has been reported. Attempts to rally around extreme nationalist positions have found little popular support. However, the immaturity of Slovakia's new democratic institutions and recent legislation affecting the use of minority languages may result in engendering inter-ethnic tension in the future.



Recommended areas for policy action:

i. Support to civil society
Citizens' organizations must be supported in their opposition to ultra-nationalist and racist politics. They can assess their needs and their priorities and require committed and understanding support. Encouragement to inter-community programmes should be fostered.

ii. Minority rights and political confidence building
Minority rights must be implemented, as intended by the Slovak government when acceding to the Council of Europe and signing international agreements. The international community and the European Union must make sure to fully monitor these aspects of the development of Slovakia in the coming years, as any failure to address minority issues in a constructive way will have dramatic consequences in the future.

iii.  International human rights obligations and rule of law
Although human rights are enshrined in the 1992 Slovak Constitution, some of its provisions allow the Parliament to pass contradictory laws by simple majority. The Slovak government should be encouraged to amend the Constitution taking into account the principles of internationally recognized non-derogable human rights.

The ratification by the Slovak government of the bilateral treaty with Hungary signed in October 1995 would be a step in the right direction, by marking the political commitment and good faith of Slovakia in implementing agreements to which it has subscribed.

iv. Employment opportunities
Strictly equal employment policies must be enforced regarding minority groups. It is also necessary to provide them with a chance of gaining equal chances of qualification and training through the school system or other educational and training facilities.

v. Economic development
The economic situation of Slovakia is also an issue that needs to be addressed urgently and with sensitivity as inter-community tensions rise in parallel to general economic deprivation. The economic crisis is an impediment to the proper implementation of a policy of affirmative action in favour of minorities. However, failing to take the specific situation of minorities in the economic development process into account will put the long term political stability of the country at risk. It should be remembered in this regard that the harsh economic reforms imposed on the Czech and Slovak Federation from 1989 onwards have played a major role in the rise of Slovak nationalism and the subsequent split of the Federation.

vi. Education
Bilingual educational facilities should be made available at all levels of education. The access of the Hungarian minority to college and university needs to be addressed as it is one of the basis for their further participation in the economic life of the country. Although some progress has been made in this area, financial cut-backs are putting these in danger.

Support to truly independent media should be afforded. This does not necessarily mean that there should be a complete privatization of the media industry, as in the currently tense situation there may be an even greater opportunity for those who want to raise the tension to do so through the media.

The present media industry, as weak as it is, does not reach the standard for independence and objectivity of a real free and vibrant democratic society.

vii. Human rights and minority rights training
Besides programmes of economic cooperation that take minorities specifically into account, resources need to be targeted towards human and minority rights training and education, both in schools for the general population and through training programmes at the work place. Financial resources should be targeted at long term education programmes.

The activities of the Minorities Advisory Council should be monitored.

Source: Minority Protection Association (1996)



III. THE ALBANIANS IN MACEDONIA - An area of  high tension

The situation in Macedonia16 is precarious, and there is a risk of violent conflict between the majority Slav Macedonians17 and the ethnic Albanians - the second largest ethnic community in the country.

There has historically been and continues to be a close link between developments in the Albanian-populated Kosovo (today part of Serbia) and the situation of the Albanians in neighbouring Macedonia. Both Albanian populations were subjected to similar policies by Serb and Slav Macedonian authorities respectively. Events in the Kosovo have been and still are closely followed and reacted to by the Albanian population of Macedonia. This explains the fear of a spill-over of the Yugoslav conflict from the Kosovo to Macedonia and the establishment of the UNPROFOR mission on Macedonia's borders with Serbia (the Kosovo province) and Albania, and an OSCE Monitor Mission.

Historical background

As a geographic term, Macedonia refers to a territory in the central part of south-eastern Europe, covering approx. 67,000 sq. kilometres. Historically, Macedonia has been an area claimed by different neighbours and has been the cause of many bloody conflicts.18

Macedonia

Macedonia is a mosaic of different peoples including Slav Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Vlachs, Serbs and Muslim Slavs.19 The Slav Macedonians form the majority, followed by the Albanians, by far the largest minority in Macedonia. Relations between these two communities have been historically tense and remain so in the newly independent state. A religious and cultural divide may be at the root of this tension. However, the twentieth century legacy of political 'discrimination' within the former Yugoslavia and - more recently - cultural discrimination against Albanians within post-Yugoslav Macedonia, has stiffened mistrust and prejudice between these groups to a level where many among the Albanians might regard resorting to violence and secession as the last instrument in their hands to assure their collective and individual cultural, religious, political and economic rights.20

The Slav Macedonians

The origin of the Macedonian people, i.e. the Slav Macedonians is debated.21
According to one interpretation, Macedonian national sentiment is largely a product of post-1945 Yugoslav nationalities policy. In an attempt to solve the country's ethnic problems, the post-war Tito regime engaged in a policy of nation-creation, in the course of which Slav Macedonians were - for the first time - recognized as a separate people. As one of the 'nations of Yugoslavia', they became the dominant ethnic group in the new Socialist Republic of (SR) Macedonia with their own Macedonian Orthodox Church which was set up by the Tito regime in 1967 but to this day has not been recognized by any other Orthodox Church.22

The ethnic Albanians

Ethnic Albanians are a predominantly Muslim people, speaking a non-Slavic language and claiming descent from the ancient Illyrians. Modern Albania was created in 1912, but its 'late arrival' resulted in a truncated state with large Albanian minorities in neighbouring areas, in many of which they constituted regional majorities. The largest of these were in the territories of Serbia's Kosovo, where they make up 90 per cent of the population, and in Yugoslav Macedonia (about one quarter of the population).

Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia

In Macedonia, Albanians live in compact settlements in the west of the republic bordering on Albania and in the north-west bordering on the predominantly Albanian Kosovo province of Serbia. In many western areas, they constitute the majority of the population. They also predominate in the north around Kumanovo which, however, has retained its Slav majority. In Skopje, the capital, they make up over 14 per cent of the population, living in such clearly defined areas so as to create almost two cities in one. Albanians remain considerably less urban than the Slav Macedonian majority.

The majority of Albanians in Macedonia are Muslim, although there are a few Eastern Orthodox villages and a small number of Albanian Catholics.  Islam has always had strong roots among the Macedonian Albanian population.

After the Second World War, Tito regime's complicated system of classifications and collective rights for the diverse peoples of Yugoslavia, meant that Albanians, although the third largest nation in the country,23  were classified as a 'nationality' of Yugoslavia - not as a 'nation', because the Albanian national home - Albania - was outside Yugoslavia.

The Albanians of the SR Macedonia were granted a number of collective rights for ethnic minorities (primarily education and cultural rights), but these were not as numerous and pervasive as those of a nation of Yugoslavia - a situation which the Albanians bitterly resented. And even these limited rights appear to have been infringed by the authorities of the SR Macedonia. For example, the authorities, regard Islam and the Arabic language as a tool of Albanian nationalism to assimilate other smaller Islamic minority groups like the Turks and the various groups of Slav Muslims (Torbeshi, Pomaks, Porturs) and Muslim Roma.

They therefore imposed restrictive educational, cultural and religious policies on the Albanian minority in their republic.24 Even more dramatically, in the late 1980s, the rise of  Serbian nationalism resulted in the Albanians' seemingly guaranteed minority provisions being ruthlessly stripped away.

Current issues

Disputed population figures and civil rights

The Albanians are by far the largest minority in Macedonia. Macedonian authorities estimate ethnic Albanians represent about 20 per cent of the total population, Albanians, however, claim up to 40 per cent. Out of fear of biased structures and procedures, Albanians boycotted the 1991 census, and some of them even the internationally monitored 1994 census.25 Thus their actual number remains heavily disputed. However, the results of the 1994 census suggest that the reality is closer to the official 23 per cent.

Recently the Albanian minority in Macedonia has grown, as many ethnic Albanians, refugees from Kosovo or previously employed in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, are thought to have moved or returned to the republic after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and during the Yugoslav  war.26 The status of these new arrivals remains highly disputed, with the Macedonian authorities refusing to grant them citizenship and the ethnic Albanians contesting the current government's citizenship laws.27

Additionally, there appears to be suspicion among ethnic Albanians concerning the Macedonian authorities' social policies, which Albanians alleged are aimed at curbing their higher birth-rates.28

The constitutional status

Ethnic Albanians are demanding an upgraded constitutional status - i.e. not as a minority but as a constituent people equal to the majority Slav Macedonians. They accuse the Macedonian authorities of refusing to recognize the true ethnic breakdown in the republic.

The Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the main political representative of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, since 1991 has demanded a formulation which would specifically include the Albanians as an integral component, upgrading the constitutional status of the Albanians by according 'state-building status'.

Political representation and participation

Ethnic Albanians feel significantly under-represented in key political institutions and posts, implying a deliberate policy of exclusion on the part of the dominant Slav Macedonians. Allegations of discrimination in employment have resulted in inconclusive talks at governmental level concerning affirmative action policies and in the introduction of a quota system for recruitment in the Ministry of the Interior.29 The Interior Ministry remains a stronghold of anti-Albanianism, and Albanians allege it refuses to employ ethnic Albanians. Recent reports also show that there were no Albanians in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs despite the new posts generated by the country's recently-gained independence.

Albanian representation in the military ranks and officer corps is disputed. Some observers point to a boycott by Albanians of the new army and estimate that they constitute only about 5 per cent of the new force. However, the Defence Minister stated in March 1994 that the share of Albanian recruits has risen from 14 per cent to 26 per cent and the share of officers has doubled to 3.9 per cent in the previous year.

Although the ethnic Albanians are represented in the present coalition government, there is cynicism among the Albanians as to their actual power. Many view the Albanian ministers as mere figureheads without any real power. Such critics also point to the centralized system whereby even though the PDP controls local government in Tetovo it has little power in practice as real political, legislative and executive power remains in Skopje.

In the state sector of the economy too, ethnic Albanians have been and continue to be significantly under-represented. Only 4 per cent of state employees are ethnic Albanians, mostly teachers and  labourers with none in the higher ranks of management.

The PDP is divided between those who favour closer links with Albania, those supportive of autonomy, and those who would prefer the establishment of a 'civic' Macedonian state. It is seeking an institutionalized form of proportional representation in all levels of decision making in society based on the results of an 'impartial' census. The party has pressed for increased Albanian representation in the bureaucracy and police force, for improved educational opportunities including the university in Tetovo, and for a measure of home rule in Albanian-populated districts.

The Albanians of Macedonia held their own unofficial referendum on autonomy in January 1992 and claimed over 90 per cent voted with over 99 per cent voting in favour. More serious perhaps was the declaration of an autonomous republic of Ilirid centred on Tetovo. However this appeared to have been based on supposed statements by an Albanian deputy which he subsequently denied. Real or not, the ramifications from this continue.

Education

Education is a key issue in inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. Education generally in western Macedonia has always been poorer and opportunities for Albanian-language secondary schooling have been fewer than in the Macedonian language. A sharp decline in Albanian-language schooling in Macedonia from that which prevailed under the communist authorities has been observed, and measures are needed to redress the balance. Article 48 of the Constitution in theory rectified such minority rights violation.30 In practice, however, only slow progress has been made. The language issue in and out of schools and related inter-ethnic tension remains.

Some recent improvements in primary and secondary Albanian-language education have been recorded,31 but the situation of higher university education remains dismal. Traditionally, the Macedonian Albanians have always looked to Kosovo. Virtually all Albanian university students from Macedonia during the communist period went to Pri›tina University. However, given the effective shutting down of the Albanian university in Pri›tina and the cutting of links with Kosovo in general since the Yugoslav war broke out, the creation of an Albanian faculty in Skopje has become an essential future requirement. This project has been under consideration, but little progress appears to have been made.  In December 1994 a private Albanian language university was created in Tetova.  After it was outlawed, it continued to function illegally.

Scarce state financial resources imply that the creation of Albanian-language education and cultural facilities are not being fostered and promoted. However, there have also been allegations of discriminatory allocation of these state resources to the detriment of the country's minorities.

The situation of the Albanian language media

Albanian-language media does operate, including daily television transmissions from Skopje and the daily publication of an Albanian newspaper since May 1994.32 However, recently, the proliferation of small radio stations' broadcasting in Albanian has been arrested on account of new government regulations, which has raised concern.



Prospects for the future

In how far the Albanians of Macedonia see their future in the new state remains a moot point. What is certain is that if there is no appreciable improvement in the position of Albanians in Macedonia, radicalization, which has already begun, will grow. The potential for conflict remains acute. The distrust and antagonism of past  may yet lead to inter-ethnic conflict and even civil war. The Albanian parties have petitioned international bodies to demand safeguards for ethnic Albanian rights before recognition of the republic.

There is an underlying wish among Albanians for Albanian unification but at the same time a realization that, after the horrors of Bosnia, this is almost certainly impossible without major hostilities and loss of life. The Albanians of Macedonia do have a stake in the system despite their non-representation in the state sector. The private sector has many successful Albanians and many also have wealth from those working abroad in Western Europe. Civil war would be disastrous for all concerned.

In the present circumstances the possibility of Macedonia disintegrating in the future cannot be dismissed. There are numerous regional and domestic pressures (hostile neighbours, the country's own ethnic problems - with both the Albanian and Serbian minorities having the implicit potential to attract involvement from their 'mother' states, and economic disintegration), which could precipitate such a development.

Suggested areas for recommended policy action

i. Civil Society
The Macedonian state must positively recognize its multiethnic pluralistic composition and take measures with partners in the minority communities to advance good inter-community relations. International organizations must increase the pressure on the Macedonian authorities in Skopje to be proactive. The reinforcement of civil society, the nurturing of multi-ethnic NGOs and the protection of independent media in minority languages is essential.

Constructive and continuous dialogue among the communities concerned should be facilitated and strengthened. This may require the allocation of the necessary financial and technical resources from national and international donors such as the European Union. The international community has an important role in monitoring the progress of this dialogue.

ii. Political Confidence Building
The Albanians must convince the Slav Macedonians that they truly see their future in the new state and must firmly renounce any notion of seceding. The alternative appears to be a repeat of the horrors seen elsewhere in former Yugoslavia.

iii. Minority rights and non-discrimination
It is essential that the rights of the Albanian minority in Macedonia be secured as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and other human rights instruments. The new Macedonian state should remove references to the Macedonian nation as the leading people, or the Macedonian Orthodox Church as the state church and change the Constitution where all citizens are equal regardless of religion or ethnicity. It is imperative that the 1991 Constitution be revised so that its definition of the Macedonian State be rid of any confused suggestion of ethnic, religious and civic nationalism. Article 19 of the current Constitution, which has explicit references to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, needs to be amended so as to ensure complete equality for all other religions.

iv. Political representation and participation
It is important that the number of ethnic Albanians employed in the state sector be increased as proportionate to their percentage share of the total Macedonian population. In particular, Albanians have to date been particularly under represented in high rank ministerial ranks - especially in the Interior and Foreign Ministries - and in executive and legislative institutions.  Unless this is revised, it contains the seeds and fuel for intensified secessionist ambitions. The authorities should actively and speedily implement a policy of recruitment of Albanians into posts in the bureaucracy so that they are truly represented and the Albanians no longer feel that the state institutions are run by and for Slav Macedonians.

v. Power devolution
The Balkan trend towards centralization should be reversed by giving ethnic Albanians some form of local autonomy in areas where they predominate. The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, has repeatedly argued for more power devolution, in order to prevent Slav Macedonian majority powers of decision-making in Skopje on ethnic and linguistic issues.

vi. Education, culture and media
Education measures are necessary to increase awareness and understanding of diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics. This should be a priority consideration for the government. Albanian-language education at all levels of secondary and higher education needs to be expanded. The contraction of Albanian-language schooling needs to be reversed and an Albanian-language university faculty set up. Ways must be sought to encourage more Albanian students into Macedonia's state universities. More Albanians must be encouraged to become qualified teachers and an Albanian teaching college must be established. 33

Durable solutions are required to respond to the potentially explosive situation in the Southern Balkans. It is crucial that the international community seeks full assurances from all governments in the region to uphold the rights of minorities.

The good offices of international bodies such as the OSCE are essential for the implementation of reconciliation and other preventive mechanisms. The OSCE has already played an important mediator role, solving various political conflicts, as has UNPROFOR.

Macedonia is now a full member of the OSCE, the Partnership for Peace, and the Council of Europe. Information on what such membership implies in terms of human and minority rights should be more readily available and more widely distributed.








IV. THE NORTH CAUCASUS - An area of violent conflict

The Northern Caucasus region stretches along the high peaks of the Caucasian mountain range from the shores of the Black Sea in the north west to the coast of the Caspian Sea in the southeast. (See Map) For centuries, the region has been regarded as the literal and symbolic border between Europe and Asia.

Its peoples 34

The Northern Caucasus - home to over 40 distinct ethnic groups35 - is a geographic area of extraordinary ethnic and linguistic diversity. (See Table 1) Its peoples share a distinctive Caucasian identity with similar cultural traits and values, developed due to similar living conditions and reinforced during joint wars against colonization. These minority populations have traditionally been governed from political centres far away - often suffering economic and/or political neglect and discrimination.

Languages

When speaking of relatedness among the peoples of the North Caucasus, the relationship is nearly always measured in terms of native languages.36 The variety of languages fall broadly into three main groups: Caucasian languages (e.g.: Chechen and Abkhaz), languages of Turkic origin (e.g.: Kumyk and Nogai), and languages of Iranian origin (e.g. Ossetian and Tat).  Hardly any of the languages are used in writing today.  Russian is the language of education, administration and publishing.  Many historical documents of the peoples have been destroyed.

Religions

Islam37 and Orthodox Christianity38 are the dominant religions in the North Caucasus. Religion has always has been an integral part of the peoples' identity and cultures, yet neither today nor in the past has it formed the basis for hostility between groups.39 There is a long-standing tradition of peaceful coexistence and a high degree of intermarriage.

Historical background40

Early history and Russian influence

This region has always experienced a variety of different ethnic and linguistic influences. Russians first developed an interest in the region in the sixteenth century. By the eighteenth century, Russia had established a firm foothold in the Stavropol region. From here, a series of violent incursions were made into Caucasian territory, culminating in the incorporation of parts of Dagestan, Ingush and Chechen territory into the Russian Empire in 1780. The Russians encountered fierce resistance from the Caucasian peoples, however, by 1864 the conquest was over.

The Soviet era

Initially, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had given rise to new hopes for independence in the region as there was an anti Bolshevik North Caucausian state after the revolution. But such hopes were soon crushed. As Bolshevik rule became firmly established, regional identity was undermined and a hierarchy of autonomies41 was established. The onset of collectivization and rapid industrialization, further undermined regional identity.

During the Second World War, the Caucasus region again became a scene of military conflict. Following the 1942-3 German occupation, the Soviet  Ministry of Internal Affairs troops deported entire communities of Karachai, Ingush, Chechen and Balkar under terrible conditions to Soviet Central Asia  and Siberia as punishment for their alleged 'collaboration with the enemy'. The former republics of the deported peoples were dissolved and allocated to other North Caucasian republics or groups.42

In the 1970s and 1980s most educational institutions and all administration was Russianized. To some extent the degree of language and cultural development was again dependent on the hierarchy of ethnic groups established by the system of autonomous regions and republics. Ethnic groups which were minorities within these units stood even less chance of maintaining and developing their language and cultural institutions.

In autumn 1990, all autonomies in the North Caucasus declared themselves sovereign republics, claiming the same status as the Transcaucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This subsequently led to serious tensions between the central and regional authorities in Georgia and the Russian Federation over the legal and political status of these entities.

Post-1991

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia opted for the status of a nation state and abolished the status of autonomy for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This plunged the country into civil war. Russia converted all former Autonomous Republics and Districts into Federal Republics within the Russian Federation, eliminating their 'sovereign' status43 and reducing them to administrative units on a par with other Russian regions. This caused resentment, fears of further forced assimilation and of dominance from Moscow, leading, in some areas - such as Chechnia - to the declaration of independence (though not acknowledged by Moscow), armed opposition and civil war.44

Current issues

Political and constitutional arrangements

At present, the North Caucasus, as interpreted by the peoples themselves, consists of nine republics: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (not recognized) in Georgia, and Adygea, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnia, Ingushia, North Ossetia, and Dagestan in the Russian Federation. (See Table 2)

To date, both the Russian Federation and Georgia have failed to elaborate a constitutional framework and status for their North Caucasian territories, which takes into account the demands and needs of the region's peoples and establishes functioning centre-region relationships.

The new Russian constitution's claim for presidencies in republics, and the new Russian parliament's structure with single delegates from republics can tip internal balances within republics where more than one ethnic group share is in power. The problem is that Russia insists on the non-national and non-sovereign character of its republics, while simultaneously promoting a Russian nation state.45

Internal borders

Groups sharing power within one republic are increasingly challenging the status quo. Ingushia and Chechnia have already parted due to diverting policies and formed ethnically defined republics. Under certain circumstances similar solutions might be claimed or implemented in Karachai-Cherkessia and in Kabardino-Balkaria.46 Some, such as the Kumyk, the Lezgi and the Nogai, are claiming ethnically defined territories or at least wish to unite with their kin outside Dagestan. Also, some Cossacks claim the re-establishment of their former Terek Republic. Ossetes claim a reunion with their southern kin in Georgia.

Related to this is a trend towards uniting culturally related minorities in separate units. Balkars and Karachai, both living in republics with ethnically unrelated groups, have discussed the possibilities of uniting together. Kumyk have suggested a union of all Turkic-speaking peoples. Such a union could consist of Karachai, Balkar, Nogai and Kumyk. Also the reunion of all Cherkess peoples into one republic is a theoretical possibility. This would include the Cherkess proper, the Adygei, and the Kabard. Like ethnic republics, ethnic unions seem doomed unless peaceful solutions can be found in time.

International borders

With the recognition of the Russian Federation and of Georgia and Azerbaijan as separate and independent states, the North Caucasus has also become an international border area of renewed geopolitical interest. Therefore, Russia and Georgia (concerning the case of North and South Ossetia) and Russia and Azerbaijan (concerning the status of the Lezgi of Dagestan) need to include the North Caucasian peoples in any negotiations about current internal administrative arrangements and cross-border contacts.47

Any such attempt at reordering internal borders along ethnic lines, or even international borders (as in the case of the Ossetes), will have to resolve insurmountable territorial disputes, as the armed clashes between Ingushia and North Ossetia already show. All the territories are ethnically mixed, and territorial claims risk leading to war and regional destabilization.

Furthermore, there are many ethnically mixed families who would be victimized in the creation of ethnically homogeneous territories. A broader understanding of minority rights needs to be fostered to secure the peaceful coexistence of different communities.

Language, education & cultural rights

Many local languages have been preserved to a high degree in everyday oral communication. Today, most ethnic groups of the Northern Caucasus want to reinstall their own language in the official sphere. However, newspapers and magazines published in native languages have few readers, and it is becoming common to publish texts in Russian with native language headings.48

Economic difficulties

The North Caucasus is experiencing a similar fate to the rest of the former Soviet Union. Soviet-style centrally imposed economic development policies destroyed the traditional economies and made the area heavily dependent on central subsidies and imports from other regions. Today, it suffers severely from this legacy.

Some of the mountainous parts of the region, especially in North Ossetia, the Stavropol Province and Kabardino-Balkaria, were, prior to 1991, well-developed tourist resorts and spas, receiving visitors from all over the Soviet Union. They are now largely deserted, due to the overall economic situation, to armed conflicts in the region and to the general anti-Caucasian sentiment among Russians.

Unemployment is growing, and many Caucasians engage in petty trade. The new possibilities on the free market have also produced an emerging upper class, which is backed by the traditional Caucasian networks, which have a reputation of indulging in mafia activities. Land reform and privatization have led to heightened fears about the distribution of land, with many groups in the region now competing for resources

The legacy of the deportations

The deported peoples still live with the legacy of their forcible resettlement and the reallocation of their land has caused ongoing conflicts and mistrust between groups.49 Many of them feel that the truth about the deportations is still to be told and full rehabilitation is yet to take place.

Prejudice and mistrust

The Soviet legacy as well as historical experiences have contributed to creating 'ethno-national hierarchies'50 throughout the North Caucasus region. These hierarchies of prejudice are expressions of intermingled majority-minority relations. They add to the political and economic difficulties and are the focus of anxiety and discussions expressed in publications and declarations of national movements and organizations.

Prospects for the future

Currently, there are two main tendencies concerning political cooperation in the region.  First, the above-mentioned efforts to secure the rights of each group by linking ethnicity to a territory. Second, there is a trend to unite the region on the basis of historical regional cooperation.51 This trend is based on a common regional identity and is opposed to ethnic cleansing. It could be implemented peacefully, if the states in question were to respect the claims of the North Caucasians and would give all the necessary guarantees for independent development.

Recommended areas for policy action

i. Civil society and prevention of conflicts
The peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region with the participation of all parties involved is of prime importance. Efforts to secure the peaceful coexistence of all the peoples in the North Caucasus should be facilitated with the full and meaningful participation of all the different ethnic groups in the region. Immediate and remedial action to defuse existing tensions and to promote intercommunity cooperation and understanding should be taken at the local, national and international levels. Any peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities should be implemented in an impartial manner.

Dialogue should therefore be encouraged between the peoples. There is a positive role for NGOs to play here with their expertise in conflict resolution. In addition, the media and international organizations should seek information about the situation from unbiased sources, because most of the information is currently Moscow-based.

ii. Political confidence-building
Information on existing standards must be disseminated among all concerned parties. International documents concerning minority and indigenous rights, the convention against genocide, the rights of migrants, self-determination etc., should be translated into Russian and distributed directly to local authorities, NGOs, and the local media. Seminars on relevant international standards for minority and indigenous rights and self-determination should be held in the region, with the peoples concerned. Discussions on how the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and others can obtain reliable information on the situation of the minorities through their own channels should be held.

The OSCE could be involved to investigate prospects of mediating in these internal conflicts. Land claims ought to be investigated separately in each case. The High Commissioner on National Minorities could be asked to look into these claims (Ingush, Cossack, Osset, Aki-Chechen, Lak, Kumyk, Avar, etc.) as they either already are, or are liable to develop into, security risks. All involve resettlements or border changes. International organizations involved in the region should liaise not only with Moscow but also with the republics and peoples concerned, including minority groups.

iii. Rule of law and minority rights
Governmental programmes should be initiated to combat prejudice and discrimination and eliminate stereotyping and labelling in all official statements at all levels. The Russian Federation and the countries in the Transcaucasus should carefully implement the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965. It is part of the Soviet legacy that certain minorities are guaranteed specific rights within their 'own' republics but not outside it, e.g. Nogai outside Dagestan, Adygei and Cherkess outside their respective republics. In order to prevent mass migration to titular republics, it should be ensured that minority rights are included in the legislations of all republics and regions of the Federation and that these are implemented.  If minority rights are not met, conflicts will increase.

The rights of the different ethnic groups in the North Caucasus to their own culture, language and religion should be recognized and duly protected within the framework of national laws. The provisions of relevant international instruments which promote and protect such rights should be applied including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Cultural Minorities, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and on Civil and Political Rights.

iv. Promotion of identity
Research and documentation on the history of Caucasian peoples must be promoted. The most disastrous legacy from the Soviet period is the unwritten history of peoples and regions. Too many blanks in history create myths and unscientific claims. A history commission with the participation of international expertise should be established at a research institution in the Caucasus in order to compile an accurate and objective history of the peoples and the region. Anti-Caucasian sentiments in Russia need to be eliminated.52 These attitudes together with attempts at subduing Caucasian calls for autonomy, increase existing anti-Russian sentiments in the Caucasus.

Institutionalized research and development of the region's languages, (some of  which are threatened with extinction), and education programmes should be initiated and the possibilities of public funding investigated. Religion was subjugated during most of the Soviet period, and public life was standardized on Russian models. Russia, having formally accepted her multiculturalism, should consider the possibility of decentralizing decisions concerning religious and cultural values.

v. International and regional borders - a participatory approach
Agreements to identify and demarcate national and regional borders should be formulated in consultation with the communities concerned. Any such processes should be devised on the principle of equality and powersharing. Minority groups affected by new international borders should be included in all negotiations and their right to cross-border contact should be upheld (e.g. representatives of the Lezgi movement together with Dagestan, Azerbaijan and Russian Federation). International arbitration in solving armed conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia should include pressure on both countries to secure cultural and language rights for all minorities not only those directly involved in armed conflicts.

The North Caucasus is the area of greatest concentration of refugees and displaced persons of the entire Russian Federation. Prevention of discrimination and protection against mass expulsions should be included in the legislations of all republics and states of the former Soviet Union. Everything should be done to diminish military administration by the central government, as well as states of emergency.




vi. Rehabilitation of oppressed and deported peoples
The issues of expulsion, deportation and resettlement and the implications of today's expulsions as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and armed conflicts will have to be investigated in the long term, and the question of culpability established. The most urgent issue is the rehabilitation of the deported peoples. Effective measures should be taken to resolve any conflicts with particular emphasis on the unsettled land claims of the deportees. The Russian government should demonstrate that it is a new regime by taking up this investigation, identifying those responsible, and, where appropriate, prosecuting them.

An official committee for rehabilitation with the participation of international expertise (from the UN and independent researchers) including the Association of Repressed Peoples should be established. It should attempt to solve the consequences of the deportations, build up a documentation centre, and hold a public tribunal, among other activities.

vii. Economic measures
The use of blockades as an instrument of controlling minorities (Moscow's initial reaction to the Chechen opposition) should be prohibited and the redistribution of resources between the state and republics (minerals, power plants, harbour installations, etc.) should be considered. The international community can contribute towards securing a peaceful and durable solution to the conflicts in the region by providing the necessary financial and technical assistance to reinforce these proposals.



APPENDIX

Map: Ethnic composition of North Caucasian territorial entities The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads, MRG Report, 1994, pp. 24-5.

It is important to note that no map adequately reflects the ethnic and national complexity of this highly diverse region in Europe.

Table 1: The North Caucasian peoples and minorities in order of size The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads, MRG Report, 1994, p. 16.

Table 2: Territorial units The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads, MRG Report, 1994, p.14.

It should be noted that most of the data, is based on the 1989 Soviet census, which is not entirely reliable. Some populations have not been registered because they lack a residence permanent - the precondition for registration. Furthermore, there is a lack of reliable data taking into account recent political-constitutional-territorial changes and in-migrations of refugees from war zones or out-migrations of Russians and other people returning to their homelands. In particular, most of the South Ossetes are said to have sought refuge in North Ossetia after the war in their homeland, and virtually the entire Ingush population of North Ossetia has reportedly fled from persecution in Ingushia.

Table 2: The North Caucasian peoples and minorities in order of size - MRG Report p.16.

Table 1: The territorial units in the North Caucasus in alphabetical order - MRG Report p. 14.




Diversity




TABLE 1 The North Caucasian peoples and minorities in order of size53


Ethnic  Number in  Language Major  % of group
group  in region group  religion  resident in
        republic

CHECHEN 957,000  Caucasian Muslim  77 in Chechnia
AVAR  601,000  Caucasian Muslim  82 in Dagestan
OSSETES 598,000  Iranian  Christian/Muslim  67 in North and
          South Ossetia54
LEZGI  466,000  Caucasian Muslim  44 in Dagestan
        50 in Azerbaijan
KABARDS 391,000  Caucasian Muslim  93 in Kabardino-          Balkaria
DARGIN 365,000  Caucasian Muslim  77 in Dagestan
KUMYK 282,000  Turkic  Muslim  82 in Dagestan
INGUSH 273,000  Caucasian Muslim  71 in Ingushia55
KARACHAI 156,000  Turkic  Muslim  82 in Karachai-          Cherkessia
ADYGEI 125,000  Caucasian Muslim  76 in Adygea
LAK  118,000  Caucasian Muslim  77 in Dagestan
ABKHAZ 105,000  Caucasian Muslim/Christian  85 in Abkhazia
TABASARAN    98,000  Caucasian Muslim  78 in Dagestan
BALKAR  85,000  Turkic  Muslim  89 in Kabardino-          Balkaria
NOGAI      75,000  Turkic  Muslim  37 in Dagestan
        18 in Kabardino-          Balkaria
ABAZA      33,000  Caucasian Muslim  88 in Karachai-          Cherkessia
RUTUL      20,000  Caucasian Muslim  72 in Dagestan
TSAKHUR  20,000  Caucasian Muslim  26 in Dagestan
        65 in Azerbaijan
AGUL    19,000  Caucasian Muslim  69 in Dagestan
MOUNTAIN JEWS18,000 Iranian  Mosaic  50 in Kabardino-          Balkaria
        20 in Dagestan56





TABLE 2 The territorial units in the North Caucasus in alphabetical order




Name of unit  Size in km2 Inhabitants57 Capital Major groups in          %

ABKHAZIA58 8,600    524,000 Sukhum  Georgians: 46, Abkhaz: 17,          Armenians: 15, Russians: 14

ADYGEA 7,600    432,000 Maikop  Adygei: 22, Russians: 68

CHECHENO 19,300  1,271,000 Grozny  Chechen: 58, Russians: 23, INGUSHIA59      Ingush: 13

DAGESTAN 50,300  1,802,000 Makhachkala Avar: 28, Dargin: 16, Kumyk:          13, Lezgi: 11, Russians: 9,          Lak: 5

KABARDINO 12,500    754,000 Nalchik  Kabard: 48, Russians: 32,
BALKARIA        Balkar: 10

KALMYKIA 75,900    323,000 Elista  Kalmyk: 45, Russians: 38,          Dargin: 4

KARACHAI 14,100    415,000 Cherkessk Russians: 42, Karachai: 31, CHERKESSIA      Cherkess: 10, Abaza: 7

NORTH  8,000    632,000 Vladikavkaz Ossetes: 53, Russians: 30
OSSETIA60      Ingush: 5

SOUTH    3,900      99,000 Tskhinval Ossetes: 66, Georgians: 29
OSSETIA61           




V. THE TURKS OF BULGARIA - A previously persecuted minority

The country and its people

Bulgaria is in south-eastern Europe and lies on the eastern side of the Balkan peninsula. It is bordered by Romania to the north, by Serbia and Macedonia to the west, and by Greece and Turkey to the south. (See Map 1)

The Bulgarians, who are a Slavonic people, established an empire in the Balkans in the ninth and tenth centuries, and were converted to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The Bulgarian state was overrun by the Turks at the end of the fourteenth century and remained a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878, when it was recognized as an autonomous principality. In 1908, Bulgaria achieved full independence as a sovereign kingdom. After the Second World War, it was taken over by the communists who retained power until November 1989. Since then, Bulgaria has moved towards political pluralism, liberal democracy and a market economy.

The ethnic Turks

Ethnic Turks have lived in Bulgaria since the time of the Ottoman Turkish conquests. After the collapse of Ottoman rule, many Turks remained, most living in compact communities in the south and north-east of the country. (See Map 2) According to the 1992 census, there were 800,052 Turks in Bulgaria, constituting 9.43 per cent of the total population, most of whom lived in the countryside. (See Tables 1 and 2)

The majority of ethnic Turks are Muslims, apart from a few thousand Eastern Orthodox Christians. Religious observance is higher among the ethnic Turks than among Slav Bulgarians.

Historical background

During the five centuries of Ottoman rule, the population of Bulgaria became increasingly heterogeneous, and remains so. According to the 1992 census in Bulgaria, 85.7 per cent of the 8.5 million inhabitants are ethnic Bulgarians, 9.4 per cent (i.e. 800,000 individuals) are Bulgarian Turks, 3.7 per cent  (i.e. 313,000 individuals) are Roma and 1.3 per cent (i.e. 103,000 individuals) represent the remaining smaller ethnic groups (Russians, Armenians, Macedonians, Wallachians, Karakachans, Greeks, Jews).62

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Bulgarian government made several attempts to convert the non-Christian population. Throughout the interwar period, the government pursued a policy of neglect towards the minorities. A survey conducted in 1946 revealed that about half of the Turkish population did not understand Bulgarian.63

Communist Bulgaria

Attitude towards ethnic Turks 1945-58

Initially, the communist regime respected Turkish-language culture and education, and its main endeavour was to make Turkish students fluent in Bulgarian. Much progress was achieved, but knowledge of Bulgarian tended to remain poor among Turkish children, especially due to inadequate provisions in the schooling system. As a consequence their education facilities and opportunities did not match those of the majority. This severely affected their full integration into the educational, economic and cultural life of the country.64  That situation encouraged an exodus of the Turk population in the years 1950-51.

Forced assimilation 1958-89

Assimilation policy65 began to seriously affect Turks in 1958 when Turkish-language schools began to be merged with Bulgarian-language ones. Under the declared policy of making Bulgaria a 'unified socialist nation', the policy of  unification of Bulgarian society was stepped up.

This culminated in the events of late 1984 and early 1985, when the Bulgarian authorities conducted a country wide campaign to forcibly assimilate the entire Turkish minority, estimated at 900,000 or 10 per cent of the population at the time.  People were forced, often at gunpoint, to change their names from Turkish/Islamic ones to those deemed more 'Bulgarian'. Newspapers and magazines intended for Turks appeared only in Bulgarian. Bans were imposed on Muslim religious practices, mosques were shut and fines were imposed on the speaking of Turkish in public places. Resistance led to dismissal from employment, arrests and killings. The authorities denied the very existence of the Turkish minority.66

The assimilation policy created fear, suspicion and alienation between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks. For the sake of the 'preservation of Bulgarian national interest and the unity of the country'- as the communist propaganda impressed on them - there was little protest by Bulgarians against the campaign of forcible re-naming of Bulgarian Turks.

Repression of peaceful mass protest, mass expulsions and mass emigration 1989-90

Until 1989, the situation was one of small scale sporadic protest due to a largely passive acceptance of the status quo by the ethnic Turkish population. But in early 1989, large numbers of Turks participated in various unofficial protest groups and mass protests on a country-wide basis.67 These were countered by violent police actions and by the expulsion of Turkish leaders to Turkey and other countries. This resulted in a huge emigration of Turks from June 1989 onwards, with many leaving 'voluntarily' due to the threat of imprisonment or other threats to themselves or their families.68 By the end of August 1989, about 350,000 Turks had left Bulgaria. However, by January 1990, after political and legal changes restoring the civil, political, social and economic rights of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, about 130,000 had returned.69

Most Turkish emigrants had suffered considerable losses and thousands of Turks remained unemployed after their return to Bulgaria. The most serious consequence for the community was that most of the Turkish intelligentsia and highly skilled Turks had left for Turkey and did not return.

Post-1989 democratic Bulgaria

The restoration of minority rights and the rebuilding of inter-ethnic relations

Immediately after the fall of the communist regime in November 1989, Turkish and other minorities' rights started to be restored.70  On 29 December 1989, a Decree by the State Council and the Council of Minister recommended that Turks be given the right 'to choose their own names, practise Islam, observe traditional customs and speak Turkish in everyday life'. In March 1990, the Names of Bulgarian Citizens Act was passed by the National Assembly, reinstating the right of all Muslims to choose their own names through a cumbersome court procedure. In November 1990,  an easier administrative procedure was set-up. Legislation passed between 1990 and 1992 facilitated the return of property to Turks who had left the country in 198971 and allowed the teaching of Turkish in schools as an extracurricular subject.

At present, over 920 mosques are active in Bulgaria, copies of the Koran are freely available, as is religious instruction in the mosques. Turkish-language newspapers and magazines have resumed publication and national radio broadcast programmes in Turkish - although very early in the morning and only two or three times per week. However, there are no special Turkish-language programmes on Bulgarian television.72 

In 1995, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which represents predominantly  the interests of the Turkish community, was the fourth largest political party in Bulgaria. Furthermore, various groups have been built up in state institutions to direct state policy towards consideration of the interests of the various minority communities.73  Additionally, some local municipalities with mixed populations have experts on ethnic problems who assist, inform and consult the local authorities in aligning local policy with the interests of various ethnic groups.

Integration of the Bulgarian Turks in Bulgarian political life

After 1989, the role of Bulgarian Turks and Muslims was considerably altered, as they were increasingly recruited into government and state services including the police force.74

Current issues

In the last six years, Bulgaria has achieved considerable success in the restoration of the fundamental rights of the Bulgarian Turks. However, these democratic conditions begin to waver in conditions of deepening economic crisis.

The 1991 Bulgarian Constitution

The 1991 Bulgarian Constitution75  has done a lot to restore the civil and political rights for members of minorities. However, improvements have been secured for minorities principally in the field of individual rather than collective rights. Ambivalence remains in particular regarding the recognition and guarantee of the rights of individuals belonging to minorities to preserve and develop their culture - although the existence of minorities is recognized by the Constitution. Article 6 declares the principles of equality and non-discrimination, but unfortunately, the principle of non-discrimination is not carried through consistently. For example, Article 11 states that 'political parties may not be founded on ethnic, racial or religious bases'. Enforcement of this provision led to the disqualification of several minority parties from participation in the electoral process.76
Educational, cultural and religious rights

The 1991 Law on Public Education allowing teaching of minority-languages in schools has not been implemented evenly. Teaching of the mother-tongue has not been established for Turks except as an extra-curricular activity amounting to four hours of tuition per week.

There are no barriers to cultural life. However, such activities are not financed by the state, and it seems unlikely that the state will be in a position to do so in the near future, as its financial resources are very limited.

According to the Citizens for Religious Tolerance Project, an independent human rights group, four types of violations of the right to religious freedom occur, including interference of the executive power in the internal life of religious communities which has particularly affected the Muslim community. Other violations include employment discrimination on religious grounds, intensification of the criminal persecution of conscientious objectors, withdrawal of parents rights on religious grounds.77

Economic situation

The difficult economic situation in Bulgaria has been further aggravated by the imposition of the trade embargo on the former Yugoslavia. This law severely restricted access to Bulgaria's traditional markets and access to Western markets remains difficult.

In today's Bulgaria, most Turks, Tatars and Gagaouzi, live in the countryside - in contrast to the majority of Bulgarians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks and Russians, who live in the towns. This has a considerable influence on their way of life, on work opportunities in conditions of growing unemployment, on access to better educational and cultural institutions, on the possibilities of receiving fast and efficient medical assistance, and on the building of infrastructures and access to various services. In this respect, the rural population in Bulgaria is severely disadvantaged. To a great extent, variations in competitiveness in the labour market among members of the various communities result from socially and culturally conditioned divergences in education, qualifications etc.

Before the current unemployment boom, this was known as the 'regional and ethnic division of labour'. It conditions to a large extent the current disproportionately high unemployment rates among specific groups - in particular, the Turkish and Bulgarian populations of the Rhodopes and the Roma population in the whole country. According to 1992 census data, 14.4 per cent of Bulgarians are unemployed, as opposed to 25.2 per cent of Turks.78  This has already led ethnic Turks to emigrate to Turkey.

All these factors cause new waves of migrations of Bulgarian Turks to Greece and Turkey, primarily for economic reasons.79  One possible way out of these difficulties would be to draw up a state programme of regional economic development, directed at the depressed mountain and hill regions where a significant number of the Bulgarian Turks are concentrated. (See Map 2 - encircled areas).

Land ownership and agrarian reform

Tensions have already arisen in connection with agrarian reform policies and privatization.

Difficulties in rebuilding inter-ethnic relations

The reinstatement of fundamental minority rights is contributing to the building of trust between the two largest ethnic communities in the country i.e. Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks. However, this process is beset with difficulties. Many links between the two communities seem to have been severed by the communist regime's policies of assimilation and political manipulation. Nationalist feelings, both among the majority and the Bulgarian Turks, hinder the normalization of mutual relations and periodically aggravate the political climate in the country. For example, a section of ethnic Bulgarians have perceived the post-1989 recruitment of  Bulgarian Turks into some important government posts as a threat to their interests. Over the past six years, some of the main political parties, especially the Bulgarian Socialist Party, have adopted ad hoc policies with the help of nationalist rhetoric and actions. In this respect, the fear of the Yugoslav war spreading to the east and to Bulgaria has been used by such irresponsible political forces and sections of the media to arouse new suspicions towards minorities, in particular, towards the Bulgarian Turks and Muslims (Pomaks).

An additional source for potential inter-ethnic tension, which was exploited in the past, concerns the demographic characteristics of the various ethnic communities in the country which differ considerably (See Table 3). The higher birth-rate among Bulgarian Turks, the growth in the relative proportions of Turks in some communities, reinforced by the migration of Bulgarians previously living there, and the tendency towards a continual fall in the birth-rate among Bulgarians are often interpreted as a 'demographic invasion by minorities'. This argument, is currently being abused for political reasons by populist forces who benefit from increased public fear and hostility towards the largest minority groups - the Turks and the Roma.

Recommended areas for policy action

i. Civil society
Constructive and continuous dialogue among the communities concerned should be facilitated and strengthened. This may require the allocation of the necessary financial and technical resources to the most deprived groups.  The international community has an important role in monitoring the progress of this dialogue.

Minority questions should be addressed with openness.  There can be no shying away from discussion and practical action. 

Reliable and objective information about the different minorities should be made available to the public to enhance the spirit of tolerance within Bulgarian society.

ii. Political confidence-building
There is a need for a coherent policy for the preservation and reinforcement of ethnic peace in Bulgaria and the non-admission of  political manipulation on minority rights. In line with this is the consistent development of practical measures on the part of the executive authorities to ensure the continuation of the policy for the creation of equal conditions and real equality between minority representatives and the representatives of the majority.

iii. Rule of law and minority rights
Efforts are needed to further adapt the Bulgarian legislature to the international human and minority rights instruments (ICCPR, ICESCR) both in terms of  legal norms and practical actions by the State. The hope remains that the Constitution will be seen as a continuing process which will evolve with future Constitutional Court rulings.

Solutions to certain regional problems, for example, the Macedonian question in Bulgaria, may be found by placing such problems in the context of respect for human rights rather than as a question of regionalism.
The question of freedom of thought, conscience and religion was still a contentious one in 1994.  Any new legislation must ensure compliance with international law. But prior to that, social conflicts arising from the activities of non-traditional beliefs and negative public opinion must be forcefully addressed both by the legislative and executive authorities.

iv. Participation of minority groups in Parliament 
Ensuring that representatives of the various minority groups have access to Parliament, will help them to make sure that their specific interests can be effectively upheld in the framework of the wider national interest. In this context, the current constitutional ban on political parties formed on an ethnic basis would have to be reviewed. Furthermore, it would be seen as a positive step by the representatives of the legislative and executive authorities to meet representatives of the minority communities periodically.




v. Economic situation
A truly rational state policy would have to be turned towards active regulation of the economic processes at work in the depressed high mountain and border region of Bulgaria. A state programme of regional economic development directed at these regions, where a significant part of the Bulgarian Turks are concentrated, should be drawn up.

Such a programme would have to apply to several deprived regions where minorities are concentrated.  It would enhance both the feelings of social perspective among the local population and its rapprochement to the Bulgarian state.  It has to develop in parallel to a higher level of tolerance in the Bulgarian public.

Donors, including the European Union, should encourage the government to implement an equal opportunities policies for members of minorities. At the same time, it should open its market to Bulgarian goods so that it can boost the deteriorating economic condition and the fall in production observed since 1989.

vi. Education and culture
Efforts should be made to support the schooling system and allow for education both in minority and Bulgarian languages as well as promote the identity of minorities. Minorities' cultural and educational activities need financial support so that they can maintain their special traditions and their national self-awareness.

Support should be granted to the minority press. Minority groups should have greater access to radio and television.

APPENDIX

Map 1: Bulgaria in Europe (Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, MRG Report, 1993, pp. 26-27)

Map 2: The location of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria

Tables from Minority Groups in Bulgaria in a Human Rights Context, 1994.
NB The figures are quoted directly from the December 1992 Census.

Table 1: The population of Bulgaria according to ethnic group and religion (p. 7)

Table 2: The population according to living environment and ethnic group (p. 8)

Table 3: The population according to age and ethnic group (p. 8)

Table 4: Educational structure of the economically active population of the largest ethnic groups (p. 22)


Table 1. The population according to ethnic group and religion.
Ethnic Group    Religion
  Christians  Muslims  Others
Overall    87  %    12.7%      0.2%
Bulgarian  98  %      2.0%      0.1%
Turkish      1.1%    98.8%      0.1%
Gypsy  60.4%    39.2%      0.3%
Other  71.8%    11.4%    16.8%


Table 2: The population according to living environment and ethnic group
Living  Ethnic Group
Environment 
  Bulgarian Turkish  Gypsy  Armenian Jewish
Urban  72%  32%  52%  99%  95%
Rural  28%  68%  48%    1%    5%


Table 3: The population according to age and ethnic group
Age  Ethnic Group
  Bulgarian Turkish Gypsy  Other
0-29 yrs 36.3%  51.4%  66.0%  38.7%
30-59 yrs 40.5%  37.0%  28.9%  44.1%
60 yrs + 22.2%  11.6%    5.1%  17.2%


Table 4: Educational structure of the economically active population of the largest ethnic groups

Education    Ethnic Group
  Bulgarian  Turkish  Gypsy
Higher and College  20.2%        2.0%    0.9%
Secondary and
Special Secondary  54.0%    24.6%    7.8%
Middle    22.6%    55.0%  46.2%
Primary and Lower    3.0%      16.0%  36.7%
Illiterate      0.2%      2.3%    8.5%




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The OSCE agreements and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities provide clear political explanations of why it is essential to protect and promote the rights of minorities. History has shown that the peace, stability and security of Europe is inextricably linked to the protection and promotion of the rights of minorities. For those who argue that we have come to 'the end of history', the situation in the former Soviet Union should be studied closely along with the return of  'reformed' politicians in Eastern Europe. To adapt Henry Ford, 'the end of history is bunk'. There is much that we should and must learn from history.

The failure to learn from history may have much wider ramifications than the danger of violent conflicts such as former Yugoslavia, where millions of people have been displaced, hundreds of thousands have been killed or wounded and acute tensions still exist. A siege mentality is developing throughout Western Europe towards asylum seekers, while refugee determination procedures in industrialized countries are reported as costing over $8 billion per annum. There is a real danger that the expansion of the European Union will be delayed or halted, while economic investment and development is always hampered by political instability.

Furthermore, the protection of vulnerable groups says much about the kind of civilization that may be fostered in the new Europe of the 21st century. Irrespective of the dangers of violent conflict, what kind of  social landscape will be inherited by the next generation in twenty  years time? Is there a desire to create a Europe based on social justice, equal opportunities, the liberation of talents and the full participation of all citizens of Europe? Or is there the desire to stay uninvolved, to allow the strong to inherit any 'democratic' society, to pass by on the other side as the vulnerable minorities are marginalized socially and economically and as some communities live in cultural and political despair?

This paper presumes that the Human Rights Advisory Committee is looking for a proactive and positive response in order to promote the rights of all communities and to promote cooperation between communities. The five scripts on minorities in Central and Eastern Europe are all very different, edited from research by different authors examining the situation of minorities in quite different States or groups of States.

What is remarkable about the recommendations is the coherence between the sets of recommendations even though they have been phrased in different ways in the original research publications for MRG. Not all the following recommendations appear in each of the five situations examined, but each one is repeated in several of the studies providing the basis of a framework for a constructive policy response.

i. Civil society

The construction and reinforcement of civil society is crucial in its own right, it advances the participation of citizens in their own society; but also guarantees the democratic rights of all citizens and all communities. A vibrant civil society not only breaks down the monopoly of the central state, but also exposes politicians and administrators to a critical review of their actions, and renders them accountable to public opinion. The role of the free press and media is crucial, though it too must have codes of practice and accept international human rights norms, including resistance towards incitement to racial or ethnic hatred. Access to the media remains a contested issue in a number of countries. Minorities often complain that their voice is rarely heard, while broadcasting in minority languages on radio and television is usually disproportionately low.

Article XIX, a human rights NGO, based in London, demonstrated clearly how state controlled television and radio were used to incite inter-ethnic hatred in former Yugoslavia, both before and during the war.

A vibrant civil society enables people to express the richness of their various identities, enabling any one national or ethnic identity to be one of many and making the likelihood of a single overriding identity less likely. It also reduces the scope for political demagogues to provoke inter-ethnic tensions.

Strong encouragement should be given to promoting diverse civil societies. This is a long term gradual process that needs to be nurtured and supported over decades and not just over one or two years. Long term funding by international donors can play a critical role alongside sharing of experiences between NGOs, the media and key elements in civil society in mature democracies. The sharing of experience and the reinforcement of issues by those working on multicultural issues is a crucial ingredient.

ii. Political confidence

The fear of the unknown can easily be exploited by politicians to build up an ethnic or national base and a position of power. Some of these fears are understandable at times of transition, when States and Nations lack self confidence and when historical persecution has not been exorcized.

Unambiguous political statements of support are needed by governments for the rights of all communities and of minority rights in particular.

Minority communities should be explicit in showing that claims for devolution or autonomy are within their acceptance of being citizens and supporters of the wider State. Neighbouring States must be seen to harbour no desire to support irredentism.

The international community has many political opportunities to commend and support positive measures and to criticise and retarget resources,where there are negative approaches.
It should be abhorrent to any democracy that funding (nd therefore substantial support) should be given without constraints to undemocratic or ethnically prejudiced governments. Funding can be channelled to NGOs or rechannelled as incentives to governments, which adopt democratic and pluralist programmes.

Bodies such as the Inter Parliamentary Union and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly should be supported in playing a key role in encouraging and promoting good codes of practice amongst parliamentarians.

International standards on human rights and on minority rights should be translated and disseminated widely through information and training programmes involving NGOs.

Information on the relevant international monitoring mechanisms should be made well known and NGOs should be ensured effective access.

Full support should be given to establishing a strong, open, transparent mechanism for monitoring the observance of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities. The expert advice to the Council of Ministers should be provided by independent experts of repute.

Governments which are are concerned about  minority issues should ensure that they are presented at a senior level at the new UN Working Group on Minorities. Funding should be set aside to facilitate the attendance of minorities at this five day meeting in Geneva.

iii. Rule of law and minority rights

It is essential that constitutions, laws, policies and practices within States conform to the agreed international human rights standards. These include the OSCE standards (especially Copenhagen), the UN Declaration on the Rights of ......Minorities and the new Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities.

Training programmes and technical assistance are needed to help explain and implement these minority standards within domestic legislation, while it is crucial that independent monitoring bodies should exist.

Ombudsmen, scholars and specialist NGOs, should be given resources to explore how far these standards have been implemented and what more needs to be done.

Constitutional provisions and laws on their own are not sufficient. It is crucial that there is sufficient understanding, goodwill and resources to implement these at different levels of society through officials and the wider public.

In the past, international human rights standards have often been treated as a State secret.
Any bilateral or multilateral aid or loan activity must be conditional on the implementation of these standards with their own in-built minority needs assessment and monitoring component, which should be insisted upon through contract compliance. Article 5 of the UN Declaration is particularly relevant here.

Asylum applications must be judged on the merits of whether a person has a well founded fear of persecution, their ethnicity may be a contributory factor in this, but generalizations should be avoided.




iv. Promotion of identity

All minority communities have the right to choose their own identity and under no circumstances can the changing of  collective or individual names be imposed on communities or upon individuals. Cultural diversity should be celebrated within European states which are, de facto, multicultural in their composition. This celebration should be shared within and between communities, but needs a careful approach to avoid any impression of cultural supremacy and to encourage inter-community confidence.

Substantial  efforts should be made to protect and promote minority cultures with resources for mother tongue education, cultural associations and cultural events in an equivalent way to such provisions for the dominant community and culture.

Minorities should wherever reasonably possible have the opportunity to conduct their relations with officials in their mother tongue, while reasonable and proportionate access should be given to minorities to use the media especially radio and television.

Research and documentation on minority communities and their languages should be financed and promoted. This is an obvious task for involving academics and NGOs. Experiences should be shared on how this has been accomplished successfully.

v. Participation

Encouragement should be given to minorities to participate in their own organisations, but also within the wider civic and civil society. This can range from measures to devolve power to geographic regions, or functional, non-geographic devolution to cultural entities. Regional devolution, or to local governments will always require balances and checks which include a sensitivity to the new numerical minority in these new areas of government. Their rights must also be protected. Other forms of participation include providing constitutional frameworks to ensure that minorities participate in parliament.

The culture of pluralism where multi-ethnic coalitions are formed, even though not essential for a government to gain a parliamentary majority, should be encouraged. The political competition on ethnic ground is understandable and should not be prevented, but in the long-run politics should not be polarized on grounds of ethnicity, especially where the winner, the majority, takes all. Forms of compromise and negotiation are essential. One forum is the minority round table, though there is the danger of tokenism and a lack of power sharing.

Participation must also include the participation of minorities in the instruments of central and local government including their role as employees, e.g. policemen, court officials, lawyers, judges, teachers, civil servants. Their participation should be measured, monitored and encouraged through special training programmes.

Any programme designed to benefit minorities or the area in which they live must involve them effectively in planning, implementation and evaluation. Schemes should be with and for minorities. A similar policy is essential when the geographic areas of government change, or where population movements take place. Minority communities must be consulted and involved if tensions and accusations of democratic manipulation are to be avoided.

vi. Citizenship and residence

The creation of new States in Eastern Europe and the rediscovery of identities has lead to major tension over who are citizens and who have the rights of citizenship. In the former Soviet Union, tensions are particularly high where it is understandably believed that populations were induced or coerced to move as part of a wider political plan to change the demography. The same was also true in Bulgaria. Basic human rights principles should be applied for each individual, who should not bear the collective guilt and punishment for the behaviour of governments decades ago. Statehood should be built on civic and not ethnic concepts.

There are acute problems for the Roma and deported peoples who have lost their land. Resources from the international community can play an important role in helping people rebuild their lives and livelihood.

vii. Employment and the economy

The economic instability with the substantial decline in real income in countries such as Bulgaria invariably leads to heightened social tensions. The structural adjustment policies and the free market economy have led members of minority communities who were dependent on benefits, such as the Roma, to be particularly exposed. This has particularly affected some Roma children whose parents can no longer afford the modest costs of school equipment or lunches. Basic child benefits are essential for the poorest. Further research is needed to see whether other forms of special funding are needed to protect other vulnerable groups (e.g. disabled, elderly) within the Roma and other marginalised minorities.

Special employment and retraining programmes are needed so that the most vulnerable can be competitive within the job market. These need to be in-built within the economic reform programmes.

Special programmes should be aimed at the poorest areas which have the highest levels of unemployment. The schemes should benefit minorities and majorities alike in these areas.

Every effort must be made to tackle discriminatory employment practices. In the long term, they can destroy the morale  of minority communities and their confidence in the State. The discrimination may on occasions be overt often it is discrete, but with determination it can be clearly measured and is well known  to minority communities.

It is crucial that all  programmes, especially the large  PHARE and TACIS, insist on ensuring that recipient State programmes are transparent and have in-built equal opportunities monitoring with independent external inspection and public disclosure of information.

Non-discrimination is a fundamental human right agreed by all OSCE and Council of Europe states including the European Union, who must not tacitly endorse or turn a blind eye to either hidden or overt discrimination. 

viii. Education

The future of multicultural Europe and of a vibrant civil society will to a large extent depend on the formal and informal education which children receive. This will emerge from the values being upheld in wider society, in the ethos and approach to multicultural education, in development of an appreciation of tolerance and difference as well as a critical approach to the teaching of history and other related subjects.

Within the school curriculum and in society more widely, resources are needed to foster understanding and respect for different cultures. Attention should be paid to human rights education which in the longer term will help to ensure a vibrant civic society.

The importance of  primary education in mother tongue cannot be over stated, while minorities must have an opportunity to learn the official state language so that they can participate fully in the whole of society. It is crucial to have sufficient bilingual teachers and bilingual government officials to make this a success.

In principle, and where possible, secondary and university level courses should be made available in minority languages. Practical considerations such as numbers, costs and materials will often make this problematic. Nevertheless, good teachers are required to work with the minority community while bilingualism of the majority community should be encouraged with resources and additional job opportunities.

Various ways of bringing children together, while promoting different identities is a difficult and sometimes misunderstood challenge. However, the right balance is essential to avoid the dangers inherent in either an integrationist approach or in separate development. History has shown that both these approaches can have disastrous consequences.